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Abstract 
Contemporary global state of affairs is faced with one of the most malicious phenomenon’s that has 
evolved over time but at a pace incomparable to its present outlook. Transnational terrorism and the 
war against it have come to define the age in which we live. The threat of terrorist attacks and the 
measures taken by governments around the world to prevent such atrocities are now part of our daily 
lives. Terrorism has been occurring for many centuries, however the twenty first century has witnessed 
the most brutal and deadliest acts of transnational terrorism ever recorded in history. Transnational 
terrorism is affecting all corners of the world and hardly a day passes without any acts of terrorism 
being reported in the media, from the United States of America to Australia, from Kenya to France, 
from Indonesia to Afghanistan and from the Middle East to West Africa. Terrorism is everywhere and 
it seeks to redefine the international state system, the legitimacy of sovereign states to protect their 
citizens and to introduce new legal norms governing the behavior of states. 
In Africa terrorism is a recently new phenomenon but it has made it existence felt on the security and 
stability of the continent, owing largely to other pressing factors that when combined threatens the 
security and stability of Africa, thus making it difficult for the continent to develop and advance its 
socio-economic and political objectives. Africa has witnessed some of the most horrifying acts of 
transnational terrorism from the Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria, Chad and Cameroun to Al-
Shabaab attacks in Kenya. Also from al-Qaeda attacks in Somalia to the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) attacks in Tunisia. Africa’s security and stability are being seriously threatened by 
transnational terrorism and collective policy responses from all levels of analysis by all actors of 
international politics appears the only remedy against this phenomenon. With this in mind, this study 
seeks to examine the historical evolution of transnational terrorism in Africa. It also tries to assess the 
causes and policy responses made by both African and international state and non-state actors against 
the menace of transnational terrorism. The research uses Kenya as a case study to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the threat and collective policy responses to transnational terrorism. Finally, it assesses the 
implications of transnational terrorism on Africa’s security and stability and concludes with 
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                                                       Conceptual Explication 
Below is a brief analysis of the concepts that are essential to understanding the objectives and key 
questions of this study. The topic was chosen on the grounds that it provides concepts that are necessary 
for assessing responses by policy makers to threats of transnational terrorism in a world that is 
universalized and contains states and non-state actors as agents of international political interaction. 
1. Levels of Analysis 
According to Goldstein (1994:12), a level of analysis refers to a perspective on international relations 
that is based on a set of similar actors or processes that suggest possible explanations to the “why’’ 
questions. In essence, a level of analysis enables researchers to trace changes in world politics to 
different groups of actors as well as to their various activities and attributes. 
2. The International State System 
The International State System is widely understood as a system of states, each of which claims control 
within its boundaries and acts to maintain that control domestically and internationally (Coplin, 1980). 
Others define it as patterns and processes of interaction between and among units in a structured and 
arranged space (Buzan and Little, 2000). 
3. International Stability 
By International stability scholars imply the preservation of the number and identity of states, 
independent of external or internal changes in these states such as war (Saperstein, 1992:518). 
4. Stability 
Stability in the international state system refers to the absence of wars, meaning the lack of violent 
conflict (Russet and Starr, 1989:106). However, it should be noted that this definition is somehow 
different from the notion of some prominent political theorists, for whom stability is the maintenance 
of the structure of the system (Saperstein, 1992:519). 
5. States and other Actors of International Relations 
The state refers to a large social system with a set of rules that are enforced by a permanent 
administrative body (the government). That body claims and tries to enforce sovereignty, in other words 
the state claims to be the highest source of decision-making of the social system within its jurisdiction, 
and it rejects external interference in making or enforcing its set of rules (Hobson, 2000: 2). 
For realists, states are the main actors of international relations (Slaughter, 2011). Moreover, realists 
view world politics as driven by competitive self-interested actors. In this way, realists argue that the 
dynamics among states is a struggle for power in an effort by each to preserve or preferably improve its 
military security and economic welfare in competition with other countries. Realists perceive this 
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struggle for power as a zero-sum game, one in which a gain made by one country is inevitably equivalent 
to a loss for others. Realists are also prone to seeing humanity as inherently divided by national loyalty 
to one’s country or some other focus of political identity such as religion or culture (Rourke, 2007:20). 
Additionally, realists emphasize what separates political entities and people. They see the international 
system as the starting point of analysis, while factors at the unit or state-societal level of analysis are of 
secondary importance. Realists are also interested in power and the balance of power, which they use 
as explanations of political and economic completion, war and other conflicts that are so widespread in 
international relations (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012:127). 
The liberal perspective by contrast, views the international system as a large, seemingly all-inclusive 
paradigm, where there are not just states but also international governmental organizations (IGO)’s, and 
non-governmental organizations (NGO)’s forming part of a cross cutting network of important actors 
in the conduct of international politics (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012:127). 
6. Actors in International Relations 
International politics is often viewed as a game or a play involving actors. The concept of actors is used 
by scholars to describe a participant or player in global politics. There are two kinds of actors in the 
world of international relations these are states and non-state actors. In this game or play there are main 
actors who exercise considerable influence in the international system and there are others whose role 
or influence is minimal (Young, 1972:140). 
Actor refers to any entity which plays an identifiable role in international relations. This entity could be 
an individual, a group of people (acting as a unit), an organization or a state entity (Evans and Newnham, 
1990:6). 
By definition, governments of sovereign state are the actors in international politics. However, in reality, 
the international system is crowded with non-state actors who participate with or without the consent 
of state actors in international interactions. These non-state actors include international governmental 
organizations (IGO)’s like the United Nations, African Union etc., non-governmental organizations 
(NGO)’s like World Vision, Amnesty International etc., transnational corporations (TNC)’s like Coca 
Cola, Mc Donald, BP etc., groups that can be religious, environmental, political and revolutionary like 
al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab etc. and individuals like Osama bin Laden (Uzodike, 2010: 16). 
7. Militarization of Africa 
One of the consequences of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States is the renewed global 
concern about transnational terrorism (Cassese, 1989; Han, 1993 and Elagab, 1999). Scholars argue that 
since that date, the US government has embarked on the so-called “Global War on Terror`` (GWOT). 
This has involved attacks on countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, which resulted not only in the change 
of regimes in those countries but also in massive violations of rights of individuals suspected of being 
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terrorists by the Bush Administration and also in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians (Lumina, 
2008:181). Accordingly, in the aftermath of such attacks governments around the world rushed to enact 
anti-terrorism legislations. 
In Africa, the GWOT has led to an increase in aid and militarization of the continent by the United 
States government, in an effort to equip African countries so that they can respond well to threats 
emanating from transnational terrorism. Hence, scholars assert that the tempo of American involvement 
in Africa has increased. For instance, in January 2007, American AC 130 gunships blasted suspected 
al-Qaeda hideouts in Somalia. The following month, Washington announced the creation of a dedicated 
African military command, the AFRICOM, in the fight against transnational terrorism (Mills and 
Herbst, 2007:40). 
Furthermore, scholars argue that the United States continues to provide military support to African 
states as a response to transnational terror threats, and this increasing militarization has implications for 
the region’s stability and security because more and more weapons are becoming available and are 
happening to reach wrong hands in some countries. This as a result, has led to the proliferation of 
weaponry and trade in arms with profiteers now finding grounds in many African states (Bamidele, 
2014:2). 
8. States 
States exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to citizens living 
within designated parameters or borders. Modern states focus and answer the concerns and demands of 
citizenries. They organize and channel the interests of their people, often but not exclusively in 
maintenance of national goals and values (Rotberg, 2003:2). 
9. Failed States 
These are states in which government legitimate authority has collapsed, violence has become endemic 
and in which functional governance has ceased to exist (Dempsey, 2006:1). 
10. Weak States 
Weak states include a broad assortment of states that are essentially weak because of geographical, 
physical, or fundamental economic constraints. They are basically strong, but weak because of certain 
temporary or situational developments such as internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, 
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11. Religious Extremism 
Religious extremism is an impulse or an orientation which, when objectified in persons or institutions 
becomes invariably diluted. It means more and more people are behaving in a religiously extreme 
manner (Liebman, 1983:79). 
12. Hard power 
Hard power is the use of military and economic means to influence the behaviour or interests of other 
political units. This form of political power is often aggressive, and is most effective when imposed by 
one political unit upon another of lesser military and economic power (Holsti, 1999:11). 
13. Soft Power 
Refers to the ability of a state to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or 
define their interests in ways that are consistent with its’ own ambition. This type of power tends to 
arise from such resources as cultural or ideological attraction as well as rules and institutions of 
international regimes. The United States has more soft power than any other nation in the world because 
institutions governing international economy such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) etc. tend to embody liberal, free market principles that 
correspond with American society and ideology (Nye, 1990: 153-71). 
14. Liberal Institutions 
Liberal institutions like the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), Trans 
Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) etc., utilize the rational actor assumption to help 
generate testable hypotheses on how international organizations can affect a state’s calculation of 
interests. 
15. Diplomacy 
This is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors. 
From a state perspective, diplomacy is concerned with advising, shaping and implementing foreign 
policy. As such, it is the means by which states through their formal and other representatives, as well 
as other actors articulate, coordinate and secures particular or wider interests, using correspondence, 
private talks, exchange of views, lobbying, visits, threats and other related activities (Barston, 1988:1) 
16. International Cooperation 
Cooperation among states is much more common than war. Yet there is much less conceptualization 
about cooperation than there is about the causes of and behaviour in war (Hammerstein, 2003:1-2). 
International Cooperation is defined as a situation where parties agree to work together to produce new 
gains for each of the participants’ unavailable to them by unilateral action, at some cost. Its constituent 
xiii | P a g e  
 
elements are working together, agreement to do so (not just coincidence), cost, and new gains for all 
parties. By gains what is meant are not only material gains, but also perception of progress towards 
goals, such as improved security, status or freedom of action for oneself and the imposition of 
constraints on other actors, and so on (Zartman and Touval, 2010:1-2). 
17. Theoretical Assessment of International Cooperation 
Realists take a short-term approach to international relations because they believe that cooperation is 
not sustainable but occurs only on a momentary basis, as long as benefits are present and up to date. 
They argue that parties have a tendency cheat and free-ride as soon as they can gain greater benefits 
from doing so then from cooperating (Bowles and Gintis, 2003:433). 
For liberals, states cooperate in the expectation of benefits from future cooperation, as well as current 
payoffs. In addition, they hold that anticipated reciprocity provides benefits from reputation and 
relationships that are not only less precise but tie states into patterns of behaviour (Hammerstein, 
2003:2). 
18. Security 
Security is a complex and contested concept that is heavily laden with emotions and deeply held values 
(Kolodzeij, 2000). Security as a human created phenomenon embraces both the use of force and 
coercive threats by humans and their agents and the transformation of these exchanges, charged with 
real or potential violence, into non-lethal, consensual exchanges. However, an all-inclusive and reliable 
theory of security must include those non-violent means and strategies devised and relied upon by actors 
to produce and potentially surmount the incentives to employ force and threats in order to resolve 
conflicts and to foster cooperation (Kolodziej, 2005). 
19. National Security 
National security must be analyzed in the context of foreign policy, it refers to the ability of national 
institutions to prevent adversaries from using force to harm the citizens of a country and its national 
interests. National security policy is primarily concerned with formulating and implementing national 
strategy involving the threat or use of force to create an environment that is favourable for a particular 
country’s national interests (Sarkesian, Williams and Cimbala, 2008:4). 
20. Globalization 
Globalization entails a process or set of processes that embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organization of social relations and transactions, thus generating transcontinental or interregional flows 
and networks of activity, interaction, and power (Held; McGrew; Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999:483). 
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                                                              Chapter One 
                            INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION 
The UN Security Council through its Resolutions 1269 of 19 October 1999, 1368 of 12 September 2001 
and 1373 of 28 September 2001, declares that transnational terrorism constitutes one of the most serious 
threats to international peace and security in the 21stcentury. It further declares that acts of transnational 
terrorism constitute a challenge to all states and to all of humanity. Its underlines that act of terrorism 
endanger innocent lives and the dignity and security of human beings everywhere. It also threatens 
socio-economic development of all states and undermines global stability and prosperity (UN Security 
Council Resolution 1377 of 2001 cited in Elagab and Elagab, 2007:31). 
1.0. Introduction to the Dissertation 
Terrorism implies the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention 
(National Advisory Committee, 1976:3). Correspondingly, transnational terrorism entails the use, or 
threat of use or threat of use of fear across national borders with its implications and consequences 
transcending national boundaries (Anneli Botha, 2007:3). Moreover, for the African continent 
transnational terrorism is a challenge that is posing grave threats to the collective peace and security of 
the region (Bamidele, 2014:2). Likewise, transnational terrorism as demonstrated by al-Qaeda and its’ 
network of affiliates such as Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) etc., poses a much 
serious threat than domestic terrorism to Africa’s and the and the global security (Hoffman, 1998). 
These extremist groups and organizations are seeking maximum killings and financial repercussions 
(Hoffman, 1998). Accordingly, as a response to these threats, African states have to be security 
conscious and guard their territories with adequate policy instruments. Similarly, policy efforts by 
nations to strengthen targets induce terrorists to redirect their attacks less-protected positions (Sandler, 
2005:78). Hence, African states must use all levels of analysis to provide collective policy responses to 
threats of transnational terrorism on their security and stability. 
1.1. Background to the study  
To study the history of terrorism is to study the history of human civilization. For centuries, dating as 
far back as the Judo-Roman periods, terrorist events have brought the subject of terrorism to the 
vanguard of civilizations around the world (Griset and Mahan, 2003:1). In line with this connotation, 
some historical scholars assert that the earliest forms of terrorism that stemmed from the Jewish and 
Islamic accounts were religiously motivated. The two religious groups sought to influence not only the 
masses, but also God. This is because, such early forms of terrorism explicitly focused on the roles of 
the Sicarii, an extreme Jewish zealot sect, which tried to incite a revolt against Rome in 66-70 A.D., 
(Weinberg and Davis, 1989:19). Similarly, the Assassins, a radical Shiite Ismaili sect, used to wage a 
2 | P a g e  
 
campaign that was aimed at the purification of Islam for almost two centuries dating from 1090-1275 
A.D. (Weinberg and Davis, 1989:19). In addition, contemporary terrorism scholar’s asserts that the 
Roman-Jewish historian Josephus Flavius (1926a) in his annals spoke of the Sicarii’s anarchistic 
strategies of offending their enemies, such as attacking them in broad daylight, preferably the times 
when crowds gathered for holy days in Jerusalem was their special seasons. According to Josephus 
Flavius, their preferred weapon was the dagger, in which the Sicarii’s draw their name from and they 
would hide it under their coats. They acted this way, because back then it was believed that the crowd 
provided some sort of shield or anonymity for the assassin, who would simply blend within it after the 
murder was committed (Laqueur, 2001:7). 
Lewis (1967:67) identifies the medieval assassins as another religious sect that used terrorism in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. He asserts that some of the features of this movement brings to 
remembrance the modern-day terrorist movements, because their origins were founded in the divisions 
that arose among the followers of the Shiite tradition and in particular with the formation of a sect 
known as the Ismaili’s (which is centred in present-day Syria, Israel and Iran). Followers of this sect 
believed in the need for purification of the Muslim community in order to speed up the arrival of the 
Imam “the heir of the Prophet, the chosen of God, and the sole rightful leader of mankind`` who would 
establish a new and just society Lewis (1967:68). Hence, Weinberg and Davis (1989:21) infer that the 
assassins, having been outnumbered by orthodox Sunni Muslims, sought to achieve their ends through 
unconventional means. Their leader Hassan I Sabah, developed a strategy of using isolated mountain 
strongholds as bases for staging protracted campaigns of terror against Sunni religious and political 
leaders, on the grounds that these leaders had seized the leadership of Islam and had corrupted its 
meaning. 
In line with the above premises, Weinzierl cited in Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-Vralstad (2004:29), asserts 
that the 18thcentury witnessed a change in the nature of terrorism with the coming of the French 
Revolution. For these scholars, during this period the “Reign of Terror`` did not initiate the revolution 
but it maintained and protected it from counterrevolutions through spreading fear by means of violence. 
For them, terror was a policy response carried out by the French state and in that way it provided an 
early example of state sponsored terrorism. Moreover, Weinberg and Davis (1989:25) argue that the 
motivational foundations for terrorism changed, since terror initiated during the French Revolution was 
not legitimized in the name of God, but in the name of the ‘’people``, the motivational foundations for 
terrorism changed as a result. Hence, the centuries following the French Revolution, saw the instituting 
of revolutions against an established order justified by its proponents in the name of the “people``. With 
these developments came new definitions of citizens and the state, as well as concepts like nationalism 
and self-determination. In short, these scholars infer that, the French Revolution instigated an 
intellectual revolution that transformed terrorism from a religious doctrine to a predominantly secular 
phenomenon. 
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In accordance with the above undertone, the 20th century saw the evolution of transnational terrorism 
when firstly, on June 28, 1914, the Austrian Prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were killed 
by Principe, a Serbian nationalist from the Society of the Black Hands organization (Dobson and Payne, 
1982: 252). This incident, according to historians and scholars of international relations, led to the 
outbreak of World War 1. Secondly, in 1934 King Alexander of Yugoslavia was exterminated in the 
streets of Marseilles, France by members of the Ustasa Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization. Again, this transnational terror incident heralded in the formulation and adoption of the 
1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism by the League of Nations, which 
became the first ever-international attempt to deal with terrorism (Dobson and Payne, 1982: 252). 
Likewise, the modern era of transnational terrorism commenced in 1968 with terrorists travelling 
between countries and maintaining a presence in multiple countries to achieve their greatest impact. 
Thus, the defining moment in transnational terrorist events was the 22 July 1968, hijacking of an El Al 
Boeing 707 en-route Tel Aviv from Rome, with 38 passengers by the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP) terrorists (Mickolus, 1980: 93). This event is noteworthy in the understanding of 
the contemporary transnational terrorism. Firstly, there was a clear evidence of state sponsorship of the 
event, given that after the plane had landed in Algiers, Algerian authorities took advantage of the 
situation and held some of the passengers’ hostage, until September of that year when a deal was finally 
reached by the governments of the parties concerned (Mickolus, 1980: 94). Secondly, the incident 
forced Israel to negotiate directly with the Palestinian suspected terrorists (Hoffman, 1998: 68). Lastly, 
massive media coverage demonstrated to other terrorists that such incidents could attract global media 
coverage (Mickolus, 1980: 94). Scholars therefore argue that terrorism is not a recent threat or 
perception for African governments. Terrorist attacks predated the 9/11 episode in the United States. 
Terrorist activity was widely initiated as para-military tactics by the continent’s liberation movements. 
This tactic was reckoned in the prolonged anti-colonialist struggle and nationalist uprisings in Africa. 
During this period, supporters of nationalism viewed terror as a sporadic extension of anti-colonialism 
but also as a tormenting tactic that was aimed at weakening an unyielding enemy (Glickman, 2003: 
165). 
1.1.1. Outline of the Research Problem 
Princeton Lyman, cited in (Rothchild, and Harbeson, 2008) observes that, Africa is no more secure 
from threats of transnational terrorism than any other continent in the world. This is due largely to the 
connotation that, its assortment of relatively failed and weak states, ethnic and religious diversity, and 
aside from this discrimination, socio-economic inequalities, poor governance system and in many 
places, “ungoverned space” lend credence to significant vulnerability of the African continent to the 
growth of radical and sometimes transnational terrorist movements.  
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Kenya occupies a geographical, regional and transnational strategic position that has enabled it to 
become East Africa’s gateway to Europe, Asia and the rest of the continent. These links have made it 
possible for potential transnational terrorists to communicate, share and launch terrorist attacks against 
Kenya or Western interests within Kenya’s territorial limits (Soke, 2003 and Cronin, 2002). 
This study assesses and examines policy responses of African states and non-state actors in 
collaboration with other international actors such as the United States, France, Britain, the United 
Nations and the European Union, on the activities of transnational terrorist groups. It provides an in-
depth analysis of Kenya’s experience with transnational terror and how the country has responded to 
such threats to national security. As a result, two of the main theories of international relations, realism 
and idealism theories are used as frameworks of analysis. These theories are used within the parameters 
of the four levels of analysis. This enables a deeper investigation of the menace of transnational 
terrorism and policy responses against it. 
1.2. Preliminary Literature and Reasons for Choosing the Topic 
States and international institutions respond to threats of terrorism by issuing counterterrorism 
strategies. These counterterrorism measures consist of governmental and institutional actions that aim 
to inhibit terrorist attacks or curtail their consequences. There are two main classifications of 
antiterrorism policies; these are proactive and defensive strategies (Sandler, 2005:78). Accordingly, 
proactive or offensive measure targets at the terrorist as well as their resources and supporters and would 
eventually weaken the operations of the group. Such proactive policy measure would incapacitate the 
group and reduces the frequency and prevalence of attacks against all at-risk targets (Sandler, 2005:78). 
An illustration of this position is found in Kenya. The Kenyan government in response to previous 
attacks and threats by Al-Shabaab launched a military intrusion into Somalia against the group and 
attacked its bases and training camps (Odhiambo, 2013:129). On the other hand, defensive or passive 
policies aimed at protecting potential target from attacks are also important. This is because, defensive 
measures often involve the installation of technological barriers such as bomb-sniffing devices, metal 
detectors, or biometric identification, the hardening of targets for instance putting barriers in front of 
national buildings, the deployment of security personnel such as sky marshals on commercial flights 
and even the establishment of terrorist alert information (Rosendorff and Sandlers,2004). 
Moreover, (Aboboaie, 2015:13) asserts that at a regional level of analysis, Africa was among the first 
regions of the world to develop regional frameworks on counterterrorism. This, she affirms include 
responses to the 1998 transnational terror attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The 1999 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which was initially drafted by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), followed by the African Union’s 2002 Plan of Action on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa and the 2004 African Union Protocol to the 
Organization of African Unity Convention. In addition to this, the AU established an Algiers Centre for 
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the Study and Research on Terrorism, which seeks to foster regional approaches to countering terrorism. 
Likewise, the UN as a global governing body in the wake of increasing transnational terror threats in 
the 21st, century has also drafted the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373, which 
obliges all member nations to enact counterterrorism policies.  
The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy is the basic instrument of action to combat terrorism, given 
that it enjoyed confidence among African member states (Aboboaie, 2015:13). Hence, in the aftermath 
of this UNSC Resolution, on April 30, 2003, the coalition government in Kenya introduced the 
Suppression of Terrorism Bill, which was a Supplement No.3 of the Kenyan Gazette. This Bill 
permitted police officers to use force and even kill suspected terrorists who refuse to be arrested. In 
addition, police officers would have 36 hours with a suspect before the suspect is allowed access to 
legal advice (Kamau, 2006: 134). 
Some researchers believe that poverty and injustice contribute to the spread of terrorism, and they assert 
that counterterrorism activities should include efforts to improve the living conditions of the people in 
less developed countries (Schweitzer, 1998). Nonetheless, other scholars argue that even though a long-
term strategy to provide disadvantaged people with employment and other economic opportunities for 
a better living might prevent some potential terrorists, however it would not be effective in discouraging 
the most fanatics. This is because, a core of offenders including but not limited to al-Qaeda, seems 
determined to wreak violence against the United States and its allies in the global war on terror (Griset 
and Mahan, 2003:279). Sharp (2000:37) argues that state sponsored transnational terrorism is a 
violation of international law that summons the victimized country’s right of self-defense. He asserts 
that there are disagreements about the degree of accountability that is necessary to label a state a sponsor 
of terrorism. The UN Charter gives victim states the right to respond with military force in the event of 
an ‘armed attack’, but it does not define that term.  
Moreover, a failed or weak government like the one in Somalia that cannot prevent terrorists’ 
organizations like Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda from using its territory as a training or recruiting base from 
which to launch attacks on other states, as the group has did in Kenya several times, is not considered 
guilty of an armed attack on another state (Travio, 2000:152). Accordingly, Griset and Mahan 
(2003:281) argue that many governments around the world, including those in Africa, the Middle East 
and Asia, are threatened by religious extremism. The large American military presence in these 
countries some fear could provoke popular uprisings capable of toppling the governments that assist 
the United States in the Global War on Terrorism. Hence, with these concerns in mind, the US has 
sought other types of support from countries such as the use of airspace and sharing of intelligence 
information.  Whittaker (2010: 639) asserts that through an array of international accords, most African 
state governments have joined in the ‘Global War on Terror’ that is led primarily by the US by adopting 
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domestic legislations, sharing intelligence information, and cracking down on terrorist target groups 
within their territories. 
Accordingly, Lutz and Lutz, (2014:525) have argued that terrorism is a significant threat to the peace 
and security of countries and their populations around the world and that it necessitates comprehensive 
and operational policy responses. Likewise, ever since the 9/11 attacks on the US, the role of 
counterterrorism has increased significantly in Kenya. However, it is essential to highlight that this 
mission to combat transnational terrorism was not a new concept. Prior to September 11, 2001 attack, 
there were certainly counter terrorism units in both the law enforcement and intelligence arenas. 
Moreover, the US National Security Intelligence Service was established as a response to the bombings 
of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, upon this Kenya became part of the countries included in 
the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program of the United States (Mogire and Agade, 2011). In addition, the 
Kenyan government has also established an Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), a Joint Terrorism Task 
Force, a National Counter Terrorism Centre and a National Security Advisory Committee (Aronson, 
2012). 
1.3. Reasons for choosing the Topic 
This topic was selected on the grounds that, even though there is more than enough literature on 
transnational terrorism or terrorism in general not much has been written about policy responses to 
threats of this phenomenon from an African perspective. There is the need to understand how the main 
theories of international relations could be applied in the analysis and assessment of the threats posed 
by transnational terrorism and how they influence policy makers in their decision-making processes in 
Africa. This will enable policy makers to assess the effectiveness of the policies, aimed at countering 
the threat and safeguarding the continent’s security and stability. Finally, I choose this topic because 
transnational terrorism is on the increase in the contemporary global system, and examining its menace 
and policy responses towards it could give one a vivid insight as to how serious its threats are and how 
to better equip the continent in terms of responding to its menace. 
1.4. Research Problems and Objectives: Key Questions  
1.4.1. Central Research Problem 
This study is primarily interested in assessing policy responses of African states and international actors 
on the threats of transnational terrorism to Africa’s security and stability with specific reference to 
Kenyan. 
1.4.2. Research Questions 
This study addresses five key questions, namely:  
How transnational terrorism historically evolved in Africa? 
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What are the causes of Africa’s vulnerability to transnational terrorism? 
How do African states and international policy makers respond to threats of transnational terrorism? 
What strategic policy responses do Kenya and its global partners employ to counter transnational 
terrorism which is threatening the country’s national security? 
What are the implications of transnational terrorism for Africa’s security and stability? 
1.4.3. Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are to provide a piece of work that has not been previously analyzed by 
scholars and researchers of international relations and global security studies. The question that follows 
is how, and in light of this question, the study will interlink all factors that might be the cause of Africa’s 
vulnerability in the face of transnational terrorism. In addition, it will assess how policy makers in all 
levels of analysis from state to regional and to global level respond to this phenomenon that threatens 
the security and stability of continent and the world at large.   
In order to do this, it first explores the historical evolution and causes of transnational terrorism in the 
African continent.  
Secondly, it assesses policy responses by African states and the main actors of international relations 
such as the United States, the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union.  
Thirdly, the study provides an in-depth analysis of policy responses by Kenya and its’ global partners 
in the war on terrorism, which are mainly the United States, the African Union and the United Nations. 
Finally, this study examines the implications of transnational terrorism for Africa’s security and 
stability. 
1.5. Principal Theories upon which the Research Project is constructed 
Theory is a systematic effort at asking questions, which will allow us to organize our knowledge, to 
orient our research and to interpret our findings. Theory should help us order the data we have 
accumulated. It should identify the main factors or variables in the field and concentrate our attention 
and research on the most important problems. Although theory might not give us all at once a master 
key to the meaning of world politics, it should lead us to a coherent understanding of data (Hoffman, 
1960: 9). 
Scholars in all social sciences such as Mansbasch and Taylor (2012:3) have articulated that, theorizing 
enables theorists to generalize global political issues by identifying how individual events and 
circumstances fit into broader patterns. For them, theory abridges the unsystematic intricacy of reality 
by pointing only to those factors that theorists believe to be important. In addition, theory is no more 
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than a set of tools whose usefulness is tested in their ability to solve concrete problems (Moore, 
1995:107-15). 
This research focuses on two theories of international relations: liberalism and realism for the analysis 
of policy response to transnational terrorism.   
1.5.1. Defining Policy Responses from a Liberal Perspective 
Proponents of liberalism argue that liberal counterterrorism policies should be persuasive. This means 
that they should be able to convince terrorists to abandon their routes or motives, but also their 
supporters and sympathizers to seek other non-violent ways to achieve their goals (Crelinsten, 
2009:236). Liberals tend to view terrorism as one of the many threats facing the international 
community alongside climate change, nuclear proliferation and pandemic diseases. The best way to 
fight transnational terrorism according to its proponents is through a multilateral approach that is aided 
by the management of international institutions. Lastly, they tend to believe that even if the military is 
necessary, intelligence and law enforcement resources are equally important in the fight against this 
phenomenon (Obama, 2011:2). 
Schmid (2005:32) points out that a three-branch strategy of the United Nations outlined in the 
September 2002, Report of the High-Level Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism, in which 
cooperation is instituted as the third prong, states that the United Nations Strategy 3 is to sustain a 
broad-based international cooperation in the struggle against transnational terrorism. Accordingly, this 
third prong includes making cooperation between the United Nations and other international actors 
more systematic and ensures an appropriate division of labour based comparative advantage. Other UN 
prongs include the development of an international action plan, ensuring a higher degree of internal 
coordination and coherence within the United Nations and finally, strengthening some UN offices, 
notably the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention of the UN Secretariat (Boulden and Weiss, 
2004). 
Neoliberal scholars assert that international cooperation, which is fundamental to their approach to 
international politics in the fight against terrorism, cannot rely solely upon a supranational legal order 
or regime. They argue that cooperation should be able to function at several levels of analysis at once. 
These levels include; international, regional, national and sub-national, including the local level. In this 
way, liberal scholars infer that this type of a multi-centric regime would encompass multiple sets of 
private and public, national and international rules, which would contribute to an integrated and orderly 
international system (Wolfe cited in Smith and Wolfish, 2001:262). Neoliberal proponents argue that 
transnational cooperation, as opposed to international cooperation or state-to-state cooperation, would 
better reflect the nature of transnational terrorist threats to Africa (Crelinsten, 2009:232). This strategy 
would also provide a kind of response framework that can be more effective in the global fight against 
transnational terrorism (Crelinsten, 2009:232).  
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1.5.2. Defining Policy Responses from a Realist Viewpoint 
On the other hand, realists view states as the main agents of international politics. Hence for states to 
respond to threats of transnational terrorism they should take the traditional counterterrorism 
mechanism that relies on the coercive capacity of the state (Crelinsten, 2009:48). In this way, two 
commonly used models of counterterrorism models appear to the realist mind in the fight against 
transnational terrorism. These include the criminal justice model and the war model. These models rely 
on the state’s monopoly of the use of force, such as the exercise of hard power.  
Their assessment of the phenomenon is that, transnational terrorism has a double character of war and 
crime. In this way, Buros (2011) asserts that the George W. Bush’s administration saw transnational 
terrorism as an existential threat. And thus opted for the realist approach because the international 
system did more to hamper U.S. efforts at combating a sophisticated actor from outside the state system 
than it did to prevent the attacks of multiple U.S. targets in the first place. Similarly, the Kenyan 
government in its response to previous attacks and threats by Al-Shabaab, a transnational terror 
organization, launched a military intrusion into Somalia against the group and attacked it bases and 
training camps (Odhiambo, 2013:129). 
Given the anarchic nature of the international system and the absence of peaceful methods of resolving 
the disputes, actors with a constitutional grievance against the state are often forced into war against it. 
Hence, the state has to counter this threat to security and stability in order to uphold its sovereignty 
(Gilbert, 1994:159). As such, scholars argue that terrorism is an offshoot of realism because, for the 
realists the 9/11, events on US home soil represents an end to the holiday from history or the exoneration 
from conflicts that the world had experienced in the 1990s (Nau, 2012:236). These scholars assert that, 
9/11 generated a new global war on terror and a renewed division of the world into friendly and 
unfriendly states. This is because the United States and its African partners committed themselves to 
fight terrorism in the continent through counterterrorism measures that mostly led to increasing 
militarization and intensification of law enforcement policies in the continent (Nau, 2012:238). 
1.6. Research Methodology and Methods 
This research’s methodology and methods draw from desktop research and this type of research is 
premised on seeking facts, general scholarly information on the topic, historical background, study 
findings and so forth that have been published or are available in public order. In this way, data for the 
research was obtained though secondary sources, mainly from encyclopedias, journal articles, 
conference proceedings, government reports and gazettes and books. Other sources of data include 
written interviews, newspaper articles and news reports. 
Moreover, qualitative research techniques have been materialized in the study to explain how policy 
makers respond to the threats and implications of transnational terrorism to Africa’s security and 
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stability using the two theories of international politics namely realism and liberalism. A qualitative 
approach to social research provides a deeper understanding of the phenomena being studied and this 
method aims at giving a more detailed explanation about social relations that lead to threats of 
international terrorism to Africa’s security and stability. 
In addition, this research is based on this approach because this method of collecting data is concerned 
with understanding the behaviour of man in a particular society. Therefore will provide a deeper 
understanding of terrorism based on the analysis made by African and US policy makers in conjunction 
with those policy panels from intergovernmental actors like the United Nations, the African Union and 
the European Union.  
The qualitative approach entails a systematic way of doing research whereby transnational terrorism as 
a phenomenon is studied in its natural settings, that is by first looking at its historical origins and 
conceptualizations in Africa. Secondly, in assessing the causes of Africa’s vulnerability to this 
phenomenon, the study examines the factors such as the failed and weak states, socio-economic 
conditions, geographical location and religious extremism, that gave rise to transnational terrorist 
activities. Additionally, this method of collecting data enables a better examination of the relationship 
between policy responses by the African governments and their US counterparts in the global war on 
terrorism. It illuminates the policy frameworks espoused by intergovernmental organizations such as 
the African Union, the United Nations and the European Union.  
This study makes use of a case study analysis for analytical purposes. Hence, as Neumann (2011:42) 
explicates, a case study research entails an in-depth assessment of an extensive amount of information 
about very limited units or cases for one period or across multiple periods of time. As such, this study 
undertakes an in-depth analysis of Kenya’s policy responses to threats of transnational terrorism. The 
country’s government perceives transnational terrorism mostly arising from groups like the Al-Shabaab 
and al-Qaeda as posing a serious threat to its national security, especially by the latest terror incidents 
in Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and Garissa University. 
1.7. Case Study Analysis 
According to scholarly understanding, Kenya is a target of transnational terrorism because of an 
assortment of dynamic forces that emanates from geopolitical, historical, economic and socio-cultural 
factors. In this way, scholars assert that the immediate causes of transnational terror attacks in Kenya 
stemmed from firstly, its close ties with Israel and Western nations, in particular the United States. 
Secondly, its vibrant coastal tourism industry that threatens the predominantly local Islamic culture and 
finally, the commonly held assumption that the country’s mostly Christian population is a permanent 
obstacle to the Islamization of Eastern Africa (Otiso, 2009:107). In line with this view, scholars have 
argued that factors that facilitate transnational terrorism in Kenya include among other things the 
country’s geopolitical proximity to Asia, Europe and neighboring African states. Others factors include 
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weak-state borders as a result of poor policing, Kenya’s politically unstable neighboring states such as 
Somalia and South Sudan. Kenya’s relatively open and multicultural society, its relatively good 
transport and communication infrastructure coupled with its advanced regional economy and its 
relatively large Muslim population as well as its socio-economic deprivation of the coastal population 
in relation to the rest of the country have all facilitated the easy flourishing of terrorists (Otiso, 
2009:111).   
Currently, the government of the United States perceives Kenya as a strategic partner in the global war 
on terror and as an anchor state in the East African region (Aronson, 2013:24). Similarly, having 
historically been an ally of the US, the East African country’s importance was however only reaffirmed 
during its democratic transition of 2002 and subsequent improvements in human rights. The last two 
decades have seen several major transnational terror incidents that have ripped the country apart 
(Aronson, 2013:24). One might also point out that the Kenyan military plays a key role in regional 
operations against Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia (Blanchard, 2013:71). As a result, the main 
perpetrator of threat to Kenya’s national security is the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization which 
originates from neighboring Somalia, where the country has launched military offenses as a response 
to its threats. This is because this group is increasingly using a strategy of sporadic guerrilla attacks, 
which it disguises as an Islamic Jihad (Holy War) against non-Muslims in Kenya while it spares the 
country’s Muslims. The group claims that its apparent reason for its transnational terror attacks in Kenya 
is retaliation to the Kenyan military presence in Somalia (Ombaka, 2015:13). 
1.8. Overview of the Research 
This study comprises five interlinked chapters. Chapter One, contains the introduction to the study. It 
presents a general background of the research, the problem statement, the preliminary literature review 
and the research problems and aims of this study. 
This chapter also highlights the central research problem, key questions and objectives of the study, the 
major theories upon which the research is formulated as well as the research methodology and methods 
of collecting data. 
Chapter Two; presents the theoretical framework and concepts of the study using the four levels of 
analysis that are available in international politics. The numerous concepts elaborated in chapter two 
are used to unpack the policy responses, causes and implications of transnational terrorism to be 
discussed in ensuing chapters. Both the main theories of international politics, realism and liberalism 
are concisely elaborated using the different levels of analysis to permit for a more coherent and precise 
study of assessing policy responses to threats of transnational terrorism on Africa’s security and 
stability. 
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Chapter Three; combines a historical background and conceptualization of transnational terrorism with 
a literature review. In this way, this chapter seeks to permits the reader to appreciate the evolution and 
conceptualization of this phenomenon in Africa. 
Chapter Four; investigates the causes of Africa’s vulnerability to transnational terrorism. It also assesses 
policy responses by Kenyan policy makers and other actors of international politics such as the United 
States, African Union and the United Nations. In this way, this chapter provides a case study analysis 
in order to understand why is Kenya constantly targeted by transnational terrorist organizations such as 
Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda, and how the government in this country has responded to these attacks and 
finally, what can be done to prevent future attacks from happening in the country.  
Chapter Five; discusses the findings and summary of this study. It examines the implications of 
transnational terrorism on the security and stability Kenya and the African continent as a whole. In 
addition, this chapter also underlines the utility of both theories of international politics in their 
assessment of policy responses to threats of transnational terrorism. Finally, the chapter sums up the 
study with a brief analysis of the causes and effects of transnational terrorism on the security and 





                                      






                                      
 
 
13 | P a g e  
 
                                                          Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework and Key Concepts of the Study Using the Four   
Levels of Analysis 
2.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter has outlined the scope of this research. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis 
of the major themes of the study. The analysis of this study is anchored on the notions of liberal and 
realist theories of international relations. These theories are viewed from their perspectives on the policy 
responses to threats of transnational terrorism.  
Furthermore, for concise descriptive and explanatory examinations of the major themes of this study, 
the sections of this chapter are divided as follows: The first section of this chapter discusses the liberal 
and realist policy perspectives to counterterrorism from an individual level of analysis. The second 
section offers the liberal and realist counterterrorism responses from a state level of analysis. The third 
section examines the liberal and realist counterterrorism responses from a systemic level of analysis. 
The fourth and last section provides a close examination of liberal and realist policy counterterrorism 
responses from the global level of analysis. The elaborated themes from which the research is 
constructed will be materialized interchangeably in order to answer its’ key questions and attain its 
objectives. 
2.2. The importance of Theory in International Politics 
In an attempt to examine the theoretical framework of this research, one might commence by providing 
a brief explanation about the relevance of theory in social science research. Scholars asserts that the 
purpose of theory can be analytically distinguished in three kinds, firstly as a normative or value theory, 
which is defined as the study of politics in terms of ethical desiderata, meaning a kind of theory that is 
produced by political philosophy. An example of this kind of theory would be Immanuel Kant’s theory 
of perpetual peace in a world federation of representative republics (Kenneth Thompson, 1955:738).  
Secondly, scholars identify theory as an empirical or causal theory, which tries to analyze actual 
political behavior and to identify the main variables, such as the theory of the balance of power, which 
was offered as the key to analyzing eighteen and nineteenth century international relations (Hoffman, 
1960:10). 
In accordance, scholars identify the third kind of analytical theory as a policy science or theory as a set 
of recipes for action, or as systematic advice on statecraft. This kind of theory scholars infer, aims to 
contribute to the intelligence needs of the time such as research on psychological warfare or military 
strategy, all of which provides us with contemporary examples (Morgenthau, 1955:431-60). All in all, 
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scholars in all social sciences have recognized that collecting facts is not enough and that it is not helpful 
to gather answers when no questions have been asked. Hence, without theory, as social researchers we 
will have to take whatever the other disciplines may see fit to dump into our plate (Hoffman, 1960). 
2.3. Theoretical Relevance of Policy Responses  
Establishing counterterrorism strategies for any state is a complex undertaking that is filled with hidden 
opportunities and precarious obligations. This is because how a state balances those opportunities and 
obligations depends on its definition of the threat that transnational terrorism poses, its understanding 
of the players involved and its assumptions about capabilities and responses both internal and external. 
In simple terms, a state has the sole responsibility to engage in decision making that seek to balance the 
concrete facts of realism with the potential for a more liberal policy response (Buros, 2011).  
The war on transnational terrorism has caused many African states and international actors to re-
evaluate their positions on international relations in terms of assessing their policy responses to threats 
of this phenomenon on the security and stability of the region (Buros, 2011). Thus, this research 
analyzes two main theories of international politics in terms of their theoretical responsiveness to threats 
of transnational terrorism to Africa’s security and stability using the four levels of analysis.   
2.3.1. Outline of Liberalism Thinking 
Theoretically, proponents of liberalism perceive the threats of transnational terrorism seriously. While 
their traditional rivals, the realists often invoke the domestic-international divide as their starting point 
to argue that terrorism does not essentially affect the international system, the liberals by contrast, see 
terrorism as an ideological challenge facing policy makers (Waltz, Kenneth cited in Booth and Dunne, 
2002). Moreover, since liberalism is more about tolerance, civility, and advancement, liberal’s asserts 
that transnational terrorism drives them down a completely dissimilar path from the one they advocate, 
to the one of violent intolerance where human life is lived in fear and at the same time in anger (Dunne, 
2008:107).  
Counterterrorism involves understanding and dealing with the ideas that underpin the use of terrorism 
in social and political life. This has ideological, political, social, cultural and religious aspects, since 
terrorists have constituencies, which include followers, sympathizers and active and passive supports. 
Hence, counterterrorism policies must deal with these wider audiences (Crelinsten, 2009:122). In the 
light of this assessment, one might argue from a liberal perspective that counterterrorism policies are 
proactive policies, that is to say, they are forward-looking policies that try to out-think the terrorist 
mind. They also should plan ahead and think preventively. 
Likewise, because liberalism have a tendency to put more emphasis on factors that transcend nation 
states, its exponents argue that power tenaciously plays a major role in their philosophical 
understanding. However, unlike in the realism tradition, it is soft or co-optive power, not military power 
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and it focuses on such issues as economic sanctions, international cooperation, political and diplomatic 
pressures on a systemic level, the protection of human rights, environmental and energy security. In this 
way, liberalism firmly focuses on diverse types of liberties such as individual, collective, economic and 
market freedoms (laissez-faire principle) (Nalbandov, 2012). 
Similarly, democratic governments need to project public understating, cooperation, self-control and 
loyalty in order to limit transnational terrorist harm to their societies and in efforts to punish or 
apprehend those responsible for terrorist acts (Perl, 1997). It is liberal institutions such as the United 
Nations (UN), African Union (AU), General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), European Union 
(EU) and other transnational groups rather than individual states that have a tremendous impact on 
international relations. Accordingly, Nye and Koahane (1971:331) argue that the mutual effects 
between international relations and the international state system are critically important to the 
understanding of contemporary world politics. 
Proponents of the liberal perspective argue that policy responses must think in the long term, even when 
they act in the short term to respond to attacks on outsmart terrorist planning and targeting. They also 
assert that these policies should go beyond legal and military approaches, to incorporate political, social, 
cultural and economic initiatives that are aimed at undermining the viral-spread of radicalizing and 
violence-glorifying ideas that fuel the use of transnational terrorism in social and political life 
(Crelinsten, 2009:236). In addition, scholars argue that contemporary transnational terrorism produces 
a credible threat to the security and stability of democratic nations and the social impact of an 
indiscriminate terrorist campaign cannot be overstated. Thus, democratic governments together with 
their liberal institutions must respond to the nature of the potential threat of transnational terrorism 
(Poland, 1988:191). In view of this Crelinsten (2009: 245) assert that international cooperation is an 
essential tool in the fight against all forms of terrorism.  
2.3.2. Outline of Realism Theory 
Realism, according to its proponents is not different from other social theories in its efforts to provide 
both an analytical and prescriptive understanding of social phenomenon (Krasner, 1992:38). In addition, 
realists recognize that policy makers will not always act according to realist principles, just as for 
instance firms do not act according to neoclassical economic principles by equating marginal revenue 
and marginal costs to maximize profits (Kranser, 1992:41). As such, the realist perspective of 
international politics regards the international environment as anarchic. Hence, its proponents perceive 
sovereign states as being engaged in a struggle to maximize their individual national interests. In this 
way, the states’ foremost priority is to counter all forms of threats from their adversaries in order to 
ensure the security of their citizens (Erdag, 2013:62). 
Additionally, realist scholars assert that the struggle against transnational terrorism is different from 
any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly mysterious enemy 
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over an extended period of time, hence war or the use of military is a necessary expedient for preserving 
power in an anarchic international system. From this perspective, realists assert that there are no limits 
in principle to the exercise of power, to a certain extent, limits that we may impose upon ourselves in 
the conduct of war are mere measures designed to preserve power during conflict and during the 
subsequent peace (Fiala, 2002). 
Scholars also argue that political realism of mainstream security doctrines is grounded on the notion 
that, actors ought to maintain the status quo because changing it is dangerous since it might lead to 
instability. In this way, realists insist that reinforcing stability in Africa and securing the continent from 
threats of transnational terrorism means more western military presence largely for the training of local 
military forces against threats to their national security, which emanates from transnational terrorism 
(Adjaye, 2011).  
2.3.3. Defining Policy Responses to Threats of Transnational Terrorism: Liberal Perspective 
2.3.3.1. Introduction to Theoretical Liberalism 
Drawing from the above discussion, policy responses to threats of transnational terrorism on Africa’s 
security and stability from a liberal theoretical standpoint shall be assessed using the four levels of 
analysis: the individual, state, global and the systemic level of analysis. 
2.3.3.2. Levels of Analysis 
According to Goldstein (1994:12), a level of analysis refers to a perspective on international relations 
that is based on a set of similar actors or processes that suggest possible explanations to the “why’’ 
questions. In essence, a level of analysis enables researchers to trace changes in world politics to 
different groups of actors as well as to their various activities and attributes.  
2.3.3.3. Individual Level of Analysis 
The individual level of analysis is the primary and lowest level of analysis. At this level of analysis 
scholars are concerned with the personal characteristics such as perceptions, choices and activities of 
each human being ranging from the average citizen to the head of state. To clarify this assertion, this 
level analyses a particular situation or phenomenon concerning individuals as causes or solutions to that 
particular issue (Uzodike, 2010:20). 
In light of this, it is essential to point out that there are limited individual actors when it comes to 
executing policy responses to threats of transnational terrorism in Africa. Most policy responses to this 
phenomenon in Africa, begin at the state level, however the main individual actors in Africa in terms 
of threats of policy responses to transnational terrorism in the continent include the likes of former US 
president George W. Bush, current US president Barack Obama, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir 
and current Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta.  
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2.3.3.3.1. Liberal Instrument of Diplomacy 
The war on terrorism in Africa did not commence on September 11, 2001, as most observers often 
assert. In fact, it started in Sudan in the early 1990’s, where Osama bin Laden operated and where an 
attack was launched against the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak (Princeton Lyman cited in 
Harbeson, 2007:60-1). Sudan was al-Qaeda’s home from 1991 to 1996, and a base from which it could 
seek to extend its influence throughout the African continent. During this time Sudanese president Omar 
al-Bashir and the nation’s spiritual leader Dr. Hasan al-Turabi consistently supported al-Qaeda for many 
years before they were forced by international pressure in the form of sanctions to expel the group from 
the country (Gunaratna, 2002:156).  
President Al-Bashir after his relationship with Dr. Hasan soured, secretly tried to extradite Osama bin 
Laden to the United State under diplomatic processes, but his attempts were scorned by the Clinton 
administration. However, after the 9/11 terror attacks, he decided to cooperate fully with the US in the 
global war on terrorism (Gunaratna, 2002:157).   
Traditionally, Africa has played a marginal role in US foreign policy. It was only after President George 
W. Bush launched the “global war on terror” following the 9/11 events in US, that Africa became one 
of the major subjects in contemporary US foreign policy (US Department of State, 2005).  As such, 
scholars assert that from a liberal perspective, policy responses to September 11, 2001 events dictated 
the use of diplomacy by the Bush administration, during his enactment of the global war on terrorism 
(GWOT) strategy as a response to transnational terrorism that had hits the United States and affected 
many other countries globally including those in Africa. The State Department’s Office of 
Counterterrorism, under the Bush administration as a response to the 9/11 attacks, identified the East 
and the horn of Africa in particular Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Eritrea, to be at great risk 
to transnational terror organizations that are determined to strike US allies and interests. As it had been 
previously witnessed in the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (US Congress, 2004).  
Accordingly, President Bush advocated for anti-terror diplomacy in Africa, in which numerous counter-
terrorism initiatives were laid down with African states. These initiatives addressed all four counter-
terrorism goals of defeating, denying, diminishing and defending democratic states against threats of 
transnational terrorism. This was evident in Kenya, where the Bush administration assisted the Kenyan 
government to launch numerous Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programs. These have shaped the 
formation and training of an integrity Joint Terrorism Task Force to coordinate nationwide 
counterterrorism efforts, draft a national counterterrorism strategy, convene a National Security Agency 
(NSA) committee, create a national counterterrorism center and establish an Antiterrorism (AT) unit 
(US Congress, 2004:7). 
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2.3.3.3.2. Liberal Instrument of Cooperation 
The administration of Barrack Obama, has championed a more liberal approach to counterterrorism in 
Africa. Obama promised in 2011 to harness every tool of American power, through concerted efforts 
of its allies, partners and multilateral institutions in the fight against transnational terrorism (Obama, 
2011:2). His administration advocated for a multilateral combination of hard and soft power. In line 
with this, President Obama in his official visit to Kenya reiterated the United States’ support for Kenya 
and the whole of Africa, by promising more mutual cooperation with the region through granting more 
funding and assistance to counter transnational terrorism. In his speech he said:  
“We (the US) stand united with Kenya in the face of transnational terrorism. America 
will work more closely with Kenya and the rest of Africa in the fight against militant 
threats” (Reuters, 25 July: 2015). 
Another individual actor in the fight against the threat of transnational terrorism to Africa’s security 
and stability is Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta. President Kenyatta has promised to provide a swift 
policy response, by implementing long-term counterterrorism strategies. Long-term counterterrorism 
policy seeks to combat transnational terrorism over an extended period of time and requires thinking 
outside the box while at the same time maintaining a close eye for new developments, new point of 
friction and new twists in the prevailing patterns of counterterrorism within Kenya. Similarly, in a public 
discourse with Obama, President Kenyatta said:  
       “We are fighting global terrorists who seek to destroy our way of life. If left undefeated, 
they will redraw the international state system and make room for violent extremism and 
tyranny. Therefore, we need to cooperate with the international community in order to 
eliminate the   threat of transnational terrorism” (Reuters, 25 July: 2015).         
 
2.3.3.4. State Level of Analysis 
This is the second level of analysis and it concerns the authoritative decision-making units of governing 
states as well as the collections of individuals such as interest groups and political organizations within 
a country that help shape international events (Uzodike, 2010:20). 
Response to counterterrorism is not a new phenomenon in Africa. In many African countries, colonial 
regimes sustained all kinds of legislations to deal with what they considered terrorist acts, but which 
the African population fighting for emancipation and for their rights considered as a just struggle 
(Lumina, 2008:184). 
2.3.3.4.1. Soft Power 
Contemporary transnational terrorism according to advocates of liberalism produces grave threat to the 
security and stability of democratic states in Africa. As such, liberal scholars assert that democratic 
governments should respond to the nature of the potential threat of transnational terrorism (Poland, 
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1988:192). Accordingly, in attempting to formulate that response liberal proponents advocate that 
democratic governments may assume positive action at two disparate levels of possible involvement 
with counterterrorism initiatives. The first level might be to deter the acts of terrorism before they 
transpire. The question that follows is how; and liberals in this perspective identify several options. The 
first is to tighten security measures at airports, national buildings and at any critical industry. The second 
option that liberals assert is to design a general public awareness program to reduce sympathy for the 
terrorist cause. The third option is to develop effective intelligence gathering that leads to the 
apprehension of terrorists and the final option is to find the causes of increased terrorist activity, 
particularly those directed at democratic institutions. However, if all means fail to deter threats, liberals 
then argue that democratic governments and their police services should respond through consensus 
with maximum force (Poland, 1988: 192). 
In addition, the second level of response for democratic governments according to liberal advocates is 
that if acts of transnational terrorism are successfully completed and those responsible for them manage 
to escape from the scene, then law enforcement agencies should locate, apprehend, prosecute and 
convict the terrorists responsible for such acts. To simplify this assertion, liberalism as a state doctrine 
implies that democratic regimes should enact antiterrorism legislation and acknowledge international 
treaties that are aimed at combating and preventing threats of transnational terrorism (Poland, 
1988:193).  
2.3.3.5. Systemic Level of Analysis 
This level of analysis entails a situation where the interactions of transnational actors congregate on a 
regional or global level. Central to scholarly concerns at this level is the influence of the international 
system on the outcomes of individual states. For instance, this level of analysis focuses on the roles of 
transnational institutions such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) etc., in the attempts to achieve collective security and stability in the region (Uzodike, 
2010:21). 
In light of the above, Crelinsten (2009:7) argues that the danger that transnational terrorism poses to 
democratic values and the way of life associated with them, stems not just from terrorist threats and 
violence and the vulnerabilities that terrorists exploit, but merely from the ways in which democratic 
societies think about them, talk about them, prepare for them, respond to them and lastly recover from 
their impact. Likewise, regional security theory as argued by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver cited in 
Tavares (2008: 109) holds that security is a regional phenomenon, because most threats travel more 
easily over short distances than long ones.  
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2.3.3.5.1. Liberal instrument of Diplomacy 
Liberal advocates argue that international diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the threat of 
transnational terrorism in Africa have multiplied in recent years. This is because in West Africa, 
following border attacks by the Boko Haram from Northeast Nigeria, regional countries have 
increasingly opted for diplomatic means to combat the menace. This situation has led to Chad obtaining 
authority from Cameroun, to carry out military operations against Boko Haram fighters within its 
territory. Diplomatic talks between the two countries are aimed at countering threats posed by the group 
in the region (Zamfir, 2015).       
Kenya has also relied on a combination of legislative, social and diplomatic measures that seek to deal 
with the country’s transnational terrorist threat. These mechanisms include anti-terrorist legislations, 
social outreaches and diplomatic peace talks that aim at resolving the Somalia and South Sudan crises 
(Otiso, 2009:125), given that most of the country’s security threats come from Al-Shabaab and 
instability in both these countries. As such, the Kenyan government has introduced numerous policy 
responses to transnational terrorism and these include the National Security Intelligence Service, which 
was established following the 1998 US embassy bombing, the Suppression of Terrorism bill, the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Acts, the Police Act and other various elements of Kenya’s criminal 
code (Kelley and Munaita, 2004). 
Moreover, the Kenyan government in its attempts to counter threats of terrorism has introduced a 
sociopolitical strategy that seeks to reach out to local communities, in order to help identify terrorists 
and promote a continued co-existence between the country’s Christian and Muslim populations. Liberal 
scholars would argue that the Kenyan government has diplomatically tried to reach out to the country’s 
social groups particularly the Muslims who feel apprehensive to some of the government’s anti-
terrorism policies. In this way, the Kenyan government aims to reassure these concerned groups that it 
is committed to an unbiased application of the law without regard to religion and that its tries to remove 
religious stereotypes of these anti-terrorism laws (Otiso, 2009:27). Finally, the main diplomatic drive 
of Kenya’s antiterrorism policies is the search for peace and stability in neighboring Somalia and South 
Sudan. This initiative by the Kenyan government is driven by the acknowledgment that political 
instability in the neighboring countries is a primary contributor to the country’s transnational terrorist 
threats, especially through Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda (Njeru, 2004). 
2.3.3.5.2. Liberal Institutionalism 
Without a doubt, in a globalized world, it would be challenging to understand the security dynamic of 
one country without inserting it into a broader regional context and without grasping the conflicting or 
supportive patterns that defines the external policy of that country with its neighbors (Tavares, 2008: 
115). Hence, with the formation of the African Union formerly known as the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), a new consensus began to emerge around the paradigm of state security and collective 
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responsibility by Africans to protect that security and ensure stability within the continent (Sturman, 
2003:105). 
Scholars assert that no single country can defeat the transnational threat of terrorism alone. Hence, with 
assistance from liberal international institutions like the United Nations (UN) and regional and sub-
regional groups like the African Union (AU), countries can join together to take the necessary actions 
to combat transnational terrorism. In addition, they can prevent and disrupt terrorist activity by working 
to secure their state borders, or implement illegal immigration policies, or strengthen their customs 
enforcement and develop strong legal and financial regulatory systems that would criminalize terrorism 
and terrorism financing (Jefferson, 2006:4). The African Union’s adoption of counterterrorism legal 
instruments, such as the OAU Convention of 1999 and the 2004 Protocol, together with the 2002 Plan 
of Action, which established an African counterterrorism legal framework, provide a vivid illustration 
of political will and determination among African states to deal earnestly with the threat of transnational 
terrorism to Africa’s security and stability (UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2006:31). 
2.3.3.5.3. Liberal International Cooperation 
There is no international criminal code that exist, nor is there an international police force capable of 
combating transnational terrorism or an international court with jurisdiction over all acts of terrorism. 
Hence, governments around the globe engage in counterterrorism activities, principally by passing laws 
against terrorism and by entering into cooperative agreements with one another. Accordingly, many 
nations began to cooperate in order to forge a common front against the threats of transnational terrorism 
in the aftermath of the devastating 9/11 attacks (Griset and Mahan, 2003:280).  
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of regional organizations that seek to make 
counter terrorism attacks as their security priorities and Africa is no exception (Tavares, 2008:120).       
Thus, in a bid to eliminate the growing threat of transnational terrorism to Africa’s security and stability, 
within the framework of liberal institutionalism, the AU established a standing decision-making body, 
the African Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is knowledgeable for peace and security issues 
within the continent. Additionally, as a result of anxiety that emanates from transnational terror threats 
within the Lake Chad region, a summit was held in Paris, called the Paris Summit of May 2014, which 
brought together heads of state from Benin, Chad, Cameroun, France, Niger and Nigeria, and the 
representatives from the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union. The motive of the 
summit was to enhance regional cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram, by means of coordinated 
patrols and border surveillance, sharing intelligence and exchanging relevant information (Zamfir, 
2015: 2).   
Countries in the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in October 2014, decided to improve their 
cooperation in order to combat transnational threats emanating from Boko Haram, by pledging troops 
to monitor their shared borders (Zamfir, 2015:2). The United States has cooperated with many African 
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states, in the global war on terrorism and has thus established numerous sub-regional initiatives that 
seek to respond to transnational terrorism threats. The first among these initiatives is the East Africa 
Counter-terrorism Initiative (EACTI), which includes military training for border and coastal security, 
counterterrorism equipment, aviation security capacity-building, assistance for regional efforts against 
terrorist financing and police training. In addition to this, the EACTI also incorporates an important 
program for educating to prevent extremist fundamentalist influences from gaining the upper hand in 
selected countries. Additionally, the Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG) is cooperating with 
East African states on anti-money laundering or counterterrorism financing regimes in these countries 
(Schmidt, 2005). 
Moreover, the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) operates in a number of selected airports in Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Tanzania and Uganda, and aim to trace the movement of potential or real terrorists 
when arriving or departing from these states. It also produces a watch list that provides states with the 
capacity to collect, analyze and compare traveler data in order to help the international community 
understand the methods used by terrorists and to track their movements (Schmidt, 2005). Accordingly, 
liberal scholars would argue that Kenya is a good illustration of the countless Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
(ATA) programs that have shaped the formation and training of an interagency Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTK) that seeks to coordinate nationwide counterterrorism efforts (US Congress, 2004:7).  
Likewise, the United States has also cooperated with the three Northern African countries of Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco in their counterterrorism initiatives. In this way, the US has been assisting 
Morocco on numerous counterterrorism initiatives such as the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance program (ATA) and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). Under ATA, Moroccans have 
been trained on counterterrorism skills, such as airport, seaport and land border security, investigations, 
forensic and post-blast investigations. In addition, Tunisia has cooperated fully with the US on matters 
of information sharing, military cooperation, tracking and freezing assets of terrorist groups. Thus like 
Tunisia, Algerian cooperation with the US has also increased in terms of information sharing, military 
cooperation, freezing of financial assets belonging to terrorist organizations. These anti-terror initiatives 
in North Africa seek also to disrupt the transit route of transnational terrorists heading for Europe (US 
Congress, 2005:7). 
Lastly, the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which was officially designed to protect national borders, to track 
the movement of people, combat terrorism, enhance regional cooperation and stability, has according 
to liberal accounts witnessed some relative success in curbing the threat of transnational terrorism in 
the region (US Department of State Office of Counterterrorism, 2005). Likewise, the Trans-Saharan 
Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), further strengthens and expands regional counterterrorism 
capacities, enhances and institutionalizes cooperation among the region’s security forces, promote 
democratic governance and human rights protection (Jefferson, 2006:12). This will ultimately benefit 
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the liberal doctrine’s global counterterrorism goals and multilateral relations championed by the United 
States (Jefferson, 2006:12). In line with the above, one might argue that the US also performs similar 
counterterrorism policy responses in Southern Africa, with the aim of capturing known terrorists in the 
region and freezing their assets. In addition to this, the US has sponsored a major conference in 
Botswana that focused on finding ways and means to strengthen counterterrorism legislations. It has 
also encouraged South Africa, the regional power to export training, intelligence and other required 
assistant aid to its Southern African Development Community (SADC) partners (US Congress, 
2005:78). 
2.3.3.6. Global Level of Analysis  
This is the final level of analysis and it is concerned with explaining international outcomes that 
transcend the interactions of states. In short, at this level of analysis, we are forced as scholars and 
researchers to focus our attention on issues from a global perspective. Most issues now have more to 
do with the quality of life than about concerns for war, peace and economic equality, for instance the 
focus is on human rights, good governance, security and stability and sustainable development (Holsti, 
1995:17).   
The United Nations (UN), which was founded in 1945 following the World War II by 51 “peace loving” 
nations’ has grown to 193 member states that have signed a number of global treaties, regional 
conventions and bilateral agreements related to threats of transnational terrorism. The UN’s mission 
according to liberal scholars is to maintain international peace and security, to promote human rights 
and to assist member nations resolve political, cultural and economic problems (Griset and Mahan, 
2003:280).   
In line with the above, scholars and researchers have argued that globalization as a process, has 
significantly narrowed the global space, thus enabling easy international travel and communication 
between countries. It has also made possible transnational terror threats and the prospect for greater 
damage as a result of this threat has increased drastically. In essence, liberal scholars and researchers 
infer that the potential of this damage was manifested sharply by the transnational terrorist attacks on 
United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es-Salaam in 1998, which were followed by a series of 
attacks against selected targets that culminated to the game-changing attacks on the US on September 
11, 2001. Not to be left out, are the series of attacks on a number of capital cities around the world (UN 
Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2006:9).  As such, the proliferation of transnational terrorism 
has sparked a new agency for a global response to this threat and liberal advocates argue that liberal 
institutions such as the United Nations and the African Union are best equipped for such policy 
adventures (UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2006:9). 
A number of African countries have become parties to the international conventions and protocols that 
are related to terrorism and transnational terrorism to be more specific, as well as to the African Union 
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conventions on terrorism. Indeed, South Africa to mention one of these African countries is a party to 
nine of these conventions (Lumina, 2008:184). Moreover, these global mechanisms instruct states to 
assume measures that necessitate legislative responses to combat transnational terrorism. Likewise, the 
African Union Convention enjoins state parties to adopt any legitimate response that is aimed at 
preventing and combating acts of transnational terrorism in accordance with the provisions of the 
convention itself and their respective national legislations (Alexander and Nanes, 1986). 
Multilateral efforts to counterterrorism at the global level begin at the UN through the UN Security 
Council Counter Terrorism Committee. Which has worked to assist Africa to implement UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 13, that requires all states to suppress and prevent terrorist financing, 
improve their state border controls, enhance information sharing and law enforcement cooperation, 
suppress terrorist recruitment and deny terrorist safe havens. Consequently, most African states have 
taken initiatives to implement UNSCR 13, thereby helping to defeat terrorist organizations by attacking 
their sanctuaries, leaderships, finances and command, control and communications and deny them 
further sponsorship, support and sanctuaries by cooperating with other states within the continent (US 
Department of State,2005:9). In addition, the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted in 
September 2001, not only condemns the 9/11 terror events in the US, but it also permits states to take 
the necessary steps in order to prevent the commission of terrorist attacks, including preventing the 
recruitment of members for terrorist groups and organizations, and adopting policies that prevent the 
financing, planning, facilitation and commissioning of terror activities (Lumina, 2008:184).  
Moreover, there are currently 12 universal conventions on specific aspects of terrorism such as 
hijacking of aircrafts; the sabotage of aircrafts; attacks on internationally protected individuals; that 
include heads of state and heads of government, foreign ministers, diplomats etc.; the taking of hostages; 
terrorist bombings and financing of terrorist activities (Lumina, 2008: 182). Additionally, the United 
Nations General Assembly has also established an Ad Hoc Committee on terrorism, which works 
primarily on developing a draft comprehensive anti-terrorism convention that is designed to fill the void 
left by the 12 sectoral treaties (UN, 2002) 
2.4. Defining Policy Response from a Realist Perspective  
2.4.1. Introduction of Theoretical Realism 
According to Hans Morgenthau cited in Art and Jarvis (2009:8), the main signpost that helps political 
realism to find its way through the landscape of international relations is the concept of interest defined 
in terms of power. Thus, it is this power relationship or expressions of power that define realism. 
Similarly, Nalbandov (2012) asserts that power in realism occupies the central place for projecting the 
country’s foreign influence by the statesman. Accordingly, for proponents of realism, there are various 
instruments of power, that are used to foster a state’s interest on the international arena and these include 
diplomacy, information sharing, military and economic strength.  
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Realism is a theory about international politics. It is an effort to explain both the behavior of individual 
states and the characteristics of the international system as a whole. The ontological given of realism is 
that sovereign states are the constitutive components on the international system. This implies that, for 
realists there is no higher authority that can constrain or channel the behavior of states. Sovereign states 
are rational self-seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively concerned with relative gains because they 
must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and well-being ultimately rests on 
their ability to mobilize their own resources and external threats (Grieco, 1988). Accordingly, realist 
scholars have argued that the states’ use of military force to preserve security against internal and 
external adversaries represents its claim to legitimate rule. In addition, treating terrorists as criminals 
may persuade the general public, who are often the victims of terror attacks that the state has legitimate 
authority, because treating terrorists as criminals implies that they have an obligation to obey the state’s 
rule of law (Gilbert, 1994:160). 
Scholars argue that realism tends to be pessimistic about human nature and seeks to define international 
relations through external truths and idealism. In this way, scholars infer that realism can be boiled 
down to a few assumptions with the most important of them being the nature of man. Hence, drawing 
from Legro and Moravcsik (1999:12), the first and least controversial assumptions about realism 
concerns the nature of basic social actors. From this inference, realist proponents assert that realism 
assumes the existence of a set of “conflict groups``, with each organized as a unitary political actor that 
rationally pursues distinctive goals within an anarchic setting (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999).  
Theoretically, realists tend to be distinguished from their traditional rivals the liberals, by their advocacy 
of hard military power over any other means of achieving political consensus.        
Realism as an ideological doctrine has much reliance on nation-states as primary actors of international 
politics. Thus, they predominantly seek to tie terrorism as a state sponsored phenomenon and they 
attempt to reject the rise of transnational organizations on the grounds that, transnational organizations 
and groups will not assume power that is above that of traditional nation-states (Smith, 1987:1-15). As 
such, for realist proponents, the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing global war on 
terrorism, implies that counterterrorism policies ought to be championed using primarily military power 
resources in order to fight the threat that transnational terrorism poses for nation states (Crelinsten, 
2009:10). Likewise, the military approach to counterterrorism, privileges the use of force and 
legitimizes it by changing the legal rules of the game necessary for combating transnational terrorism. 
Also, unilateral actions by those state actors capable of acting singularly if others refuse or are incapable 
of cooperating in the fight against transnational terrorism renders military action in the fight against this 
menace inappropriate because one party uses it to advance its coercive nature to the disadvantage of 
those unwilling or incapable to act (Crelinsten, 2009:10).    
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For realism, there are many other actors that transcend national boundaries, such as International 
Governmental Organizations (IGO)’s, Foundations and Multinational Corporations (MNC)’s, terrorist 
groups, but they contend that these actors can only be understood in the context of a system composed 
of sovereign states. IGO’s are created by states, while MNC’s depend on property rights guaranteed by 
states and Foundations operate according to the laws of states. Terrorists on the other hand, act beyond 
the bounds of state organizations, but they are likely to be ineffectual without the support of states and 
they aim at changing the nature of states, either their boundaries or their political systems (Krasner, 
1992:39)   
2.4.1.1. Individual Level of Analysis 
In line with the above, one might argue that it is worth noting that from a realist point of view, that 
Africa lacks individual actors in terms of formulating policy responses to threats of transnational 
terrorism on the continent’s security and stability. Nonetheless, one prominent African individual actor 
who champions realist thinking in the fight against transnational terrorism in the continent is the Kenyan 
president Uhuru Kenyatta. Other individual actors in the realist approach to transnational terrorism 
response in Africa include the former United States president George W. Bush, French President 
François Hollande and the current US president Barrack Obama.  
In line with the above assertion, one might begin by arguing that the first individual realist advocate to 
be scrutinized in Africa’s attempts to initiate policy responses to threats of transnational terrorism is the 
former United States president George W. Bush and his administration. Accordingly, realist scholars 
assert that, the administration of George W. Bush, perceived transnational terrorism as an empirical 
threat to global security and stability. This required a realist response because he presumed that the 
international system did hamper US efforts to combat a sophisticated actor (al-Qaeda), from outside the 
international state system, then it did to prevent multiple transnational terror attacks against US targets 
from the onset (Buros, 2011). In this way, realists insist that Bush’s administration did not depend on 
alliances and international institutions in response to transnational terrorism; instead, it utilized 
American power to shape the international system through a predominantly unilateral military approach 
to threats of transnational terrorism (Buros, 2011).  
2.4.1.1.1. Realist International Cooperation 
The realist scholars assert that the involvement of African states in the US led global war on terror, 
under the administration of George W. Bush, has resulted in the increasing militarization of the 
continent. These scholars justify their connotation on the grounds that on January 2007, American AC 
130 gun-ships blasted what they termed “suspected al-Qaeda hideouts in Somalia. The ensuing month, 
Washington announced the creation of a dedicated African military command, the AFRICOM (Mills 
and Herbst, 2007:40). In addition, realist proponents argue that US counterterrorism military activities 
in the continent under the Bush administration also included the deployment of approximately 2,000 
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troops belonging to the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) which was 
established in Djibouti in October 2002, under the US Central Command (CENTCOM).  The US State 
Departments’ funded African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme, which was 
responsible for training and equipping African national militaries for conducting peace and security 
support operations and for countering threats of transnational terrorism and also for providing 
humanitarian relief (Mills and Herbst, 2007:42). 
2.4.1.1.2. Militarization of African Responses to Transnational Terrorism 
Moreover, the Obama administration, similar to that of Bush, supports the Transitional Government of 
Somalia, in its bid to fight the threats of transnational terrorism, which emanate largely from Al-
Shabaab, which is reported to be supported by foreign fighters from as far afield as Afghanistan, Britain, 
Pakistan and the US (Harding, BBC News, 2009). As a result, realist advocates points out that, the US 
from time to time sends drone aircrafts to raid targets in Somalia. They also assert that in June 2009, 
the US shipped 40 tons of ammunition to the Ahmed government of Somalia to support its struggle. 
Again, in September of the same year, the US Special forces from an American warship attacked a 
convoy of transnational terrorists, and in the midst of such event killed the Al-Qaeda leader of Somalia 
(Gettleman and Schimtt, 2009).     
In accordance, realist scholars assert that the last individual actor in responding to threats of 
transnational terrorism on Africa’s security and stability is the current Kenyan President Uhuru 
Kenyatta. As such, realist advocates argue that given the nature of the threat that transnational terrorism 
poses for Kenya’s national security, President Kenyatta has responded to these threats by employing 
preemptive counterterrorism policies in order to eliminate these threats. He has authorized the nation’s 
military to launch a military incursion into Somalia against the threatening transnational terror group, 
Al-Shabaab. This military operation was an attempt by the president to demonstrate to the group the 
country’s power and legitimacy in the application of force. Hence, the operation was dubbed “Operation 
Linda Nich``, which is a Swahili phrase for “Operation Defend the Country`` (Odiambo; Maito; 
Kassily; Chelumbo; Onkware; and Oboka, 2013:129). 
Furthermore, the insurrection in Northern Mali, which eventually led to the political coup d’état, was 
prompted by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and by the Ansar Dine, a suspected 
Al-Qaeda terrorist affiliate group. The main objective of the two groups was to achieve independence 
for the northern region of Mali, which they preferred to call Azawad. In the midst of the instability that 
was created by the coup, another group, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) created a stronghold 
in the region and attempted to spread a rigorous version of sharia law throughout the country. In 
response to transnational terrorist threats to security, stability and the execution of six French hostages, 
the French President François Hollande emerged as one of the leading force in countering terrorism in 
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the African region. He encouraged military action in order to boost security and prevent instability in 
the region that emanates from these terror groups that are linked to Al-Qaeda (Ondimba, 2012).  
2.4.1.2. State Level of Analysis 
This is the second level of analysis and it concerns the authoritative decision-making units of governing 
states as well as the collections of individuals such as interest groups and political organizations within 
a country that help shape international events (Uzodike, 2010:20). 
As a line of debate, it is critical to illustrate that this level, counterterrorism responses are not a new 
phenomenon in Africa. In many African countries, colonial regimes sustained all kinds of legislation to 
deal with what they considered terrorist acts, but which the African population fighting for 
emancipation and for their rights considered as a just struggle (Lumina, 2008:184). 
2.4.1.2.1. Militarization of African Responses to Transnational Terrorism 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been an increased engagement between 
the United States and Africa (Francis, 2010: 115).  Accordingly, the magnitude of US policy towards 
Africa has at the same time shifted primarily towards a more aggressive and militarized approach, that 
is aimed at protecting and securing access to strategic resources and military bases, and countering the 
threat of transnational terrorism than simple development (Abrahamsen, 2004: 677). Likewise, realist 
scholar’s asserts that these US policies are justified as part of the global war on terror and in this way, 
there has been an increasing presence of US military in parts of Africa such as the Horn, the and the 
Sahel, which is regarded as a buffer zone between Maghreb and sub-Sahara Africa (Abrahamsen, 
2004:677). In addition, realist proponents argue that, as part of increasing counterterrorism capacity in 
Africa, a number of military training programs have been established by international state actors such 
as the United States and Britain. These programs seek to prevent terrorists from finding convenient 
bases from where to regroup and launch their terror campaigns (Abramovic, 2004; Ellis, 2004; Keen, 
2004a; 2004b; Lyman and Morrison, 2004).  
2.4.1.2.2. Hard power 
Realist scholars argue that, Africa’s military significance to US foreign policy has been countersigned 
by the formation of the US-Africa Command called the AFRICOM in 2007. Additionally, they assert 
that security doctrine between the US and Africa has remained rooted in the political realist thought, 
which dates to the Cold War era. For these scholars, this is because the African state has kept its place 
of importance in security narratives through government-to-government interactions and consultations, 
but also through weapons sales and military training (Metelits, 2004). Moreover, realist proponents 
notes that even responses to other issues facing the continent such as poverty and underdevelopment, 
have become intertwined with countering transnational terrorism. This is because every encounter 
between the continent and the American state have been militarized, and this is demonstrated by the 
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increasing numbers of US civil affairs operations that are concurrent with the shrinking Congressional 
allocations of traditional US support to the continent (Ploch, 2010).  
In line with the above, realist scholars argue that Kenya shares an all but unguarded and unmarked 
border with Somalia and Al-Shabaab has been threatening the country from the Somali side of the 
border, even though Kenya is considered the last front of defense against transnational terrorist threats 
in East Africa (Gettlemam, 2009:11). It is argued that, the group penetrated refugee camps inside Kenya, 
hoping to recruit followers and forced school students to quit their classes and join the group. As a 
response, the Kenyan military forces started to mobilize along the border in an attempt to defend the 
country from the threats (Transnational Threat Update, 2007).    
2.4.1.3. Systemic Level of Analysis 
This level of analysis entails a situation where the interactions of transnational actors congregate on a 
regional or global level. Thus, central to scholarly concerns at this level is the influence of the 
international system on the outcomes of individual states. For instance, this level analyses the role that 
transnational military institutions such as the US-Africa Command (AFRICOM) and European Union 
Command (EUCOM) play in assisting African states tackle systemic threats such as those posed by 
transnational terrorism (Uzodike, 2010:21). 
2.4.1.3.1. Realism and International Cooperation 
In light of the above, Realist scholars argue that, shortly after the terror events of September 11, 2001, 
the United States and its allies set about persuading other members of the international community that 
a militaristic response to the threats posed by transnational terrorism was necessary and justifiable. The 
rationale behind this action to resort to war with terror groups like Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab realist 
asserts was purely on the grounds of self-defense (Dunne, 2009:110).  As such, realist proponents 
drawing from the above activity, asserts that the fundamental rationale behind the US military 
engagement in Africa is the war against transnational terrorist organizations, who also happen to be Al-
Qaeda affiliates. These groups include, Somalia’s Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), 
as well as armed groups such as Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Nigeria’s Boko Haram. 
In addition, to assist African states counter the threats posed by transnational terrorism to the region’s 
security and stability, the U.S. has recruited a diverse assortment of African allies, including those that 
face direct threats from these transnational terror groups. In this way, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti 
and Ethiopia have become key partners in the war against Al-Shabaab, while Niger, Chad and Burkina 
Faso have emerged as important hosts of U.S. operations against AQIM (Opalo, 2014). 
Moreover, a handful of Africa states realists argue have cooperated with the US in countering 
transnational terror threats to their security and stability and these states comprises South Sudan, 
Mauritania, Mali, Ethiopia, Uganda, Niger, Seychelles, Burkina Faso and Kenya, all of which already 
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hosts sites designated for US drones. They host shared bases and military surveillance facilities and in 
addition to this, the US scholars argue maintains a secretive program that trains counterterrorism 
commandos in states that astride the vast Sahara region, whose unmonitored spaces provide a benign 
base for transnational terror organizations (Opalo, 2014). At the same time, the U.S. and European 
Union Command (EUCOM) spearheaded a series of training and military support operations in the 
Sahel, that later blossomed into the much larger Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative that now 
involves both North African and Sahelian states (Lyman cited in Harbeson, J., 2007).  
2.4.1.3.2. Militarization of Africa’s Responses to Transnational Terrorism 
Realist proponents argue that the horn of Africa has become the object of the most intense and most 
militarized US response to transnational terrorism in Africa. Arguably, commencing in 2002, the US 
has stationed more than 10 000 troops in Djibouti under the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 
(CJTK-HOA). In accordance, CJTK-HOA, participates in a joint allied patrol of the Red Sea coastal 
area and carries out a series of civic action and military training programs throughout the Horn and East 
Africa. It is also responsible for gathering intelligence on possible terrorist infiltrations (Lyman cited in 
Harberson, 2007). 
The United States and its partner nations in the Sahara/Sahel regions of Africa, launched the Operation 
Enduring Freedom -Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) which is the name of the military operation that consists 
of counter-terrorism efforts and the policing of arms and drug trafficking across the region (Global 
Security, 6 February, 2007). Likewise, in January 2013, France intervened on behalf of the Malian 
government's request for security against growing threats from transnational terrorists and deployed 
troops into the region. As a subsequent result, the French Launched Operation Serval on 11 January 
2013, with the hopes of dislocating the al-Qaeda affiliated groups from northern Mali (The Guardian, 
14 January 2013.). 
The US Navy’s African Partnership Station Program, originated from a request by the nations 
surrounding the Gulf of Guinea, which sought the US assistance to develop plans to improve their 
regional maritime security against transnational terrorists using the sea as a point entry to the operation. 
Likewise, the navy, working through US embassies in these countries, determines the needs of each 
country and then dispatches ships to offer support to them. This program is meant to provide security, 
defense, training and long-term cooperation between America and African nations (Buss; Adjaye; 
Goldstein and Picard, 2011). Accordingly, this inference was further illustrated by the former Gabon 
president El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, in his speech when he stated that “extremist groups like Al-
Qaeda are no strangers to the African continent with operations in Sudan, Nigeria, and Somalia, most 
notably through the militant group Al-Shabaab. Additionally, their mounting expertise, especially in 
Northern Africa, was demonstrated by Al-Qaeda’s recent involvement in the Malian coup d’état.  As 
such, Al-Qaeda’s naturalization in the African continent has been perceived as a threat not only to 
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regional security, but also to global security. Thus, stabilizing the region and containing the influence 
of extremist transnational terror groups will depend on the international community’s ability to work 
with regional partners” (Omar Bongo Ondimba, 2012). 
2.4.1.4. Global Level of Analysis 
This is the final level of analysis and it is concerned with explaining international outcomes that 
transcend the interactions of states. In short, at this level of analysis, we are forced as scholars and 
researchers to focus our attention on issues from a global perspective. Most issues now have more to 
do with the quality of life than about concerns for war, peace and economic equality, for instance the 
focus is on human rights, good governance, security and stability and sustainable development (Holsti, 
1995:17).   
At this level, one might assert that given the nature of the realist theory of international relations, this 
level in terms of main policy actors, is not applicable to the African scenario because realism does not 
value the activities or the existence of international institutions above state actors. Thus, for realists 
there is no authority beyond that of nation states. 
2.5. Preliminary Conclusion 
In summary, the theory that prevails between liberalism and realism with regards to transnational 
terrorism is liberalism. This is because, even though realism is a stimulating theory, but it places little 
focus on transnational groups and focuses exclusively on nation states. As such, given the upsurge of 
globalization, multinational corporations (MNC)’s, transnational terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, Boko 
Haram, Al-Shabaab etc., international governmental organizations (IGO)’s like the United Nations 
(UN), the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) etc., realism’s lack of emphasis on 
transnational groups is imprudent. 
Furthermore, cooperation and liberal institutionalism as championed by liberal scholars remain the core 
instruments against transnational terrorism. This is because no country in spite of all its capacities can 
fight the phenomenon on its own. As for Africa, the continent needs more attention and assistance from 
the United Nations (UN) and the international community at large. The African Union (AU), as a 
regional body should call upon its member states to ratify the International Convention on Terrorism 
and the African Convention of 1999, together with its protocol. In addition, the AU should help its 
members to implement all elements of the African Union Plan of Action. The action plan was adopted 
in Algiers in 2002 to combat transnational terrorism. Liberalism also theoretically asserts that the 
international community and the UN should also increase assistance to the African states in all its forms, 
legal, institutional and logistical. International liberal institutions should also assist the AU in its efforts 
to solve the existing regional conflicts, in order to prevent the emerging cells of transnational terrorism 
from gaining the grounds in the continent. They should also assist African states in their economic and 
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social development processes, so that all conditions that might trigger Africans to resort to terrorism 
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                                                         Chapter Three 
Historical Background and Literature Review on Policy Responses to 
Transnational Terrorism in Africa 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical background on transnational terrorism in the African continent. It 
begins with an analysis of how our understanding of terrorism today, in all its forms, came about. Its 
then provides clarification about the evolution of the concept of terrorism in Africa and how it became 
linked to forms of violence, the most predominant being political violence. It also traces the advent of 
terrorism in Africa to colonial policies.  
This chapter stresses that, the use of political violence during the colonial era was infiltrated with bias. 
The use of terror during colonial era in Africa was meant to curtail opposition to colonial regimes. The 
approach of colonial rule was not comprehended as acts of terrorism, even though it entailed fear, 
brutality and threatened and disrupted the security and livelihood of civilian populations in Africa. 
However, when the liberation movements resorted to political violence as a last resort of defeating an 
unyielding enemy, they were labelled as terrorists by the colonial regimes. This chapter also identifies 
three epochs of terrorism that are helpful in understanding the evolution of terrorism in Africa.  
3.1.1. Historical Conceptualization of Terrorism in Africa 
On a conceptual level, the lack of accuracy has long been a challenge in international and comparative 
political studies (Smith, 2010:3). Hence, as Giovanni Sartori (1970:1035) notes, some decades ago 
scholarly understanding of terrorism lacked a disciplined use of the terms and procedures of 
conceptualizing the phenomenon. As such, generations of political and social theorists have defined 
and redefined the concept of terrorism. However, the concept of terrorism was developed and defined 
primarily in the context of Western experiences and was not formulated for worldwide or trans-border 
traveling (Sartori, 1970: 1036). 
Terrorism as we understand it today, has remains a deeply challenging concept ever since its early 
modern historical origins in the French Revolution. Yet, scholars argue that, even today academics have 
not reached a clear, consistent and universally agreed upon definition as to what constitutes an act of 
terrorism or who is a terrorist (Laqueur, 2001). Thus, throughout the history of western political 
understanding, which laid the foundations of the phenomenon’s theoretical comprehension, terrorism 
has come to be associated with numerous forms of political violence such as oppressive government 
brutality, armed rebel attacks, political assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings and suicide bombings 
(Hubschle, 2006:2-18). Griset and Mahan (2003:1) assert that the acts of terrorism have historically 
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been committed by individuals and groups as well as by state and non-state actors and it has formed 
part of the history of virtually every country in the world with its causes varying from widely over time 
and place.  
Likewise, Schmid (2004) asserts that as contemporary scholars of terrorism, our understanding of the 
phenomenon as an act of political violence has been shaped at most part by the theoretical lens, the 
cultural and ideological words of the interpreting subject-scholar. In simple terms, this premise suggests 
that the conceptual lenses through which scholars have historically attempted to understand the 
phenomenon encompasses among other things politics, war, religion, crime and communication. As 
such, one might argue, drawing from Malinda Smith (2010:3) that the lens through which scholars have 
conceptualized terrorism are not mutually complete or essentially all-encompassing. According to him 
individual scholars have tended to privilege one or the other’s conceptual description of the 
phenomenon and this in turn has shaped how the concept of terrorism gets to be universally understood. 
For instance, in the past the enslavement, colonization and the struggle to liberate oneself from these 
forms of subjugation were seen as acts of terrorism by the interpreting subject scholars Smith (2010:5).   
In line with the above, one might add that even among the African populace, the conceptualization of 
terrorism meant that the phenomenon is understood as a form of political violence directed at the 
presiding regime due to conceptual perceptions of the phenomenon by Africa’s historical rulers (Smith, 
2005:165). Accordingly, scholars argue that when some of the continent’s well-known native 
intellectuals in the decolonization struggle championed political violence against colonization, they 
were labelled as terrorists because their actions at that time were seen as acts of terror. For instance, 
when Amilcar Cabral advocated for an all peoples war against imperial Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau 
and the Cape Verde Islands, he was deceived and assassinated by agents of colonial rulers for 
perpetrating political violence against a system that was oppressing the people (Chabal, 1983; Dhada, 
1973 and Bienen, 1977). 
3.1.2. Terrorism as a Political Violence and its Responses during Africa’s Colonial Era 
Throughout history, every terrorist has been claimed to be a freedom fighter battling against repression 
and appalling cruelties (Oche, 2014:2). Accordingly, scholarly research on terrorism within 
international politics calls into question the ways in which some acts of political violence have been 
legitimized and authorized. For instance, the hegemonic status of the United States can function to 
protect its political violence from being conceptualized under the rubric of terrorism, while some acts 
of the same nature by others are classified as terrorism (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989). In line with this 
assertion, one of African scholars who is among the best-known anticolonial theoreticians, Franz Fanon, 
advocated for political violence as a norm against the brutal nature of colonial subjugation and rule. His 
argument rested on the belief that political violence and action have a psychologically emancipatory 
potential to drive out the “systemized`` dehumanization of European colonial rule in Africa (Fanon, 
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1969). Fanon as a psychiatrist even willingly offered to equip Algerian anticolonial fighters using 
psychological techniques to help them resist the torture that was systematically practiced by the French 
in colonial Algeria (Bancel; Blanchard and Lemaire, 2001). 
Nonetheless, France as the colonial power in Algeria at that time responded to the championing of 
political violence in the country against its rule by declaring Fanon a “persona non grata``, literally 
meaning an “unwelcome person``. In short, what we perceive in the imprisonment of Nelson Mandela 
and other liberation leaders in South Africa during the apartheid regime; the political assassination of 
Cabral by the colonial regime in Guinea-Bissau; the coup d’état and assassination of Patrice Lumumba 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the labelling of Fanon as a persona non grata by the 
French colonial regime, implies that no matter how brutal, unjust and terrorizing the colonial regime 
was, it had the authority to the legitimate use of force (Smith, 2010:13). Similarly, the subjugation, 
assassinations, expulsion from mainstream politics and unspecified detentions that were suffered by 
African intellectuals in the name of liberation were not assumed to be forms of state sanctioned 
terrorism but instead as legitimate national security responses by colonial regimes against terror threats 
(Gordon, Sharpely-Whiting and White, 1996). 
On the contrary, African anti colonialists no matter how just their cause was, were considered terrorists 
and as threats to the security and stability of the colonial state. In the end, it was the victorious colonial 
regime, who received both the spoils and the authority to shape and tell the hegemonic story of terrorism 
(Smith, 2010:14). The contention here is that the struggle to emancipate the African continent from the 
repressive rule of colonialism was often labelled as terrorism. In order to elaborate on this argument 
clearly, one might draw from the experiences of apartheid regime in South Africa to illustrate the 
politics of interpretation of terrorism in the African continent. In June 1967, the apartheid government 
in South Africa introduced the Terrorism Act No.83 of 1967. The act roughly defined terrorism as any 
act which endangered the preservation of law and order in the republic (Smith, 2010:15). 
In addition, the act re-conceptualized many criminal acts as terrorism and made terrorism equivalent to 
treason. Moreover, under the terrorism Act, only the authority of a police officer was essential to 
indeterminately detain a suspected terrorist without a right to free trial (Smith, 2010). It is important to 
note that, since the law incorporated as terrorism the intent or conspiracy to harm the prevailing 
apartheid order, then it is understood that by definition any act by individuals or organizations that 
aimed at overthrowing the repellent apartheid regime could be interpreted as terrorism and certainly as 
treason (Smith, 2010:16). 
3.1.3. Responses to Political Terrorism by International Actors during Africa’s Colonial Period 
Scholars have argued that both the Nixon and the Reagan administrations in the United States were 
friendly to the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Reagan administration, in particular, classified the 
African National Congress (ANC) as a terrorist organization (Smith, 2010:14). Rather than distancing 
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itself from the brutality of the apartheid regime, the US supported the imprisonment of Nelson Mandela 
and the banning of the ANC. It also placed the ANC and other liberation leaders on its pre-9/11 terrorism 
watch list. In an interview with the CBC News in 1981, President Reagan was quoted saying: 
“It is the United States’ interest to support the apartheid regime because South Africa is a country that has stood 
by us in every war that we’ve fought. A country that is strategically essential to the free world in its production of 
minerals`` (www.democracynow.org, 2004).     
The ANC remained on the US’s terrorism watch list through the administrations of both George H. 
Bush and William Jefferson Clinton well into post-9/11 transnational terror attacks. It was not until 
April 2008 that the then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, canvassed for the removal of the 
ANC from the terrorism list at the US Senate (The Australian, 2008).  She said that, “it had become a 
rather chastening matter that she still had to waive on her own counterpart, the then South African 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Nkosazane Dlamini Zuma, and not to mention the great icon, former 
president Nelson Mandela`` (The Australian, 2008). Subsequently, the ANC was delisted from the US 
terror watch list (CNN.com, 2008).  
National liberation movements across the African region resorted to all forms of political violence such 
as acts of sabotage against colonial regimes from Kenya to Guinea-Bissau and Algeria to South Africa. 
These freedom fighters engaged in acts regarded by the colonial regimes as terrorism in order to put an 
end to the brutal colonial rule in Africa (Gunning, 2007 and Jackson, 2007). As such, this essential 
distinction acknowledges the fact that people have a fundamental right to be emancipated from the 
chains of slavery and colonialism. Non-violent approach is not the only means to attain freedom form 
colonial rule.  
3.1.4. Terrorism as Political Violence and its Responses during Africa’s Post-Colonial Era 
Terrorism has long been recognized as a recurring feature of political violence. However, the events of 
September 11, 2001 and the dominant communicative response of the US made terrorism and the global 
war on terror a defining aspect of the historical moment. The US position encompasses responses to 
threats of transnational terrorism (Baudrillard, 2001:11). This illustration draws from the premise that 
the Bush administration’s response to the 9/11 attacks was to declare a permanent state of emergency 
and to call for an endless global war against transnational terrorists. The theater of this anti-terrorism 
campaign later shifted from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 to an open ‘new front’ on the African 
continent, a move that included the 2006 proxy intervention by Ethiopia on neighboring Somalia 
(Smith, 2010:6).  
Political violence has since continued to be the foundational factor of terrorism in the continent. This is 
because no state in the African continent has proved to be exempted from the exercise of political 
terrorism. One might draw from a multitude of contemporary instances from the developments in, 
Mauritania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Central Africa 
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Republic, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Algeria, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, all of which provide a deep sense 
of the persistent nature of this practice (Davis, 2013:4). In most cases, the violence is usually associated 
with the authoritarian state that seeks to cling on to power. The consequence of this is repressive rule 
and indiscriminate killing of political opponents.  
This development has been the most common feature of politics in the post-colonial Africa. In some 
cases, political violence occurred in some states whose post-independent governments have maintained 
relationships with their former colonial masters. The outcome was the rise in anti-government 
movements. Consequent to this, guerrilla war and other rebellious and insurgent activities have 
prevailed in such states (Davis, 2013:4). 
Likewise, political violence in post-colonial African states has been instigated by religious, ethnic, clan 
and even tribal rivalries that have led to mass deaths and destruction of villages. Thus, transnational 
terror groups like al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab exploit existing political violence within the state so as to 
recruit supporters through propaganda stimulation.  This has led to the increased violence and political 
crisis in most African states. In the light of the above, one might assert that the end cycle of political 
violence in Africa has no limit and indeed many of these cases mentioned above are historic whether 
from the case of Rwanda, to that of South Africa and Algeria. This demonstrates the pervasive nature 
of terrorism in the continent in the form of political violence (Aussaresses, 2004). 
3.2. Historical Evolution of Transnational Terrorism in Africa 
Historicizing the phenomenon of transnational terrorism in Africa often leads one to the mid-morning 
events of 7 August, 1998, where bombs explosions killed 213 people at the US embassy building in 
Nairobi, Kenya. Out of these casualties, 12 were American citizens. At the same time, there was an 
explosion at the US embassy building, in Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing a few dozen and injuring 
about 70 others (Ajayi-Soyinka, 2003:604). Prior to these events, the discourse of transnational 
terrorism in the continent was often centered on the June 1995 incident in Ethiopia, when members of 
the Islamic Group, allegedly planned the assassination of the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, 
while in Addis Ababa attending a summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (New York 
Times, 1995).  
Nonetheless, scholars have argued that a critical history of transnational terrorism in Africa must also 
take into consideration the events that happened precisely seven months after the 9/11 attacks, on 11 
April 2002, when Al-Qaeda launched its first attacks on North African soil (Smith, 2010:53). The target 
of the attack was the El Ghariba Synagogue on the Tunisian Island of Djerba, where 21 people were 
killed (The Guardian 2002 cited in Chelin, 2015). This attack according to Chelin, (2015:109) not only 
signaled the emergence of al-Qaeda in North Africa, but it also marked the beginning of the group’s 
reign on transnational terror. This later expanded to the Maghreb region and possibly the whole of 
Africa. This is because this event was followed by a series of transnational terror incidents in which, 
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Islamic militias, which are al-Qaeda affiliates targeted hotel resorts and other places in the region where 
Western interests seems to be strong (Burke, 2002:3-85). 
The African continent’s historic encounter with transnational terrorism can be divided into three stages, 
namely: The Afro-Eastern epoch, the Afro-Western epoch, and the Afro-global epoch. 
3.3. The Three Stages of Africa’s Historical Encounter with Transnational Terrorism 
3.3.1. Afro-Eastern Epoch 
Transnational terrorism in the Afro-Eastern epoch was characterized by external and internal features. 
The external character of terror was triggered by the invasion of sub-Saharan Africa by the Arab 
merchants in search of slaves. The Arab merchants and missionaries arrived into the equatorial regions 
of Africa, where they terrorized the local population and herded them into slavery in the Arabian 
Peninsula (Lewis, 1994). Lewis (1994) further argues that, this encounter marked the first incidents of 
slave trade in the history of black Africa. Historical records have it that the first man to call people into 
prayers in the minaret was Bilal ibn Rabah, who was born as an African slave in Mecca in 580 AD 
(Levtzion and Pouwels, 2000). He was chosen by the Prophet Muhammad himself for his beautiful 
voice. During this epoch of black African history, terrorism also founded a counterfoil in locally 
instigated terror, which was based on terrorism of African societies of this period. Gibb (1929:317-23) 
asserts that apart from some collaboration with the slave traders from the East, black African history 
during this epoch also featured some elements of another form of terror, that is of cannibalism. 
His premise rested on one of the earliest sources of African history, which provided a vivid insight into 
the terror of cannibalism in the continent. These sources draw from the writings of Ibn Battuta, a 
Moroccan explorer who embarked on a journey in 1352 into what was the unexplored regions of Africa 
and the Middle East and from where he eventually came up with some of the most distinguished records 
of pre-modern African history (Smith, 2010: 57). The voyages of Ibn Battuta to Africa, particularly to 
Mali in West Africa corresponded with the time in which the famous King of Mali, Sulayman Mansa 
Musa, was on the throne. According to Ibn Battuta one of the most terrifying features of some groups 
among black Africans at those times was cannibalism. Ibn Battuta’s chronicles as compared to those of 
other Arab writers of that time were given much credence by the international community for one good 
reason that, they were based on his direct contact with black Africans whom he wrote about (Gibb, 
1929). 
3.3.2. Afro-Western Epoch 
The second stage of Africa’s encounter with transnational terrorism was heralded by the arrival of 
Europeans in the continent in the late sixteenth century. The active engagement of Europeans in the 
enslavement of Africans signaled the beginning of the Afro-Western epoch of terrorism. During this 
period, slavery remained the greatest act of terror to be experienced by Africans for centuries to follow 
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(Smith, 2010:58). Physical torture and death suffered by Africans during this epoch cannot be 
replicated. Nevertheless, contemporary black Africans still bear their scars and are permanently pained 
every time they imagined sufferings of their forefathers when they were herded into slave ships to 
embark on an unknown destination into the America’s and imperial Europe. Sinclair (2004:102) infers 
that contemporary Africans both on the continent as well as those in the diaspora are pained by the fact 
that their forefathers were trapped like game. They were physically examined in a similar way as horses, 
bought and branded like cattle, herded in barracoons like pigs, chained below decks like wild beasts. 
Then imprisoned and led out to labour in the American fields under the whip like donkeys until they 
were worn to death. 
The former British Prime Minister Tony Blair cited in (Smith, 2010:59) asserted that the European 
enslavement of Africans was a form of terror that neither apology nor reparation can appease. In 
compliance with the above assertion, one might infer that the demise of slavery marked the commencing 
of the third and final historical epoch of terrorism in Africa, the Afro-global epoch.  
3.3.3. Afro-Global Epoch 
This epoch began with the scramble for states in the continent by European colonizers. For the native 
Africans, the beginning of colonial rule meant a transition from one form of terror to another. This is 
because unlike in the era of slavery where Africans were forced out of their native lands, taken into 
foreign lands, and shackled like animals, colonialism did not demand this from the natives. Rather the 
system of colonialism demanded that Africans should remain second-class citizens in their native lands 
(Okere, 2009). The British government and some other Europeans countries managed to successfully 
colonize Africa through the instrumentality of the Bible and the bullet (Memmi, 1991:8). In this way, 
the fear prompted by the brutality of the British colonialists warranted the swift establishment of their 
sovereignty over much of Africa and colonial terror became the definite means upon which their 
colonial empire in Africa could be expanded (Smith, 2010:60). 
Colonialism was rooted in Africa by means of political violence as a way of sustaining the system from 
the Cape to Cairo and from Senegambia to the horn of Africa (Smith, 2010:61). Prior to the forceful 
occupation of Egypt in 1881, the British imperialists were continuously attacked by native Egyptians 
whom they sought to conquer. In an attempt to curb these attacks, the British employed the instrument 
of terror. They did this by wiping off the map of a whole village just because of the death of a soldier 
in the desert due to exhaustion. As a result of this assault, the British authority was able to occupy the 
Egyptian landscape after having terrorized and instilled a sense of fear among native Egyptians (Ahmed, 
1999:35). The same could be said about the history of French colonial rule in the continent and this 
could not be more horrific then it was in Algeria, where the French imperialists using the foundations 
laid out by Napoleon Bonaparte in the 18th century, initiated the instrument of terror in order to force 
Algerians into submission. The crimes committed by France during its 130 years’ rule in Algeria and 
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particularly during the eight-year war of independence in which hundreds of thousands of Algerians 
lost their lives have been forgiven but they will always remain in the heart of Algerians (Bouche, 
1998:23).   
Commentators on the historical evolution of transnational terrorism in Africa argue that torture was a 
principal element of French colonial rule and was installed from the onset of Algerian conquest in 
January 1830 and the French army massacred or deported villagers en-masse, raped women and took 
children hostages, stole harvests and livestock and even destroyed orchards (Le Cour Grandmaison, 
2001). In addition, those who were engaged in these acts of terror individually benefited as Louis-
Phillippe and subsequently Napoleon III awarded their army generals with promotions. In simple terms, 
scholar’s asserts that due to fierce eager by European colonists to dominate and control native Africans 
in their own lands, the Algerian war of independence against the French remains a touchstone of the 
barbarity and cruelty of transnational terrorism in the history of Africa’s encounter with terrorism (Le 
Cour Grandmaison, 2001). 
3.4. Literature Review  
3.4.1. Defining Terrorism 
Terrorism is a global phenomenon that is easy to identify but difficult to define. Scholars all over the 
world define it based on their socio-economic and political conditions. Those affected by social and 
economic problems conceptualize terrorism as conflict in the society between affluent and the destitute. 
On the other hand, those experiencing the manifestation of terror tactics to gain political benefit consider 
it as a political phenomenon, hence in all its attempts one might infer that the word 'terrorism' is 
interpreted to suit different interests (Prabha, 2000: 125). One might assert that there is not one but 
many definitions of terrorism. Beginning in the 1920’s, the international community at large have 
fruitlessly attempted to construct a unanimously agreed upon definition of terrorism. Gurr (1970: 11) 
asserts that the reason that there is not one but many definitions of terrorism because terrorism means 
different things to different people. Some scholars, motivated by their self-insights of the phenomenon, 
have interpreted it to suggests a method of political violence that is incorporated under conspiracy, 
rebellions, coups d’état, political assassinations, and small-scale guerrilla wars. Oyeniyi, cited in 
Okamu and Botha (2007:43) argues that some scholars have interpreted the phenomenon to mean an 
attempt to achieve political ends by creating a climate of fear through bombing, assassination, 
kidnapping and seizure of aircraft, or the undermining of confidence in a state’s ability to protect its 
citizens or to gain publicity for a cause. 
Drawing from Lumina (2007: 121), one might maintain that the inability of scholars to arrive at a 
universally acceptable definition is first and foremost attributed to the fact that terrorism is a highly 
provocative and indefinable concept. Terrorism induces strong emotional and conflicting responses 
from those who errands themselves with the task of defining the phenomenon. There is lack of clarity 
41 | P a g e  
 
as to who and what constitute a terrorist and how to efficiently respond to its’ threats. Hence, for the 
purpose of this study we handpicked some few definitions of this phenomenon that are put forward by 
scholars as well as by state and non-sate actors of international politics.  
This study is interested in examining transnational terrorism in the African continent. Its’ therefore 
commences by explaining the phenomenon as argued by the African Union’s Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism which was cited in Botha (2007: 2). The Convention defined 
terrorism as any act, which is a defilement of the criminal laws of a state party concerned. It also asserted 
that any act, which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause severe injury or 
death to any person, member or group of persons, or that may cause destruction to public or private 
property, to natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage, amounts to acts of terrorism. In 
addition to this, any act that is calculated or intended to primarily intimidate, put into fear, or induce 
any governing body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, with the intention to force 
it to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according 
to certain principles. Secondly, to disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the 
public or to generate a public emergency, or thirdly, to create a general insurrection in a state amounts 
to terrorism (Botha 2007: 2). 
One might further examine the definition of terrorism from the Islamic perspective. Some scholars and 
global security observers have argued that modern forms of transnational terrorism in Africa and the 
world at large poses a serious threat to regional and international security and stability. They have 
argued that the terrorist groups are connected to religious extremism mostly from the Islamic faith as it 
is witnessed in the activities of Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, and ISIL etc. This argument, 
according to Botha and Solomon (2010:1) stems from the political outlook that on an international scale 
the greatest challenge presented by Islamic religious antagonism to regional and global security and 
stability does not necessarily rest on political or economic domination of any specific country. The 
formation of transnational terrorist networks has had devastating consequences on the security and 
stability of individual countries as witnessed in the twin bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in the late 1990’s but also by the disastrous attacks of the twin towers on 11 September 2001 
on US soil (Smith, 2010: 85).  
It is important to highlight that this study does not link terrorism with Islamic faith, but rather it seeks 
to draw the definition of terrorism from the Islamic standpoint. Modern transnational terrorism in many 
parts of the world, as in Africa, has taken the face of Islam. The Convention of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating International Terrorism, which was held in 1999, defined 
terrorism in its article 1, as any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions, 
perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people. It 
further stated that threat to harm or imperil lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the 
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environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards amounted to terrorism. Aside from 
the above, the Convention averred that any act that threatens to or occupy or seize any territory or 
endanger a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, 
political unity or sovereignty of independent States amounted to terrorism (Aboboaie, 2010:1). 
Given the crucial role played by the United States in the global war on terror, this research finds it 
essential to acknowledge the definition of this phenomenon from the US policy perspective. The US 
Patriot Act of 2001, defined terrorist activities to include threatening, conspiring or attempting to hijack 
airplanes, boats, buses or other vehicles. More so, as any activity that is threatening, contriving or 
attempting to commit acts of violence on any protected persons, such as government officials.  
Alternatively, any crime that is committed with the use of any weapon or dangerous device with a 
determined aim of endangering the public safety or to cause substantial property damage instead of a 
mere personal monetary gain amounts to terrorism (Kiras, 2005). In line with this, the US Army noted 
that terrorism implies the calculated use of violence or threats of violence to attain goals that are 
political, religious or ideological in nature (U.S. Army, 2001: 37).  Such violence is expressed through 
intimidation, coercion or instilling fear in a targeted audience. 
The UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 which was adopted on December 9, 1994 and titled 
“Measures to Eliminate Transnational Terrorism,” contained a provision that defined terrorism as 
criminal acts that are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable. Whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that 
may be invoked to justify them (Prabha, 2000: 130). However, one might argue that the UN Member 
States still have no agreed-upon definition of terrorism and this fact has been attributed to one of the 
major obstacles to meaningful international countermeasures (Suarez, 2008:11). 
In addition, to these definitions of terrorism by international non-state actors, scholars of international 
relations such as Viotti and Kaupi (2001) have defined terrorism as a politically motivated violence 
directed against non-combatants and designed to instill a sense of fear in a targeted audience. They 
argue that, despite the fact the use of violence for the attainment of political goals is common to both 
states and non-state groups, there is no acceptable agreement on when is it considered legitimate to use 
violence to achieve political motives. As such, one might infer that in line with the definitional attempts 
put forward by scholars and actors of international politics, this research adopts the AU definition of 
terrorism on the grounds that such classification of terrorism provides the necessary context on what an 
act of terrorism in a strictly African framework implies. In order to arrive at this, one might briefly 
differentiate between the many types of terrorism. 
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3.4.2. Types of Terrorism 
Transnational terrorism according to Anderson (1998:282) cited in Anneli Botha (2007:3), refers to the 
use or threat of use of anxiety such as extra ordinary violence for the attainment of political purposes 
by an individual or by a group of individuals. Such people could be acting for or in opposition to 
established governmental authority. Such action could be extended to influence the outlooks and 
behaviours of a targeted group across national boundaries. To simplify this definition, transnational 
terrorism is carried out by autonomous actors, regardless of support from sympathetic states actors and 
whose instrument of tenacity together with its implications surpass national boundaries of sovereign 
states (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2010:6). 
International terrorism, on the other hand as argued by Anneli Botha (2007:3) consist of acts of terror 
that are impelled by a third state and whose implication has international consequences because they 
include incidents where the perpetrators cross national borders in order to strike at foreign targets. 
Moreover, scholars believe that such perpetrators of terror select their victims or targets because of their 
connections to a particular foreign country, for instance diplomats or local executives. In addition, this 
type of terrorism is largely associated with the Cold War. A classic example is the hijacking of an Israeli 
air flight in 1968 by a group of terrorists who belonged to the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) (Mickolus, 1980). The aircraft landed in Algeria and Algerian authorities airlifted all 
non-Israeli passengers to France. In the cause of the event, the Israeli and Algerian governments 
negotiated for the release of the hostages and the plane through diplomatic channels. Thus in the ensuing 
weeks, all hostages including the crew members were released in exchange for 16 convicted Arab 
terrorists (Mickolus and Flemming, 1988: 156). 
It was not unusual for African liberation movements and their colonial adversaries to resort to operations 
that would in nowadays only be labeled as terrorist in nature. Imobighe (2006:16) asserts that domestic 
terrorism relates to those acts of terrorism that are carried out by individuals or local groups within the 
perimeters of a state.  Such acts are designed to redress domestic grievances. Domestic and transnational 
terrorism cannot be separated since both are important to understanding and assessing the causes and 
implications of transnational terrorism to Africa’s security and stability. It is often through domestic 
challenges and grievances that transnational terrorism finds space among African states.  
Botha (2007:6) have argued that a host of African countries have exploited the international call for 
countering terrorism by using it as an excuse for shelving the necessary domestic reforms. He notes that 
some states have exploited the counter terrorism campaign to commit extensive human rights violations 
against their nationals. For instance, the Kenyan government has been using its policing mechanism to 
respond to threats of terrorism by indiscriminately detaining its nationals of Somali origin. Kenyan 
authorities have also send troops into Somalia to attack Al-Shabaab bases. However, such moves have 
been criticized by diplomats and analysts as being inept. These observers also cautioned that such far-
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reaching campaigns would create a sense of resentment among Muslims in the country and thus, 
providing Al-Shabaab with an opportunity to capitalize on the situation (Reuters, 2015). The victims of 
the attacks in Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and Garissa University were mostly foreigners and non-Muslims.  
From the above, one might infer that domestic upheavals contribute to transnational terrorism by 
providing safe-havens for transnational terror cells to operate, thereby increasing insecurity and 
instability among states in Africa. This has led the United Nations to implement a Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy in Eastern Africa, which seeks to promote effective leadership through regional and 
international initiatives. This will address the threat posed by Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, 
Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations operating within the continent in order to reduce 
transnational implications on Africa’s security and stability (The Independence, 14 July 2015). 
State terrorism on the other hand entails a systematic use of terror by government in order to control its 
population. This type of terror is entirely carried out by the group holding power in a country and is 
often inflicted with a purpose of eliminating opposition to government rule. According to Hoffman 
(1998:164), radical states sponsored terrorist groups emerged as a deliberate foreign policy tool for a 
cost-effective way of waging proxy wars. Armed proxy combatants are used against political opponents 
by the ruling regime. With enhanced resources at their disposal, state-sponsored terrorist groups are 
often capable of carrying out more deadly attacks than other terrorists, including aerial bombings. 
Another form of terror is that of religious terrorism which is perpetrated by religious ideologies and 
grievances. Religious terrorism is particularly dangerous because of the fanaticism of those who 
practice it and their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the cause. In addition, religious terrorists are 
likely to use “all in” tactics such as suicide bombings in order to advance their cause. This is often made 
possible by religious teachings that are used to justify and even encourage this kind of self-sacrifice 
(Peters, 2004).  
Additionally, right wing terrorism aims at combating liberal governments and preserving traditional 
social orders. This type of terrorism is commonly characterized by militias and gangs, which often 
employ their violent terror tactics under racial motivations and aim to marginalize minorities in a state. 
The majority of right-wing groups do not advocate any specific program or reform, rather they prefer 
to shield behind elusive slogans of strident nationalism, the need for racial purity and re-assertion of 
governmental strength. As such, like other terrorist organization the more cultured right-wing groups 
also seek targets that are likely to advance their cause. These groups frequently attack immigrants and 
refugees from the developing world and are racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic (Hoffman, 1998:165). 
On the other hand, left wing terrorists’ organizations seek to overthrow capitalist democracies and 
establish socialist or communist regimes in their place. They aim to attack the established system in 
order to do away with class distinctions. Because they perceive the majority of civilians as suffering 
under capitalist exploitation, leftwing terrorists have sometimes limited their use of violence to avoid 
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hurting the victims they were out to save. Although these groups still exist in contemporary international 
system, they are not as prominent as they were during the Cold War epoch (Laqueur, 2001: 75).  
Separatist terrorism seeks to cause fragmentation within a country and to establish a new state. This 
form of terrorism is often used by minorities within a nation state that desire self-determination 
commonly due to malpractices of discrimination and subjugation by majority groups. These groups 
often draw attention to a fight for ‘national liberation’ that they think the world has ignored. This sort 
of terrorism has been among the most successful at winning international sympathy and concessions. 
Examples of such minorities seeking self-determination include ETA a Basque separatist group from 
northern Spain, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Kurdish PKK in Turkey, the Irish Republican Army in 
Northern Ireland and Chechen Terror groups in Chechnya, southern Russia (Lewis, 1998). The last type 
of terrorism is narco terrorism scholars argue that this form is conducted to further the aims of drug 
traffickers. It may take the form of assassinations, extortion, hijacking, kidnapping of judges, 
prosecutors, law enforcement agents and the general disruption of law and order in a state (Parenti, 
2002).  
3.4.3. Types of Policy Responses to Threats of Transnational Terrorism  
The study of transnational terrorism has been an active field of social research in economics, political 
science, sociology and other related disciplines since the late 1960’s. In the beginning, political sciences 
took a conceptual and historical approach to analyze the study of terrorism, which was however 
pragmatic given the absence of data and theoretical construction of terrorist behavior (Sandler, 
2013:257). As such, scholars argue that policy responses to threats of transnational terrorism often 
entails counterterrorism measures that are used by state governments in order to constrain terrorist 
attacks or curtail their consequences on a state’s security and stability environment (Sandler, 2005:78).  
Arguably, there are five main categories of antiterrorism policies and these are proactive, coercive, 
persuasive, defensive and long-term counter terror policies. Accordingly, a proactive or offensive policy 
tries to target terrorists, their resources and their support base directly. These measures aim to weaken 
the ability of terrorists to operate, thus reducing the frequency and prevalence of terror attacks against 
nations whose security and stability is threatened by transnational terrorism. Security scholars argue 
that such actions often include attacking terrorist’s camps, assassinating their top leaders, freezing 
terrorist assets, reacting against a state sponsor of transnational terrorism, infiltrating terrorist groups 
and gathering and sharing vital information (Sandler, 2005:75). Coercive policy measures on the other 
hand, form the traditional counterterrorism toolbox that relies heavily on the coercive capacity of the 
state. This type of response, analyzes the two most frequently used models of countering transnational 
terrorism, the criminal justice model and the war model. Both these models rely heavily on the state’s 
monopoly on the use of violence, for instance the exercise of hard power as opposed to soft, co-optive 
power (Crelinsten, 2009:48). 
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Persuasive policy response relies on soft, co-optive power because it entails understanding and dealing 
with the ideas that underpin the use of terrorism in social and political life. This policy measure 
incorporates countering not only the violence and the threat, but also the messages that are 
communicated by terrorist cells. This is crucial because terrorists are not interested in their victims as 
much as they are interested in the effect of their victimization on various audiences. In this way, scholars 
argue that the ultimate goal of persuasive counter terrorism is to ensure attitudinal and behavioral 
changes in particular target groups and audiences (Crelinsten, 2009:135). Likewise, defensive or 
passive counterterrorism policies try to protect a potential target against an attack. These measures 
involve the installation of technological barriers such as bomb-sniffing devices, metal detectors and 
even biometric identification. They also include the hardening of targets for instance barriers in front 
of national buildings, the deployment of security personnel on commercial flights and the institution of 
terrorist alert signals (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004). 
Finally, long-term policy responses seek to combine the levels of analysis and to address the complexity 
of the environment in which terrorism develops and evolves. This measure also aims to build resilience 
on the side of policy makers and to take terror out of terrorism by building trust and ceasing policy 
makers from exploiting the fear of terrorism for political or economic purposes (Crelinsten, 2009:194). 
3.4.4. Policy Responses to Threats of Transnational Terrorism by State and Non-State Actors of 
International Politics 
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon for policy makers and so are responses to it. Scholars have asserted 
that some responses to it are more useful for dealing with specific types of terrorism than others. Thus, 
policy responses to threats of transnational terrorism require policy makers in spheres of analysis to 
respond collectively against the threat to Africa’s security and stability. Regional efforts in preventing 
and countering transnational terrorism have a long history in the continent, since Africa was among the 
primary regions of the world to develop a continental framework for combating threats of transnational 
terrorism on its security and stability (Aboboaie, 2010:13). In accordance, scholars argue that attempts 
to counter terrorism culminated in the 1999 African Union Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Transnational Terrorism, which was adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session AU Summit 
that took place in Algiers, Algeria on July 1999. The concluding remarks of the convention, was the 
rejection of all forms of fanaticism and terrorism, whether under the championship of sectarianism, 
tribalism, customary and religion. The convention also required that states parties should criminalize 
terrorist acts under their national laws but in line with the objectives of the convention (Bamidele, 
2014:2). 
According to Oche (2014:10), the threat that transnational terrorism poses to Africa’s security and 
stability was highlighted at the African Union (AU) level, during its constitutive act of the union of 
2002. Where it was stated that the AU shall function in accordance to several principles, one of them 
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being “Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political 
assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive attacks”.  In this way, the AU presents to African states 
guidelines on how to combat transnational terrorism by helping them ensure the strength of their law 
enforcement agencies and border capabilities, which will restraint the illegal movement of terrorists in 
and around the continent (Gearson, 2002). Moreover, the AU Protocol seeks to help African states 
develop the necessary legislative and judicial measures in order to improve their counterterrorism 
capacities that include the development of appropriate knowledge on how to suppress the financing of 
terrorism. This initiative by the AU includes the requirement that member states introduce anti-terror 
legislations and criminalize the funding and money laundering of   transnational terrorism (AU, 2002). 
Since the attacks of 9/11, 2001, the United Nations through its UN Security Council organ has adopted 
several binding resolutions that aimed to restricts terrorism and minimize the ability of terrorists to 
mobilize support (Lumina, 2008:183). Hence, on 28 September 2001, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1373, which sought to criminalize the provision of funds and services to terrorists and the 
freezing of financial assets that belong to individuals who commit acts of terrorism. The Resolution 
also established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC) in order to monitor its implementation (UN, 
2002). In addition, the Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly have collectively 
adopted resolutions that focus on the need to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering the threat of transnational terrorism. The General Assembly resolution adopted on 18 
December 2002, affirmed that states have a duty to ensure that any measure taken to counter threats of 
transnational terrorism complies with their obligations under international law (Elagab, 1999). The GA 
resolution also asks the High Commissioner for Human Rights to take a number of actions including 
examining the question of the protection human rights while countering transnational terrorism (General 
Assembly Resolution, 2003).   
However, one might point out that even though there are a number of international and regional treaties 
that aim to combat the threat of transnational terrorism, it is nonetheless essential to argue that there is 
no single universal convention on the entire phenomenon of terrorism (Lumina, 2008:183). 
Ever since the 9/11 transnational terror incident in the US, the role of counterterrorism has increased 
significantly in Kenya and among most African states. However, the mission to fight transnational 
terrorism in Africa is not a new concept. Prior to September 11, 2001, there were certainly 
counterterrorism units in both the law enforcement and intelligence units of Kenya. The National 
Security Intelligence Service was established following the US embassy bombings of 1998 and Kenya 
also became part of the US Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA)’s (Mogire and Agade, 2011). In 
addition to this, the Kenyan government has also created an anti-terror Police Unit (ATPU), a Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, a National Counter-Terrorism Center and a National Security Advisory 
Committee (Aronson, 2012). 
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3.5. Preliminary Conclusion 
In summary, colonialism and the previous epochs of African enslavement may have been over long 
ago, but the marks of historical transnational terrorism that was left by these epochs on the faces of the 
African populace will remain for centuries to come. Given the brutality and the dehumanizing effects 
that these epochs left on the histories of Africans as a whole from the north to the south and from the 
east to the west of the continent. Arguably, no continent has ever felt the brutality of transnational 
terrorism than Africans. However, what comes as a surprise is the fact that Africans their struggles for 
liberation from the harsh realities of colonial rule get to be labeled as terrorists by colonial regimes and 
their allies. In addition, the historical struggle for independence in Africa has meant that even after most 
or all of Africa has attained freedom, the governments of the post-colonial state also resorted to using 
the instrument of brutality in order to silence their populace. Consequent upon armed resistance against 
colonial rule, the post-colonial African environment has witnessed proliferation of arms. Such arms had 
gotten into the wrong hands such as militias and rebel groups who have embarked on political violence 
as a mechanism to settle political grievances. Thus, political violence in the contemporary epochs is 
seen by many Africans as a way to force the government to address their grievances. Illustration of this 
point is drawn from the current activities of local transnational terrorist groups like Boko Haram and 
Al-Shabaab. These terrorist groups are using political violence to inflict a sense of fear among fellow 
Africans in order to attain their political, religious and ideological goals. There is no doubt that the 
culture of terrorism is deeply rooted in African way of life since even the post-independent African 
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                               Chapter Four 
Examining the causes of transnational terrorism in Africa and the responses 
by African and international policymakers using Kenya as a case study. 
4.0. Causes of Transnational Terrorism in Africa 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to firstly examine the causes of Africa’s vulnerability to threats of transnational 
terrorism and secondly to assess the responses of African and international policymakers on the threat 
of transnational terrorism to Africa’s security and stability. Finally, it draws on the experiences of Kenya 
as a case study analysis of the effects of transnational terrorism on the continent’s security and stability. 
In light of the above, one might stress out that there are numerous causes of transnational terrorism in 
Africa. Bjorgo (2005:3) lists four common causes of transnational terrorism in the continent and often 
the world at large. The first of these is structural causes, which affects people’s lives in ways that they 
may or may not comprehend at systemic and global levels. This includes aspects like demographic 
imbalances, geographic location, globalization, rapid modernization, transitional societies, class 
structures etc. The second deals with facilitator or accelerator causes. These causes render transnational 
terrorism feasible or attractive without it being the primary architect. Instances of such causes as argued 
by scholars include weak state’s poor control of territorial borders, failed states, evolution of modern 
news media and transportation. Some scholars even argue that transnational terrorism occurs mainly 
because modern conditions have made it exceptionally easy to employ terrorist tactics (Bjorgo, 2005:3). 
Thirdly, motivational causes arise from the actual grievances that people experience on an individual 
level, which motivates them to act. In this way, socio-economic conditions, ideologies, political and 
religious leaders are sometimes capable of elevating causes from a structural level to a motivational 
level, thus moving people to act (Bjorgo, (2005:3) cited in Oche (2014:5).  The final cause is the 
triggering cause in which the direct precipitators of terrorist attacks may be historic or proactive events 
such as political calamity, religious extremism, an outrageous act committed by an external actor or any 
other events that might call for revenge or action. Drawing from this argument, scholars assert that even 
diplomatic negotiations may trigger opponents of political compromises to carry out transnational 
terrorist acts in order to undermine the dialogues and to discredit the moderates (Bjorgo, 2005:4). 
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4.1.1. Failed States as causes of Africa’s vulnerability to transnational Terrorism 
Following the transnational terror incidents of 9/11, 2001, failed and failing states became increasingly 
seen as a potentially grave threat; not only to their domestic populations but also to international security 
and stability since they provide avenues for transnational terror organizations to thrive (Boas and 
Jennings, 2007: 478). Osama bin Laden coordinated his terror networks from Afghanistan; there were 
also speculations that al-Qaeda profited from Sierra Leone’s diamonds. Farah (2002) argues that al-
Qaeda cells had planned the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam inside Kenya 
years before the actual incidents. All these conjectures have led to widespread perceptions that failed 
and failing states are a free trade zone for transnational terror organizations and organized crimes 
(Farah, 2002). Africa has been seen as a hub of these sorts of states. This suppressive nature of the post-
colonial African state is replicated by the fact that after independence the first generation of African 
leaders maintained a protracted image of colonial rule, thus failing to think and rebuild a post-
independent democratic state leading mostly towards state failure or collapse (Aboboaie, 2010:4).  
Failed states in the African context refer to states in which government’s legitimate authority has 
collapsed, violence has become endemic and functional governance has ceased to exist. Such states 
have lost their capacity to guarantee safety and security to their citizens. In addition, these are states 
that cannot guarantee human and economic development for the progression of the state. They are also 
unable to provide chances for political participation or respect for human rights (Dempsey, 2006:1). 
Such states have emerged in the post-cold war period as one of the most pressing challenges facing the 
international community. These states, especially in Sub-Sahara Africa have emerged as a challenge for 
the continent’s security and stability. Transnational terror groups use the chaos they have generated to 
shield themselves from effective counterterrorism policies that are advanced by the African Union and 
other state and non-state international actors such as the US, UN etc., in the worldwide war on terrorism 
(Hehir, 2007:315).  
United States policymakers regard failed and failing states in Africa such as Sudan and Somalia to 
mention a few to be the breeding places of transnational terrorism (Piazza, 2008). The US foreign policy 
has remained neutral for a long time in its response to threats of terror posed by failed and failing states 
since it has ignored the dangers that these types of states imply for the security and stability of Africa 
and the international community but also for the US national security itself (Piazza, 2008:469). 
Addressing the dangers of transnational terrorism in Africa requires a high priority policy response on 
the side of policymakers and in line with forward-looking counterterrorism strategies (Hagel, 2004; 
Krasner and Pascual, 2005). African policymakers and their US counterparts have championed the 
acknowledgement of conditions in failed states within the continent that foster or render transnational 
terrorism possible to include extreme political instability, humanitarian crises and poor governance 
(Hagel, 2004; Krasner and Pascual, 2005). Efficient counterterrorism responses are needed to 
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collectively address the underlying causes of transnational terrorism in Africa. The US national Security 
Council (2002) declared and that it was totally unacceptable for the international community to continue 
to wear a veil of ignorance when it comes to threats posed by failed and failing states. The Council 
averred that challenges of failed states transcended national boundaries. One of the consequences was 
the escalation in transnational terror attacks in Africa and across the globe (US National Security 
Council, 2002). 
The assertion that failed and failing states in Africa are encouraging the rise of transnational terrorism 
arises from the premise that state failures are more prone to be targeted by terrorists or to have their 
nationals committing terror attacks in foreign countries. They even stand a more possible chance to host 
active transnational terrorist groups that commits acts of terror abroad (Piazza, 2008:470). Failed and 
failing states are unable to control their own national borders or to project power throughout their 
national territories. Consequently, they continually face threats of secession, civil wars and large scale 
violent internal struggles for effective control between legitimate government and one or more non-
state actors (Routledge, 2003).  
For instance, the Al-Shabaab terror group seeks to overrun Somalia, which is considered a failed state. 
The group initially attempted to establish an Islamic Emirate in Somalia that would also include the 
northeastern region of Kenya, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as well as Djibouti (Al-Shabaab, August 
21, 2001). The Al-Shabaab has ideological links to Al-Qaeda, which is responsible for the 1998 attacks 
on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam. The group was also responsible for the 2002 Mombasa 
hotel bombing. Al-Qaeda exploited the chaos created by failed state institutions in countries like 
Somalia to support and provide funding to terror groups like Al-Shabaab. It developed Somalia as a 
principal hub upon which to stage attacks throughout the East African region (Odhiambo, 2013:127). 
4.1.1.2. Responses to Failed States as Breeders of Transnational Terrorism 
4.1.1.2.1. State level of Analysis 
Africa is becoming a platform for transnational terrorist activities. The United States which is the 
champion of the global war on terror (GWOT) has involved the continent in countering transnational 
terrorism especially in failed states by increasing the militarization of the continent (Mills and Herbst, 
2007:42). The US in this way has implemented pro-active policy strategies as a response to transnational 
terror networks that are operating in the continent’s failed and failing states. Such policies can be 
divided into four broad categories:  
Firstly, the US exerted military operations that aimed at targeting terrorist hubs and sought to destroy 
them using direct military strikes. Secondly, US they have implemented security assistance programs 
that focus on building local state capacities in order to combat transnational terrorist networks within 
individual nation states. It also sought to cultivate local and regional partnerships capable of forestalling 
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the requirements for direct United States intervention in the wake of terrorist crises. Thirdly, the US 
Department of Justice has exploited extradition treaties and partnerships with host nation’s law 
enforcement agencies and internal security forces in order to identify, apprehend and bring to justice 
terror suspects that are operating or have taken refuge in foreign states. It also work with host nations 
and international organizations to restrict the ability of terrorist groups from operating in the global 
commons (Dempsey, 2006:18).  
4.1.1.2.2. Systemic Level of Analysis  
Lastly, in a much broader context, the United States has endorsed strategies that aim to address the root 
causes of transnational terrorism in Africa and the conditions that foster them. However, even though 
such strategies have seen success in most African states, the remaining challenge is how to make them 
efficient in failed states environment given the absence of institutional capacity and infrastructure to 
support them (Dempsey, 2006:19). Despite successive interventions by the US, UN and AU coalitions 
some states in Africa continue to be classified as failed states. In a bid to counter transnational terrorism 
in these states and Africa as a whole, the UN has amended counterterrorism priorities, mandates, 
activities and objectives which the African Union determines as it priorities in preventing and 
combating transnational terrorism in the continent. These priorities conjointly by the United Nations 
and the African Union cover three broad arenas, namely counterterrorism legislations, operational 
mechanisms and capacity building. However, due to variations in recognizing priorities and capacities 
of the UN and AU institutions, the consequences have been a more focus on security related issues with 
less emphasis on stability related subjects which come in the form of economic development, which 
best echoes African states (UNOSAA, 2003:21).  
4.1.2. Weak States as causes of Africa’s vulnerability to transnational Terrorism 
The long process of state formation and decline in post-colonial Africa is connected to transnational 
networks in complex ways. Just as in the era of colonization, trading companies and religions aided and 
supported the expansion of the state system from its European core to the world beyond its frontiers. 
The September 11, 2001, and the subsequent global war on terror have not fundamentally transformed 
the dynamic interplay of territoriality and transnationalism (Booth and Dunne, 2002:15). The weak 
nature of many African states as a result of incapacity to control its territory has been cited as one of 
the obstacles to economic and political development in the continent (Kirwin and Cho, 2010:3). This is 
one of the causes of the increasing threats of transnational terrorism on the continent’s security and 
stability (Kirwin and Cho, 2009). 
Weak states are states that supply less political goods in comparison to strong states and have a tendency 
to become a failed state if not properly addressed. Such states are also categorized as fragile states due 
to their fragile institutional capacity and their inadequacy to project power within their territorial 
boundaries (Whitaker, 2010:640). Thus, Herbst (2000) argues that the inability of African states to 
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project power through their domestic institutions contributes towards their weakness in the fight against 
threats of transnational terrorism to the security and stability of the continent. He further asserts that 
incomplete control over the hinterland of most African states is responsible for the incidents of political 
violence. The primary challenge in terms of threats of transnational terrorism is that African leaders are 
incapable of governing and providing order and security to their citizens. Following the twin bombings 
of the US embassies in 1998 in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam, the likelihood of Africa becoming a haven 
for transnational terrorists was heightened. The continent is made up of weak multi-ethnic states with 
underdeveloped police, military and intelligence forces that include the mostly ungoverned territories, 
which promote unregulated access to artilleries (Mills and Herbst, 2007:42).   
Colonially bequeathed, artificial state borders divide local ethnic groups, making people on either side 
of the border to show first and foremost more allegiance to their extended family networks than to their 
central governments (Piombo, 2007). This in turn made the continent more vulnerable to transnational 
terrorism because of clan loyalties and trading and smuggling routes in the continent, which date back 
centuries. Weak and porous borders in conjunction with migrant groups makes it impossible to maintain 
track of people and the free flows of people and goods across African borders, often facilitate the 
transport of goods and commodities such as weapons and transnational terror recruits (Piombo, 2007). 
Weak and poor sea controls along the coast of the horn of Africa and downwards the East and Central 
African regions made it virtually impossible to monitor the African coastline (Piombo, 2007). This has 
added a maritime dimension to the difficulties being faced by African policy makers in tracking 
transnational terror activities and financing (Piombo, 2007). 
African weak states retain the outward signs of sovereignty and functional governance even though they 
are not fully functional. This promotes transnational terrorism in the continent in two ways: firstly, the 
principle of sovereignty shields transnational terrorists from the military and law enforcement capacities 
of foreign states that are targeted by or are interested in addressing threats of transnational terrorism. 
Sovereignty imposes legal limits on the intervention by other states. Secondly, government officials in 
weak states are susceptible to manipulation by transnational terrorist.  This is often facilitated partly by 
the raging poverty and corruption, as most government officials would be ready to compromise their 
official position on the platter of corruption (Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002:100). Thus, such government 
officials will not hesitate to provide transnational terrorists with access to legal documentations such as 
passports, visas and even end-user certificates to import export arms, in exchange for money, political 
support and even physical protection given the vulnerable nature of weak states (Piazza, 2008:472). 
4.1.2.1. Critiques of Weak States as Perpetrators of Transnational Terrorism in Africa 
Some scholars are against the theoretical model that weak states are key contributors of transnational 
terrorism in Africa (Menkhaus, 2003 and von Hippel, 2002). They argue that weak states are actually 
undesirable locations for terrorist organizations to base their activities, since transnational terrorists in 
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these countries are essentially vulnerable to the policing efforts of third-party states (Menkhaus, 2003 
and von Hippel, 2002). These critiques also assert that a very limited number of foreigners are to be 
found in weak states and are as a result highly noticeable, thus making weak states a poor location for 
transnational terrorists seeking to conduct clandestine operations there. Accordingly, terrorists 
themselves can be badly affected by the general chaos that characterizes the everyday life in weak states 
and they can like all other citizens or tourists be extorted, detained or harassed by local authorities 
(Piazza, 2007:472).  
Transnational terror organizations that are based in weak states might find themselves required to take 
sides in local disputes or even dragged into domestic conflicts that might end up distracting them from 
their primary objectives (Menkhaus, 2003). Since weak states lack a more centralized power with a 
clearly established power structure, they do not provide transnational terrorists with a clear target to 
fight against or a coherent ally with which to fight along (Piazza, 2007:472). Contemporary 
transnational terrorism is often prearranged and coordinated across multiple countries and not all of 
them happen to be weak or fragile states. Even though the original idea behind the 9/11 attacks was 
mooted in Afghanistan, however the logistical planning of the incident happened in Germany and Spain, 
which are two of some of the world’s strongest states (Schneckerner, 2004). It is as a result unlikely 
that there is a linear relationship between weak states and transnational terrorism (Schneckerner, 2004). 
4.1.2.2. Responses to Weak States as Breeders of Threats of Transnational Terrorism to Africa’s 
Security and Stability 
4.1.2.2.1. State Level of Analysis 
At a state level of analysis, the United States has offered support for foreign military, police and 
counterterrorism assistance to most African states as a primary means upon which it aims to prevent 
security threats that emanates from weak states. By providing this specialized form of assistance, the 
US, which is the driver of the fight against global transnational terrorism, seeks to build and reinforce 
the security sector capabilities of partner nations in Africa, so as to prevent state weaknesses that 
transnational terrorists seeks to exploit (Whitaker, 2010: 643). Examples of counterterrorism policies 
in weak states that focus on military assistance and training include the Regional Defence Combating 
Terrorism Fellowship Program and the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) (Patrick and 
Brown, 2007). 
4.1.2.2.2. Systemic Level of Analysis 
At a systemic level of analysis, lies the United Nations’ Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which 
was created in 2001 to monitor the implementation of the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373. 
Consisting of all 15 members of the Security Council, the CTC encouraged states to ratify all existing 
UN legal frameworks on transnational terrorism and to enact domestic legislations that are necessary 
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for their enforcement. In addition, Resolution 1373 obligated all UN member states to uniformly submit 
periodic reports to the CTC on their efforts to criminalize, prevent and punish terrorism related activities 
in their own backyards (Rosand, 2003:336). By virtue of the promotion of the domestication of the 
provisions of existing international agreements, the CTC attempted to build a global legal framework 
against transnational terrorism, which would help weak states in Africa counter threats posed by this 
phenomenon (Whitaker, 2010:641).  
In addition to the Security Council’s approach to counter transnational terrorism, other UN agencies 
and multilateral organizations have developed their own counterterrorism initiatives. In order to 
coordinate these efforts, the UN Secretary-General established the Counter-Terrorism Implementation 
Task Force (CTITF) in 2005, which included representatives from more than 20 institutions such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) and the World Bank. Moreover, in September 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted 
the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which incorporated a wide-ranging plan of action intended to 
build individual nation state’s capacity, to prevent transnational terrorism and to address the underlying 
causes of such threat. This global counter-terrorism strategy was initially projected to serve as a unifying 
framework for multilateral counterterrorism efforts that are coordinated by the CTITF, which itself was 
institutionalized within the UN Department of Political Affairs (Whitaker, 2010:641). 
4.1.2.2.3. Global Level of Analysis 
The promotion of international diplomacy is one way in which international actors in the war on 
transnational terror, primarily the United States, African Union, United Nations, European Union, 
Britain and France, can engage African countries on issues that weaken the state and thus pose a threat 
to the security and stability of the African continent. The AU is cooperating with international actors 
on weak states agendas. These agendas include the promotion of democracy, good governance and the 
strengthening of state capacity against transnational terrorism. The African Union as a regional body 
seeks to prevent threats of transnational terrorism to the continent’s security and stability from emerging 
(Wyler, 2008:11). International diplomacy extends beyond the issues of state weaknesses. However, 
the strategic focus of this policy instrument is to directly confront threats of transnational terrorism on 
the security and stability of African states.  
International diplomacy as advocated by the AU also aimed at strengthening the capacity of the African 
states in order to promote regional stability, protect civilian population and to promote the just 
application of government and the rule of law (Wyler, 2008:11). This is because government policies 
at a national level form the foundation of global counterterrorism efforts. Since 2001, there has been a 
wave of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) legislation across Africa and the world at 
large (Haubrich, 2003:15). The US has been pushing for international coordination in the fight against 
transnational terrorism since the events of September 11, 2001. The US as the champion of the global 
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war on terror (GWOT), with the help of powerful allies like Britain, has been able to effectively force 
its approach to counterterrorism policies on weak states (Whitaker, 2010:643). 
4.1.3 Socio-economic Conditions as Causes of Africa’s vulnerability to Transnational Terrorism 
The European powers partitioned Africa with such haste that the process itself became to be referred to 
as the scramble for Africa (Oliver and Anthony, 1994:100). The state thus created under this process 
was characterized from the early post-colonial era among other things by violence, repression, 
economic exploitation and exclusion. This repressive element is reflected by the continent’s total 
insignificance to the cultural, economic, political and social rights of its populace. This is because the 
different visions that invaded post-independent Africa have profoundly affected the nature and character 
of African states. The African continent is marked by sub-ethnic identities that are coupled by religious 
polarization, which formulated deeply divided societies that were unable to create well-organized 
institutional structures necessary to sustain the African state (Aboboaie, 2010:4). As a result of this 
exploitative and repressive nature of the post-colonial state, Africa currently suffers from poor socio-
economic circumstances. Thus, Africans inherited a state that lacks security and stability making it 
vulnerable to threat of transnational terrorism. The reason for this, is because socio-economic conditions 
like poverty, unemployment and widening inequality gab between the rich and the poor produces a 
society of people that have nothing to lose. The widespread conditions of poverty, conflicts and 
economic exploitation in Africa often creates a breeding ground for individuals to resort to acts of 
terrorism (Botha, 2007:5). 
Poverty, social injustice and political repression attract transnational terrorist groups by allowing them 
to buy off immigration and local security officials in most African states. The fact that East Africa and 
the horn of Africa are homes to some of the most impoverished countries in the world, with high levels 
of social injustice and political hostilities, generally renders the region a breeding ground for 
transnational terrorism (Shinn, 2004:38). Political repression and socio-economic conditions are 
responsible for dispersing potential extremist and terror groups across the regions of the world. For 
instance, Egypt’s repressive counterterrorism strategy against domestic terrorism succeeded in reducing 
terrorism within the country. However, such a radical counter terror lasted only until extremist terror 
reappeared in the country in 2003 when it was disguised as religious politics (Botha, 2007:7).  
In reality, the repressive response by Egyptian authorities to domestic threats of militants and extremists 
under the emergency legislation resulted into a situation where leaders and supporters of those groups 
fled abroad, to countries where they not only supported untold causes, but also contributed to the 
creation of transnational terror organizations. One of the most prominent Egyptian nationals who 
influenced the development of transnational terrorism was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was the leader of 
al-Jihadi militant group in Egypt and was responsible for the formation of al-Qaeda in 1998 (Botha, 
2007:7). 
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Another socio-economic factor that renders Africa vulnerable to transnational terrorism emanates from 
insufficient communication and education of the broad public. This is due to over-sensitivity on the part 
of security personnel to consider anything and everything that relates to terrorism as top secret while at 
the same time excluding the valuable source of information on acts of transnational terrorism, which is 
the general public. Community involvement cannot be secured through legislation because even though 
the responsibility rests with the public to inform security officials such as police force about any 
suspicious activity. However, this cannot just be done without equipping them with the knowledge and 
without establishing a relationship of trust between the general public and security officials (Botha, 
2007:11).  
Transnational terrorists hide themselves out in the multiple lawless and stateless regions that litter the 
African continent. They apparently gained recruits from among the starving and displaced masses that 
have been victimized by powerful warlords and government authorities that are fighting one another 
over the continent’s spoils. Primarily, militant recruiters are thought to prey on vulnerable communities, 
where they are able to build militant organizations and recruit the next generation of suicide bombers 
from the ranks of the poor and starving Africans (Piombo, 2007). Another social factor that renders 
Africa vulnerable to transnational terrorism has to do with its open borders and large illegal immigrant 
communities in which individuals with clandestine motives can disappear on without being noticed. In 
this way, scholars argue that hospitality and a culture of generosity whereby people out of free will help 
those in need without having to ask questions. This according to scholars might contribute to a scenario 
whereby innocent civilians support, provide safe haven and even facilitate acts of transnational 
terrorism without knowing it (Botha, 2007:12). 
4.1.4. Africa’s Geopolitical Location as a Cause of Africa’s vulnerability to Transnational 
Terrorism 
In the wake of transnational terror attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, scholars argue 
that Africa has become one of the geographical zones of struggle in the Americanized global war on 
terror (GWOT). Africa has been drawn into this new chapter of global conflict by the dent of the 
continent’s Mediterranean and Northeast African geo-cultural and geopolitical proximities to the 
Middle East and Southwest Asian war zones (Jhazbhay, 2006:8). These zones encompass the US and 
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Africa is witnessing 
two rival models that are competing for power among transnational terror groups, these two groups 
being the Islamic States of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qaeda. While these two groups share some 
long-term goals, they have adopted radically different approaches to marketing their ideology and 
expanding their support bases in the continent (Joscelyn, 2015).  
The ISIL group is believed to be using a consistent branding that seeks to describe its followers in Africa 
and the world in general as part of a growing caliphate that is led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Al-Qaeda, 
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on the other hand has adopted precisely the opposite approach which is far more clandestine in nature. 
The group adopted numerous brands all of which serve to mask the extent of its influence and inculcate 
its radical ideology in local populations. This has made it possible for the group to attract support from 
individuals, organizations and governments that may not want to be seen as openly assisting the group 
in its transnational terror acts (Joscelyn, 2015).   
Al-Qaeda has two official or regional branches in Africa; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The leaders of the two groups in Africa remain loyal to Ayman al Zawahiri, 
the current senior al-Qaeda emir. While AQIM and Al-Shabaab are often referred to as Al-Qaeda 
affiliates, the group itself calls them regions or branches. Each regional emir oversees al-Qaeda’s efforts 
in his designated area. For instance, AQIM emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (a.k.a. Abdelmalek 
Droukdel) is in charge of al-Qaeda efforts in North Africa and downwards into Mali. On the other hand, 
Al-Shabaab’s emir Ahmed Diriye (a.k.a. Sheik Ahmad Umar) is generally in charge of al-Qaeda’s 
efforts in Somalia and East Africa (Joscelyn, 2015).  
The presence of ISIL in Africa has grown significantly over the past year, especially in Libya, Tunisia 
and Egypt’s Sinai region. Scholars assert that the growth of this group in these parts of Africa has been 
fueled mainly by young jihadists (Joscelyn, 2015). The ISIL has further gained a significant footing in 
West Africa by merging with Boko Haram earlier this year. It is likely that the group sent a team to 
Nigeria to improve Boko Haram’s media capabilities and to negotiate the alliance, since Boko Haram 
now calls itself the Islamic State in West Africa, or the Islamic State’s Province in West Africa 
(Joscelyn, 2015). 
Another geopolitical factor that makes Africa vulnerable to transnational terrorism is the view that in 
Africa just like other parts of the Islamic world; Islam is under attack and therefore need to be defended 
against the West and its local collaborators. This is gaining increasing credibility and financial 
incentives appear to be equally crucial, whether in the form of direct payments or in the form of 
prospects for wealth. This is rampant in the regions of the continent where youth unemployment is high, 
earnings low, land questions unclarified and advancement within traditional structures difficult. Under 
such circumstances, membership in self-funding transnational terrorist movements that offer 
opportunities for advancement are extraordinarily attractive and lucrative to Africa’s youth population 
(Steinberg and Weber, 2015:10). 
The presence of al-Qaeda in the continent also poses a geopolitical threat of transnational terrorism 
because the late Osama bin Laden, continuously expressed his yearning for an Islamic Caliphate that 
would stretch from Morocco in the Atlantic Ocean to Pakistan on the Indian border (Davis, 2004:7).  
Africa is a natural focus of Wahhabism activity (an extreme religious movement that belongs to a branch 
of Sunni Islam). This because during the period 1991-96 Sudan served as al-Qaeda’s central base of 
operation before intense pressures from the US, Saudi Arabia and Egypt forced bin Laden to move his 
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legions to Afghanistan (Davis, 2004:8). While Sudan represented a major safe haven for al-Qaeda’s 
presence and operational activity in Africa, the East African countries remain the central target for 
transnational terrorism in Africa. An illustration for why East Africa remained part of al-Qaeda’s 
strategy, the deputy Emir of Jamaat-e-Jihad Eritrea (Eritrea Islamic Jihad Movement), Abul Bara’ 
Hassan Salman indoctrinated that the Horn and East Africa regions together belongs to Islamists and 
not the West (Gunaratna, 2002:152). 
In a more precise in-depth observation of the causal impact of geopolitical factors on Africa’s 
vulnerability to threats of transnational terrorism, Kenya’s proximity to Somalia and the Middle East 
created a haven for transnational terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda to penetrate the country 
since its porous borders in the northeastern along the Somali territory (Aronson, 2013:26). Scholars 
justify this claim on the grounds that the first transnational terrorist incident in the country occurred 
years before the initial launch of the global war on terror (GWOT) by the US and its allies. Little 
attention has been paid by the international community on the syndicates, who orchestrated such an 
attack. This event occurred on 28 January 1976 and was plotted by the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP) in collaboration with the Baader-Meinhof group, with the motive to shoot down 
what was an El Al passenger plane during its scheduled stopover in Nairobi. However, this plot was 
eventually impeded after a successful intelligence sharing information between Israel and Kenya 
(Mogire and Agade, 2011:474).  
The ensuing transnational terror incident in Kenya happened four years later when the PFLP attacked 
the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, killing 20 people. The PFLP committed this act as retaliation to Kenya’s 
assistance of Israel during the rescue operation to free hostages at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda in 
June 1976. Both these attacks targeted Israeli interests in Kenya and were the early indications of the 
threats posed by transnational terrorism to the security and stability of African states (Mogire and 
Agade, 2011:475). In addition, as part of the revenge scholar’s asserts that the former Ugandan president 
Idi Amin ordered the slaughter of hundreds of Kenyan civilians that were living in Uganda at that time 
(BBC, 4 July 2008). 
It is important to note that globalization process has made it easier than before for transnational terrorist 
organizations to share information and cooperate internally and with other organizations in order to 
secure geographic access and acquire weapons. This is because, terrorist organizations including radical 
Islamic groups are currently conducting acts of transnational terrorism mainly in countries and regions 
of the world where the political state of affairs is unstable and governance is weak (The US State of 
Department, 2013). In addition, organizations which are affiliated with al-Qaeda and other radical 
terrorist groups operate mostly in North, East and West Africa as well as in Middle East and parts of 
Asia. In most of these countries, porous borders have permitted terrorist groups to infiltrate their 
territories (Defense of Japan, 2014). 
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It has been argued by scholars that the uprooting of terror cells from Afghanistan and other parts of the 
region by US Central Command, has made them to shift their operations to the wide-open, relatively 
forsaken areas of Africa. This has provided an easy entrance to Europe through countries like Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya and Morocco (Keenan, 2005:625). In addition, policy makers also argue that the US 
considers the Algerian group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) to be posing a grave 
threat to Africa’s security and stability because of its links to al-Qaeda (Lyman et al., 2006). 
4.1.5. Religious Extremism as a Cause of Africa’s Vulnerability to Transnational Terrorism  
Holy terror was practiced in earlier centuries by religious groups such as the Jewish Zealots, the 
Assassins and the Crusaders (Lacqueur, 1999). Contemporary scholars have particularly raised 
concerns about the return of religious fanaticism in global politics (Lacqueur, 1999). Religious 
extremism entails the activities of a small group drawn from the world’s most prominent religions. 
Leaders of such groups often manipulate their followers. They perpetrate heinous crimes in the name 
of their faith under the guise of executing the will of God (Weinberg, 2005: 21). Thus, the growth of 
religious terrorism worldwide accounted for the increased severity of terrorist attacks since 1991(Enders 
and Sandler, 2000). The messianic concepts of deliverance are of increasing concern in the 
contemporary century (Enders and Sandler, 2000). These concepts are legitimized by theological 
imperative and achieved through personal actions that incorporate mass indiscriminate murder. 
The importance of religion as a political tool is well recognized by scholars of international politics. 
Religion stretches beyond national borders, thus in a way it is able to broaden the potential support base 
for transnational terrorism (Botha, 2007:5). Thus, religious extremists prepared for a major crisis at the 
beginning of the millennium because they believed that the year 2000 signaled the commencing of the 
world’s end. They foresaw political and personal repression enforced by the United Nations and carried 
out with the support of the United States government. Scholars commonly referred to this as the New 
World Order Conspiracy (Weinberg, 2005:21). Such a conspiracy has survived well into the 21st 
century and its influence includes beliefs that divine intervention in worldly affairs is justified by 
religious scripts (Weinberg, 2005:21). 
It is evidence from the above that religion is one of the most critical variables that have induced fears 
of increased transnational terrorist penetration throughout the African continent. The Muslim 
population in Africa is estimated to account for at least a third of the continent’s billion or so population 
(Davis, 2004:3). The Islamic revivalism in Africa has its roots in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and scholars 
insert that Saudi Arabia has built and refurbished numerous Mosques throughout the continent (Davis, 
2004:3). Many Saudi conservative clerics, facing pressure at home and also exiled from their own 
country have preached a host of anti-Western and anti-American Wahhabi laced messages throughout 
much of Africa (Davis, 2004:3). Similarly, Pakistan has undertaken to build madrassa’s in many Sahel 
countries and many Pakistani and Saudi jihadists have besieged local bazaars with cassette tapes that 
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are filled with messages that are purporting for the “destruction of infidels`` or a jihad against US troops 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (Smith, 2004:4). An example to illustrate this assertion is the claim that in 
Mauritania and Chad, the issue of religious fundamentalism has become so prevalent that both states 
have sought United States assistance in order to root out the tide of what both states considers to be 
increasing Islamic revivalism (Smith, 2004:4).  
North Africa and the Horn of Africa form Africa’s bridge to the Middle East. It should be noted that 
there exists a complex interrelationship between differing Islamic cultures within the continent from 
East to West. This relationship has a direct effect on the deepened terrorist activity in the continent; 
first, in Sudan and later along the East coast of the continent and on the constant instability of Somalia 
(Lyman, 2013). Terrorism as a phenomenon comes in multiple shapes and sizes and many of which are 
all too familiar in the African continent. This is because the continent has been relatively marginal in 
issues and conflicts around the Middle East. The continent might thus far be dragged into such tensions, 
in parts as its own diverse yet concomitant cultures may be infected by religious based fundamentalisms 
(Shaw, 2005:130).  
The influx of radical Islamists from the Middle East into the African continent is also alarming. For 
instance, (Schwartz, 2005), notes that Nigeria is a target of aggressive, radical Sunni Islamic agents 
with support from religious charities and other outreach groups that are headquartered in Saudi Arabia. 
The objective of this group is to influence the establishment of Sharia Law, as the exclusive law 
governing Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim Northern states (Schwartz, 2005). The twenty first century 
has been cited by scholars as an era of radical faith-based extremism in Africa (Independent 
Commission on Multilateralism, 2015). Starting from the era of the Lords’ Resistance Army, to Boko 
Haram and Al-Shabaab and even beyond, thus forming an integral part of the security and stability 
picture in the continent. This comes as scholars assert that extreme interpretations of virtually all 
religions in the continent from Christianity to Islam have been on the rise since the turn of the century. 
Just as the crusades of the twelfth century were about competition for power in the name of God so are 
the contemporary religious ideologies that stimulate acts of terror in the name of God (Independent 
Commission on Multilateralism, 2015).  
However, despite increasing engagement of all religious sects in Africa with acts of terrorism, Islamic 
extremism remains the most prominent religious ideology. The proliferation of transnational terrorist 
groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and even ISIL attest to this statement. 
These groups have corrupted the doctrines of Islam by using extreme religious interpretations to 
legitimize their brutal instigation of terror tactics like persecuting innocent civilians and suicide 
bombings. Their global ambition is to see the establishment of a new political order; that is something 
like an Islamic state or a Caliphate that would be based on radical interpretations of the religious Sharia 
Law. Examples of such radical establishments in Africa include Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria or 
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Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the whole East African region (Independent Commission on 
Multilateralism, 2015). 
4.2. Responses to Threats of Transnational Terrorism by State and Non-state policy makers 
The global fight against transnational terrorism is the defining conflict of the 21st century because 
transnational terror organizations function both operationally and ideologically at local, national, 
regional global levels. One of the single biggest challenge facing policy makers, international security 
and intelligence community, law enforcement authorities and national militaries around the globe is 
how to defeat transnational terror groups like al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and ISIL (Gunaratna, 
2002:221). In the case of Africa, transnational terrorism cannot simply be confronted from an 
intelligence and law enforcement perspective only. It requires a counter terrorism (CT) approach that 
incorporates technical and logistical cooperation with a program to advance development, strengthen 
governance and democracy with promotion of human rights and social inclusion. Such a focus on 
counter-terrorism initiatives will enable policy makers to deal with those issues on which terrorist 
groups attempt to build their support base on such as alienation, marginalization, widespread poverty, 
underdevelopment, porous borders, injustice and conflicts. These elements, according to policy makers, 
provide the necessary context for terrorist groups to establish support systems while recruiting cohorts 
(Smith, 2010:75).  
In some African states, acts of terrorism are often the feature of local conflicts even if they have wider 
consequences. Thus the danger with equating all acts of terrorism with the broader global war on terror 
(GWOT) is that, often these conflicts arise from grievances which have long been simmering in nation-
states. Classical examples are found in Sudan’s Darfur region and Somalia. These repeated instances of 
force and repression have resulted in the escalation of conflicts, as a result hampering peace and stability 
efforts and making political settlements difficult. Thus, policy makers need to avoid the exclusion of 
dialogue and negotiations of problem states when addressing and responding to threats of transnational 
terrorism because this would create possibilities or safe-havens for terrorists. Nonetheless, the existence 
of neglected or economically deprived states creates on its own a security vacuum, which generates 
fertile grounds for terrorist activities. It also creates spaces upon which, terrorist organizations establish 
themselves in those vulnerable states in the African continent (Smith, 2010:76).   
4.2.1 Individual Level Responses to Threat of Transnational Terrorism by State and Non-state 
policy makers 
4.2.1.1. President George W. Bush 
Following the events of September 11, 2001 in the US, the attention of United States policy makers has 
since firmly refocused its agenda upon the African continent which has thus emerged as a key new front 
in the global war on terror (GWOT) (Lyman and Morrison, 2004:80). As a subsequent response, former 
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United States President George W. Bush issued a word of confidence to all American people and the 
global community by assuring them that his administration will marshal all of its resources, whether 
diplomatic, financial or military towards the goal of defeating transnational terrorism in all corners of 
the globe (Loayza, 2002:241). In accordance to this statement, the Bush administration announced in 
June 2003, a $100 million program to fund a complementary East African Counterterrorism Initiative 
(EACTI), which was designed to strengthen the counterterrorism capabilities of the US’s partner nations 
in the region. This program was also inclusive of provisions of military training for border, aviation and 
coastal security (Wycloff, 2004).   
Moreover, the claims that the activities of the Algerian terrorist group the Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GSPC) were spilling over into the neighboring Sahel region, provided justifications for 
the Bush administration to support the Pan-Sahel Initiative of 2004. The $ 7.75 million counterterrorism 
strategy was meant to provide military training to assist regional countries in combat threats of 
transnational terrorism (Black, 2004). In 2005, the Bush administration extended the sphere of its war 
on terrorism in Africa even further by launching the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). 
This later became the $500 million Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program that 
sought to build North and Sub-Sahara African capacities to patrol borders, intercept armed groups and 
cooperate intra-regionally. In addition to this, the Bush administration established additional relations 
with African countries. These countries included Ghana, Uganda, South Africa and Namibia. The 
essence of the relationships was to assist them upgrade their ports, airfields, the repositioning of fuel 
and other critical supplies and for access agreements that would permit swift deployment of United 
States forces for counterterrorism purposes (Lyman et al., 2006).   
African reactions to the 9/11, 2001 transnational terror events in the US were overwhelmingly 
supportive of the United States, to the extent that dozens of African leaders willingly offered support to 
combat threats of transnational terrorism in their own backyards (Dagne, 2002:1). The administration 
of George W. Bush asserted that Africa with its large Muslim population could play a pivotal role in 
solidifying support in Muslim and Arab countries against the threat posed by transnational terrorism on 
the continent’s security and stability. In this way, policy makers from the Bush’s administration sought 
cooperation between the United States and Africa in the fight against transnational terrorism as viable 
to include the extraditing and apprehending of members of African terrorists and extremists’ groups 
who are active in Europe and the United States (Dagne, 2002:4).  
4.2.1.2. President Barrack Obama 
The Obama administration’s policy on transnational terrorism suggests that his policies are neither 
idealist nor realist but are attempts to seek an evolving middle ground that balances principles and 
values with pragmatism. Obama has made it clear that in his analysis of policy making, there was no 
contradiction between values and the rule of law and preserving security and safety (Allen and Gerstein, 
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2009). President Obama then asked the Congress for $5 billion to train and equip foreign governments 
for counterterrorism initiatives. Most of the countries he cited for such initiatives are in the northern 
half of Africa including Somalia, Mali and Libya. Reports suggest that US Special Operations are 
already training new counter terrorism units in Libya and Mali as well as Niger, Chad and Mauritania. 
The reason for American policy to focus mostly in Africa in its quest to combat the menace of 
transnational terrorism was defended by Obama when he said: 
“Today’s principal threat no longer comes from a centralized al-Qaeda leadership, but from decentralized al-
Qaeda affiliates and extremists such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and AQIM etc., many of which with agendas 
focused in the countries where they operate. In this way, we need a strategy that matches this diffuse threat, one 
that expands our reach without sending forces that stretches our military thin or stir up local resentments in those 
countries where they are stationed`` (President Obama quoted in Zoe Carpenther, 2014). 
The Obama administration also created the Counter-Terrorism Partnerships Fund in order to add more 
money and a new name to an already existing account of security cooperation programs with the African 
continent. Over the last few years, the United States has spent millions of dollars training proxy forces 
in Africa. In 2012 alone, the United States planned fourteen major training operations across the 
continent including those in Mali, Morocco, Uganda, Botswana, Senegal, Lesotho and Nigeria 
(Carpenther, 2014). In addition to this program, President Obama committed the United States to an 
intensified war against transnational terrorism in East Africa by announcing that his administration 
would expand support for counter terrorism operations in Kenya and Somalia, including increasing 
training and funding for Kenya’s security forces. Obama has also acknowledged that Al-Shabaab 
terrorists are able to maintain the capacity to launch attacks against ‘’soft targets’’ both in Kenya and 
Somalia in spite of years of American drone strikes and efforts from regional, US-backed 
counterterrorism force based inside Somalia (Eilperin and Sieff, 2015).  
President Obama further asserted that security issues in Africa were of primary importance for his 
administration. This is because instabilities in Somalia or elsewhere in the continent were likely to spill 
over across borders. Thus, the counterterrorism initiatives are a security concern for African 
governments but also for the United States. This is because while al-Qaeda affiliates are the primary 
concern in East Africa, the situation is somehow different in West and North Africa, where the activities 
of the Islamic State have become an increasing threat to regional security and stability particularly in 
the Maghreb and Nigeria (US National Security Advisor Susan Rice cited in The Washington Post, 
2015). President Obama has also promoted US counterterrorism efforts with allies in Somalia and 
Yemen as a model upon which he hopes the United States can pursue its security goals in Africa and 
the Middle East without having to deploy combat troops (Eilperin and Sieff, 2015).  
4.2.1.3. President Uhuru Kenyatta 
As a strategy to fight threats of transnational terrorism in the country, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta 
has directed the recruitment of coastal youth into the National Youth Service empowerment program. 
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This aim to train the youth in skills that will enable them to earn a livelihood, in the hope that they will 
deviate from joining extremist groups that commits acts of terrorism (Aine, 2015). President Kenyatta 
further argued that because terrorism is not country specific but it’s a global phenomenon, world 
governments needed to recognize the fact that terrorism is a global threat which requires to be countered 
through global partnership programs in order to the defeat and secure not just Kenya but the whole 
world. In addition, President Kenyatta said that African states acknowledged that security was critical 
to ensuring long-term stability and investments. For that reason, African states would appreciate to see 
the international community rallying behind them and fully supporting their counter terrorism mission 
in Somalia so that African forces can expand their operations and reduce the area of Al-Shabaab’s 
operation in the entire East African region (Daily Nation, 6 August 2014). 
After accepting the resignation of the head of police and nominating a new interior minister, Kenyan 
President Uhuru Kenyatta vowed to intensify the war against Al-Shabaab. This determination followed 
the series of attacks that the group had caused in the country since 2010, including the Nairobi mall 
attack and the recent Garissa university massacre (Reuters, 2 December, 2014). Uhuru Kenyatta further 
asserted that it was only through unity that the global community and individual nations can defeat the 
menace of transnational terrorism and violent extremism. In this way, Kenyatta was highlighting that 
his administration was alert to the changing nature of the threat of transnational terrorism and had 
formulated better mechanisms to respond to it. He inferred that his administration had reviewed its 
security laws and adopted a number of strategies to deal with terrorist threats and other related 
international crimes that facilitate each other (Kenyatta cited in Daily Nation, 30 September 2015).  
4.2.2. State Level Responses to Threat of Transnational Terrorism by State and Non-state policy 
makers 
4.2.2.1. United States of America 
As the international community, become increasingly engaged in the war on terror, the US government 
issued a 9/11 Report to address the threat posed by transnational terrorism on Africa’s security and 
stability. The Report stated that “transnational terrorist organizations continue to use Africa as a safe 
haven, staging ground or as a transit point to target US interests. The Report concluded by saying that 
the menace of transnational terrorism against US and local African interests is likely to continue to grow 
in several parts of the continent because of porous borders, lax security, political instability, religious 
fundamentalism and a lack of state resources and capacities`` (Congressional Research Service, 
2004:12).  
As a result of the threat that transnational terrorism posed to Africa’s security and stability, the United 
States bolstered the launch of a number of counterterrorism (CT) initiatives in Africa that aimed to 
address and respond to threat of transnational terrorism. The first of these US-backed counterterrorism 
initiatives in the African continent was the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) 
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established in 2003. This initiative involved military training for border and coastal security, 
interagency counterterrorism coordination, aviation security capacity building, assistance for regional 
efforts against terrorist financing and also police training (Ploch, 2010: 24). In addition, the EACTI 
included an important educational program that tries to prevent extremist’s fundamentalist’s influences 
from gaining the upper hand in targeted countries. In order to achieve this goal, the EACTI provided 
funding for teacher education in disadvantaged Muslim communities of the East African region. It also 
encouraged greater access to primary education for girls and also tried to improve broader community 
involvement in education. EACTI programs also incorporated media and information outreach 
programs, whereby English language was to be used in order to depict a more accurate image of the 
United States and its values, but also to counter the Islamist-controlled media outlets in the region (US 
Department of State, 2004). 
Kenya and Ethiopia form part of the strategic Horn of Africa sub-region. The two countries have strong 
diplomatic and military friendly relations with the United States, dating as far back as the Cold War 
era. The United States also supported the two African countries militarily and economically. Following 
this diplomatic rapprochement, the US military has been responsible for directing intelligence assets to 
conduct surveillance and reconnaissance missions over parts of Somalia, where Al-Shabaab and al-
Qaeda are said to have operational bases. The United States, British and French aircrafts have been 
reported to have taken aerial photographs of suspected terrorist training camps and facilities in Somalia, 
from Kenya and Ethiopia in early 2002 (Nyambura, 2010:99).  
The United States considered East Africa and the Horn to be the primary targets of transnational terror 
organizations. The US Department of Defense took the initiative to establish the Combined Joint Task 
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) which was a US military approach to counter the menace of 
transnational terrorism in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. As a result of the efforts of the task force, 
scholars have argued that a number of members of terrorist groups have since been arrested in Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Kenya, Eritrea and Djibouti (US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, 2005: 
7). The CJTF-HOA had devoted much of its energies to counterterrorism and to counterinsurgency 
training with the help of allied forces and the armies of Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. It also dedicated 
its efforts to conducting a number of civic action programs that sought to refurbish schools and clinics 
as well as providing medical services to disadvantaged communities in the region (Schmitt, 2005:11). 
It is argued that the main objective of the US National Strategy for Combating Terror are to preserve 
and promote free and open societies, defeat terrorist extremism and to create a global environment that 
is hostile to terrorism. In this way, policy makers asserted that there were two bases of this strategy. 
These include expanding the capacity of foreign partners to combat transnational terrorism and to 
reduce ideological support for terrorism in the world (Boudali, 2007:3). For the US strategy to succeed 
in Africa, the United States the chauffeur of the global war on terror, has to assist African governments 
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and provide viable social and economic opportunities to their citizens in order to eliminate the local 
conditions that lead to social unrest from the extremist ideology that facilitate terrorist activity (Boudali, 
2007:3).   
The US sponsored counterterrorism program, the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP) program, which sought to address the above challenges facing African states through a 
combination of military-to-military security assistance and development programs that try to reduce the 
support of violent extremists in Africa. The primary objective of the TSCTP is to reduce the impact of 
terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel region, by so doing reduces terrorist’s threats to the US. 
Furthermore, the TSCTP’s military parameters are said to increase the capacity of participating nations 
to identify and respond to internal security threats, while development assistance programs seek to 
address social and economic issues that facilitate the spread of extremist and violent groups and 
ideologies. Finally, public outreach programs seek to promote democratic institutions and values in the 
region while also creating positive impressions about the United States (Boudali, 2007: 4).  
It is worth noting that the TSCTP is an extension of the prior Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which began 
in 2003 with a two-year budget of $7.75 million, and which was provided by the United States’ State 
Department (Ulmer, 2004). Other previous counterterrorism training programs in Africa that were 
sponsored by the US included the African Response Force, the African Contingency Operations 
Training Assistance, the Coastal Security Program and the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(International Crisis Group Report, 2005). In 2009 policy makers, asserted that the United States 
government further established the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), 
which is a multi-faceted program that was designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, 
law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. The program used law 
enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, namely reducing 
the operational capacity of terrorist networks, reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to 
violent fanaticism. It also aimed to achieve the development of the rule of law as a framework for 
countering terrorism in partner nations, enhancing border security and countering the financing of 
terrorism in the region (US Department of State, 2014).  
4.2.2.3. Kenya 
Kenya is working closely with local, regional and international partiers in the fight against threats of 
transnational terrorism. The country has engaged in bilateral agreements with strategic partners such as 
the United States and its look forward to enhancing these collaborative actions as a basis for improving 
its counterterrorism programs (Uhuru Kenyatta cited in the Daily Nation, 30 September 2015). In 2003, 
Kenya commenced to robustly address institutional weaknesses that hamper its ability to pursue 
terrorists and to respond to the menace of transnational terrorism. As a result, in April 2003, the country 
published a draft Suppression of Terrorism bill. It is currently in the process of redrafting the bill in 
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order to incorporate concerns from civil society champions who fear that the bill contains many human 
rights flaws. Moreover, the country in collaboration with the United States continues to share 
information on suspected terrorists including those associated with al-Qaeda operations. It has also 
taken the initiative in arresting terrorist suspects and disrupting their operations (U.S. Department of 
State, 2004).  
Kenya with fellow African states that contributed troops and police under the African Union mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) embarked on high-level meetings to discuss the instability in Somalia. The crisis 
in Somalia was a threat to the security and stability of the whole region mainly through the activities of 
Al-Shabaab. As such, African states had collectively agreed to the increased deployment of troops by 
AMISOM in order to defeat transnational terrorists that continued to launch attacks from Somalia and 
are threatening the security and stability of Kenya (Uhuru Kenyatta cited in the Daily Nation, 30 
September 2015). Kenya further argued that AMISOM needed sufficient resources to enable a surge 
that responded to practical military advice. This was to provide force multipliers in air and naval assets 
and to increase stabilization and development efforts in areas liberated from the menace of transnational 
terrorism (Uhuru Kenyatta cited in the Daily Nation, 30 September 2015).  
4.2.3 Systemic Level Responses to Threat of Transnational Terrorism by State and Non-state 
policy makers 
4.2.3.1. The African Union (AU) 
Outside of the United Nations system, numerous regional and sub-regional institutions have also 
assumed a leading role in counterterrorism operations. Regional multilateral institutions at this level of 
analysis have a number of capabilities when it comes to countering the menace of transnational 
terrorism. They have better knowledge of the region and its’ political dynamics, and they have practical 
expertise of local conditions. The other reason is that they possess unique approaches that were 
grounded in a particular culture or context. Aside from this, they have the ability to enhance information 
sharing and finally, they were often able to undertake region-specific initiatives that complement and 
boost global efforts. All in all, regional and sub-regional institutions provide a resource to the local 
populace that has not been utilized by the United Nations system to the greatest benefit (Wu, 2009:98). 
Africa was among the first continents to react to the current waves of transnational terrorism, prior to 
the transnational terror attacks of 1998 on African soil. African states have long promoted the 
imperative to eliminate the phenomenon of terrorism. Some even tried to develop counterterrorism 
measures as early as the 1950s and even debated against the phenomenon, when the matter was first 
raised on the agenda of the UN General Assembly (GA) in 1972. However, it was not until 1992, that 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Heads of Government during a summit in Dakar adopted 
Resolution 213 with stated objectives of strengthening cooperation and coordination between African 
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states, in order to enhance the effectiveness of its initiatives against the menace of transnational 
terrorism (Ewi and Aning, 2006:35).  
From that moment, Africa had been vocal in the fight against terrorism. The 1998 attacks in Kenya and 
Tanzania demonstrated the point that even though such attacks targeted US interests in the continent it 
took place in Africa and claimed lives of its citizens (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 
2006:10). This realization prompted a dynamic action by the OAU against the menace of transnational 
terrorism (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:10).  African states have since the 1998 
attacks been at the vanguard of combating transnational terrorism. They have made efforts at regional 
levels to fight and eliminate the menace of this phenomenon through comprehensive and collective 
approaches that sought to address the root causes of this phenomenon in the continent. To this day, the 
African Union (AU) member states have adopted conventions and related instruments that created a 
universal framework for preventing and eliminating transnational terrorism. Their efforts culminated in 
1999 to the formation of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. This 
convention rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism and required that all parties to the convention 
criminalize terrorist acts under their national legislations as stipulated in the convention.  The 
convention was followed by the institutionalization in Algiers, Algeria of the African Centre for the 
Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which served as an institution for the AU Commission to 
boost the capacity of the continent in terms of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa (Adekaye, 
2006:2).  
In addition to the AU Convention of the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, AU Senior Officials 
gathered in Algiers in September 2002, and adopted the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and 
Combating of Transnational Terrorism. The AU Plan of Action established a legal framework and a 
roadmap for African countries to implement international counterterrorism measures in line with the 
OAU Convention, as well as the measures that were mandated by the Security Council Resolution 1373 
of 2001 on all UN member states (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:31). In 2004, the 
AU members adopted the AU Protocol to the Organization of African Unity Convention, which 
convened on the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The responsibility was for 
implementing regional, continental and international counterterrorism instruments as well as 
harmonizing and coordinating efforts in the prevention and combating transnational terrorism. In the 
same year, the AU established the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) 
in Algiers, Algeria. Within the structure of the AU Commission, the Defense and Security Division of 
the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) have the two primary responsibilities namely that of 
developing AU counterterrorism policies and of ensuring that political consensus is reached by all 
member states on the AU counterterrorism programs. In this way, the PDS’s mandate was to ensure 
that the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism has the required political mandate for 
its function (UN Office on the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:32). 
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4.2.3.2. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
It is essential to highlight that each region and sub-region has its own dynamics and terrorist threat 
levels, which require specially formulated regional initiatives to modify the sub-regions responses to 
the menace of transnational terrorism. The ECOWAS is often cited as being the most engaged and 
effective of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the African continent in terms of 
counterterrorism programs which happen to fall within its peace and security division (UN Office of 
the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:37). An example to illustrate this premise draws from the 
assessment made by policy makers that, ECOWAS has established a Warning and Response Network 
which is in accordance with Article 58 of the revised Treaty and the Protocol relating to the Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. This network served as 
an information sharing initiative by the sub-regional body for addressing security matters such as threats 
of transnational terrorism and other political and human security issues within the framework of conflict 
prevention (Jaye, Garuba and Amadi, 2011: 23).  
In addition, this sub-regional peace and security observation system is operated by the ECOWAS 
Observation and Monitoring Centre at the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, Nigeria. It also includes 
four other Zonal Agencies established in Banjul, the Gambia; Cotonou, Benin; Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso and Monrovia, Liberia. It aims was to provide the sub-region with the capacity to evaluate, inform 
and guide responses to potential security menace such as transnational terror threats (UN Office on the 
Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:37).  
4.2.3.3. Financial Action Task Force Style Regional Bodies (FATFSRB) 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is a thirty-six-member intergovernmental policymaking body 
that was established in 1989, by the G-7 Summit held in Paris. This was informed by the mounting 
concerns among the summit participants about the menace posed to the international banking system 
by money laundering.  After September 11, 2001, the body expanded its role to include identifying 
sources and methods of terrorism financing within its scope (Jackson, 2012:1). Its current objectives 
include firstly revising and clarifying the global standards for combating money laundering and 
terrorism financing. Secondly, to promote global implementation of its money laundering standards and 
thirdly, to identify and respond to new money laundering and terrorist financing threats and finally, to 
engage with stakeholders and partners throughout the world on issues related to money laundering 
(Terry, 2010:4). 
Likewise, Financial Action Task Force Style Regional Bodies (FATFSRB) is a regional body that 
assists member states in the implementation of international anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist 
financing standards and recommendations. The FSRB’s objective is controlled and operated by their 
member states with technical assistance and other resources coming from external partners. The 
objective is to initiate numerous programs that were aimed at implementing forty recommendations 
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from the FATFs, that pertained to money laundering and nine recommendations on terrorist financing. 
In addition, there are two very effective FSRB in the African continent. These include the 
Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa 
(GIABA) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). The 
GIABA consists of 15 member states while ESAAMLG has 14 members and the two combined have a 
total membership of 29 African states. Both FSRB’s responsibility is to conduct mutual evaluations and 
work on various anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing frameworks and implementation 
issues. Their responsibility also includes providing financial training and capacity building to their 
members (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:39).  
4.2.3.4. European Union (EU) 
The European Union (EU) considered the risks presented by transnational terrorist groups in the Sahara-
Sahel region of Africa to be the second key transnational terrorist threat to the European mainland. As 
a result, it has sent a member state expert mission to regional countries like Mali, Niger and Mauritania 
to explore possible counterterrorism efforts, in order to provide assistance at a national and regional 
level. Moreover, the EU has also supported the Sahara-Sahel regional conference on the considerations 
of security and development impetuses that was initiated by the Malian President Amadou Toumani 
Touré (Council of the European Union, 2009:15).   
Proximity makes countries like Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco of particular importance to be scrutinized 
and given counterterrorism assistance by Europe. This is because the threat posed by North African-
based terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was not limited to the African 
continent but also affected the European continent. As such, the European Union in 2011 implemented 
its ground-breaking Security and Development Strategy for the Sahel. This Strategy contained four 
components of action, namely development, good governance and internal conflict resolution. 
Secondly, political and diplomatic actions; thirdly, actions focused on security and the rule of law and 
finally, actions that aimed at countering violent extremism and terrorism. Counterterrorism was a 
principal component of the strategy and it is interlinked with efforts to support the countries of the 
region consolidate, and where mandatory re‐establish, state authority, the rule of law and good 
governance across their territories as a strategy to prevent the menace of transnational terrorism in the 
region (Bérangère, 2011). 
4.2.4. Global Level of Responses to Threat of Transnational Terrorism by State and Non-state 
policy makers 
Given that the total amount of the menace as well as its’ increasingly transnational nature, the war 
against terrorism is being pursued at the local, regional and global levels. At the height of the 
multilateral response lies the UN system. Policy makers observe that even though certain member states 
72 | P a g e  
 
have often taken the front lead, the role played by regional organizations, intergovernmental agencies 
and member states is essential to assess the coherence and effectiveness of the overall multilateral 
efforts to counter transnational terrorism (Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 2015:8). 
Counterterrorism has been on the agenda of the United Nations for decades and it is said that the 
organization remains the best positioned in terms of coordinating overall global counterterrorism 
efforts. Eighteen universal instruments against transnational terrorism have been amended within the 
framework of the UN system and member states through the General Assembly (GA) have been 
increasingly coordinating their counterterrorism strategies (Independent Commission on 
Multilateralism, 2015: 9).  
The UN General Assembly and the Security Council are two principal organs of the UN system that are 
engaged with the formulation of counterterrorism norms and mandates. The General Assembly has 
traditionally been primarily the norm-setting organ, the Security Council has broadened its role in the 
post 9/11 period, when it comes to the establishment of counter-terrorism mandates and measures for 
all UN member states to implement (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:13). However, 
the Security Council remains at the forefront of efforts to combat transnational terrorism, even though 
it is important to point out that the General Assembly, along with other UN bodies have launched their 
initiatives to counter terrorism before the Security Council emerged as a dominant player on the scene 
in the aftermath of September 11. To consolidate these sets of attempts the UN Secretary-General 
established in 2005, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to enhance 
coordination and coherence of counterterrorism activities within the UN system. At the moment, the 
CTITF includes thirty entities that range from the Interpol to the World Health Organization (WHO). 
This is an indication of the coordination and harmonization challenges that trans-governmental actors 
encounter as they work under a broadened definition of counterterrorism. In this way, the 
counterterrorism strategy and the CTITF function as an operational bridge linking intergovernmental 
political decisions with their implementation panels at the technical and trans-governmental level 
(Millar, 2010). 
4.2.4.1. Security Council 
The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001, which established 
certain mandatory requirements on all UN member states (UN Doc, 2001). By virtue of the mandatory 
requirements of the Resolution, each individual UN member state is obligated to establish a prescribed 
legal framework in its domestic laws and to create necessary institutions for preventing and combating 
terrorism and to cooperate fully with other nations on a global scale in these efforts (UN Office of the 
Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:18). Accordingly, drawing from Resolution 1373, the Security Council 
further made the implementation of certain anti-terrorism requirements compulsory on all states 
including the requirement that UN member states prevent the financing and other forms of support to 
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terrorists. Other requirements include denying terrorists safe havens; make acts of terrorism extraditable 
offences; formulate the necessary legal framework and operational mechanism to provide mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters with regards to acts of terrorism. Lastly, all member states became parties 
to and implement the provisions of the 12 anti-terrorism conventions and protocols (UN Office of the 
Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:19). 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Security Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
under Resolution 1373, whose main objective was to increase the ability of member states to combat 
terrorism. To assist the CTCs function, the Security Council through its Resolution 1535 set up a 
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTCED), with the responsibility to monitor the 
implementation of Resolution 1373 and to facilitate the provisions of technical assistance to member 
states (UN Doc, 2004).  
4.2.4.2. General Assembly and other UN Functional Organs 
UN member states on September 2006 embarked on a new phase in their counterterrorism efforts by 
agreeing on a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) in the General Assembly. This strategy 
signaled for the first time the coming together of all UN member nations on a common strategic and 
operational framework that is designed to combat terrorism. The strategy formed the basis for a concrete 
plan of action that endeavoured to address the conditions that were conducive to the spread of terrorism; 
to prevent and fight terrorism; to take the necessary measures to build state capacity that is sufficient to 
fight terrorism. Furthermore, to strengthen the role of the UN in fighting terrorism and to ensure the 
respect of human rights in the counterterrorism process (Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 
2015). In order to deal with the underlying conditions and root causes of transnational terrorism, the 
UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established programs to encourage 
interreligious and cultural dialogues and also the promotion of moderate perspectives in educational, 
religious and cultural institutions so as to prevent these institutions from becoming platforms of 
incitement and recruitment of terrorists.  
The UN Development Program (UNDP) also played a vital role in supporting strategic linkages between 
the civil society and the private sector. The UNDP supported the UN member states in constructive 
engagements with the states that were dissatisfied and were prone to violence. It also promoted political 
and social inclusion as a means of helping to address grievances. In this way, the UNDP plays an 
inherent role between security and development and in counter terrorism capacity building mechanisms 
(Millar, 2010).  
4.2.4.3. UN System Countering Terrorism Implementation in Africa 
At the height of the deadly terrorist attacks that killed more than 200 people in Nigeria, the UN Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UNCTITF) unveiled three projects under the Integrated 
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Assistance for Counter-Terrorism (I-ACT) initiative to support government efforts in combating the 
menace of terrorism. Through the I-ACT, the CTITF provided partner nations with holistic and country-
specific assistance projects to support the integrated implementation of UN global counter-terrorism 
strategy. Madagascar, Nigeria and Burkina Faso were the first partnering member states to officially 
request to be considered for assistance within the strategy as part of the I-ACT Initiative (United 
Nations, 2002:1). Hence, the UN system, especially the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)/ Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTCED) is responsible for evaluating and assessing the 
level of implementation by African states of Security Council mandates.  
This process, started in 2002 and included the facilitation of technical assistance through identification 
and assessment of the needs facing each African state, including embarking on individual country visits 
and encouraging donor nations and functional organizations to develop and deliver technical assistance 
programs that match the needs of countries (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006: 13). 
 As part of this process, the UN CTC/CTED collaborated with the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC)/ Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) and other partners to develop counterterrorism 
technical assistance programs that suited the requirements of African states. The UNODC/TPB was 
developed as the primary UN assistance provider in 2002, with the task of meeting the demands for 
legislative drafting assistance to many African states that were seeking technical assistance from the 
CTC in drafting their anti-terrorism legislations. As such, the UNODC/TPB launched its Global Project 
on Strengthening Legal Regime against Terrorism in 2003. Its role was to help a number of African 
countries enact anti-terrorism legislations so as to enable them to ratify and implement international 
anti-terrorism instruments.  Its role also included providing training to criminal justice professions in a 
number of countries (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006: 13). 
The CTC/CTED and UNODC/TPB have been engaged in assessing the threats of terrorism and Africa’s 
vulnerability to transnational terrorism and related crimes. They have engaged in facilitating programs 
that develop effective counterterrorism capacities of African states. In addition, bilateral partnerships 
especially with the US have focused on military-policy security capacity building efforts, which 
included the strengthening of border control capacities. Despite all these efforts more still needs to be 
done because addressing problems and deficiencies of such programs is often constrained by African 
states’ lack of capacity to absorb available assistance measures. Policy makers are of the view that there 
was the need for institutional capacity building at a state, sub-regional and continental level before 
matters could be channeled at the global level (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2006:25). 
4.3. Kenya: Case Study Analysis 
Kenya has long been the victim of transnational terrorism. The country’s proximity to Somalia and the 
Middle East initially created a haven for transnational terrorist groups to penetrate the country. Prior to 
the US led global war on terror (GWOT), little consideration was given to these syndicates. The first 
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incident of transnational terrorism in the country was the January 28, 1976 plot by the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Baader-Meinhof group’s attempt to shoot down an Israeli 
EL Al passenger plane during its schedules stopover in Nairobi (Mogire and Agade, 2011:474). Since 
these incidents, Kenya has been a target of transnational terrorism because of a combination of 
dynamics that range from geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and socio-cultural 
factors.  
The country also remains the prime target of transnational terrorism because it has substantial Western 
interests since its hosts the headquarters of the UN Environmental Program and the UN Habitat 
Program. There are also numerous Western embassies and several international businesses (Princeton 
Lyman cited in Harberson, 2013). Nonetheless, policy makers observe that the immediate causes of 
terrorist attacks in Kenya stem from a variety of reasons firstly, from its close relationship with Israel 
and Western nations, in particular the United States. Secondly, from its vibrant coastal beach tourism 
industry, which is perceived by the local Muslim population as a threat to its culture. Thirdly, from the 
perception that the country’s majority Christian population is an obstacle to the Islamization of Eastern 
Africa, fourthly, from local socio-economic inequalities and finally, from weak security institutions 
coupled by porous borders (Otiso, 2009:107).   
Kenya is among one of only two Sub-Saharan African countries to be directly affected by the present 
upsurge of transnational terror activities in the world, the other being Tanzania. In 1998, both countries 
suffered terrorist attacks that targeted US Embassy buildings in their capital cities and collectively 
claimed the lives of some 250 people and injured close to 5,000 others (Muendo, 2003). Since those 
attacks, Kenya has been witnessing a wave of transnational terror attacks, as in 2002 another al-Qaeda 
orchestrated terror attack targeted an Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in the coastal city of Mombasa, 
killing 13 people and injuring dozens others.  
Again, in September 2013, Al-Shabaab militias attacked Nairobi’s West Gate Shopping Mall, which is 
mostly populated by foreign nationals’, killing close to 80 people most of them local Kenyans and other 
foreigners from the UK, France, India, China, Ghana, South African, Canada etc. Reports suggested 
that hundreds were injured and a further 27 people were reported missing by Kenyan authorities and 
the Al-Shabaab group, publicly claimed responsibilities for the attack, by citing that it was a response 
to Kenya’s military presence in Somalia (US Department of State, 2013). Other terror incidents in the 
country have occurred almost simultaneously, since after the mall attacks. The June 2014 attack in 
Mpeketoni led to 68 deaths, in July the Lamu attacks claimed 29 lives, and in November, a bus attacked 
in Mandera killed 28 people. This was followed by another attack in December also in Mandera, which 
took the lives of 36 quarry workers. In April 2015, an attack on the Garissa University College left more 
than 148 students dead (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Report (KNCHR), September 
2015: 3).   
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4.3.1. Analysis of Immediate Causes of Transnational Terrorism in Kenya  
4.3.1.1. Close links with Israel and Western Nations  
Kenya’s links with the West commenced with the arrival of Portuguese in the late 1400s and was 
strengthened by the colonial and post-colonial period exchanges (Were and Wilson, 1968). Since 
independence, Kenya has associated itself with Western nations and this geopolitical standpoint has 
resulted in beneficial economic and technological aid flows that have advanced many aspects of the 
country’s developmental agenda. In addition to this, the country’s numerous tourist attraction sites have 
made the country a major magnet for western tourists (Otiso, 2009:111). Many western countries and 
businesses operate their Sub-Sahara activities from Kenya because of the country’s relatively developed 
infrastructure, financial systems and booming economy.  The country also hosts headquarters of UN 
agencies and is also a recipient of large western investments (Soke, 2003).    
Another geopolitical factor that renders the country vulnerable to transnational terrorism is its close ties 
with Israel, a country that is perceived by many Muslims around the world as illegitimate because of its 
persecution and occupation of Palestinian people and its lands (Maina, 2004 and Harman, 2002). The 
primary grievance of al-Qaeda against the United States is its diplomatic support of Israel at the expense 
of Palestinians. Thus, it is not surprising that Kenya’s long pro-Israeli stance is viewed by al-Qaeda as 
evidence of the country’s support of US policy in the Middle East (Soke, 2003).   
4.3.1.2. Kenya’s vibrant Coastal Beach Tourism Industry 
The country’s lively tourism industry has also contributed to its vulnerability to transnational terrorist 
attacks. This is because, tourism as it is practiced in the country’s coastal beaches is said by policy 
makers to be at odds with the local Islamic culture and customs. For example, Islam forbids women 
from showing their bodies publicly and it’ also forbids the consumption of alcohol. However, in 
Kenya’s coastal beaches, women tourists walk around barely dressed and alcohol is freely served in 
many tourist bars. In addition, tourism is said to have contributed to high incidents of prostitution and 
drug consumption in the country (Otiso, 2009: 112).   
Another weakness of tourism in Kenya’s coastal region is that it has not benefited the local people, in 
particular the Muslims who make up the majority. Most tourist facilities are either state owned or 
belonging to foreign investors. These facilities are also Western oriented whereas most locals practice 
Arabized Islamic lifestyle and lack the necessary skills such as knowledge of English language that 
could enables them to work in the western dominated tourism industry (Eastman, 1995:177).  As a 
result, anti-tourism sentiments by some locals has made it easier for groups like al-Qaeda to infiltrate 
the area in the guise of providing solutions to poverty and local Islamic cultural attrition (Otiso, 
2009:112).  
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4.3.1.3. Religious Contestation for Regional Supremacy  
One of the reasons Kenya is vulnerable to transnational terrorism stems from the contest between Islam 
and Christianity for spiritual domination in Sub-Saharan Africa (Potter, 2003). While most countries in 
the Horn and East of Africa have Muslim majority citizens, Kenya stands out as the only Christian 
dominated country with a relatively large economy (Potter, 2003). This creates a serious backlash to 
Muslims who desire a larger role in the regions’ affairs by perhaps offering Sharia (Islamic Law) as a 
solution to the region’s socio-economic challenges (IPS, April 15, 2004). Thus, terrorist attacks in the 
country, above and beyond targeting mainly US and Israeli interests, were orchestrated to strengthen 
the Muslim perspectives in the country’s national affairs (Mbogo, 2003). This is to enable the terrorists 
aid the cause of Islam in the country and in the region, since Kenya has the largest economy in the 
whole East African region (Mbogo, 2003).  
4.3.1.4. Local tensions stemming from Socio-Economic Inequalities 
Muslims make up about a tenth of Kenya’s population, and they reside primarily in the Northeast and 
along the coast. These communities mostly lag behind in economic prosperity, due to limited public 
and private investment, which gives rise to local tensions and instabilities. The coastal populations have 
been marginalized politically and socio-economically since colonial periods, which created an 
environment of non-existent social services and poverty in the area (Cronin, 2002:38). This spatial 
unequal development process initiated by the colonial regime has been further emphasized by the 
respective post-independence governments with most investment resources being concentrated in the 
Central and Rift Valley provinces that have the bulk of the country’s socioeconomic and political elites 
(Eastman, 1995; Foeken, Hoorweg and Obudho, 2000:7). 
Moreover, the Northeastern region bordering Somalia, which is an area equal to the size of Mississippi, 
has less than 100 miles of tarred roads. Kenyan-Somali clan conflict and mayhem have often led to past 
conflicts in the region, including the 1980 Garissa massacre and the 1984 Wagalla massacre, which 
resulted in the deaths of over 4,000 ethnic Somalis (The Equal Rights Trust, 2012: 44).  
4.3.1.5. Weak Security and problem of Porous Borders 
The role of counterterrorism increased sharply in Kenya since 11 September, 2001. The operation to 
counter terrorism was not however, a new concept and to be exact, counterterrorism units existed both 
in law enforcement and intelligence spheres prior to 9/11. Funding and support from the more 
experienced Western partners has also boosted its counterterrorism measures (Mogire and Agade, 
2011). The siege at Garissa University lasted nearly 15 hours, yet security forces were only deployed 7 
hours after the attack began, and they did not enter the university premises until 11 hours had passed. 
Despite new security laws passed in 2011 to refurbish the police, intelligence and defense forces in 
Kenya, not much progress has been made (Gettleman and Kushkush, 2015:1). 
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Likewise, porous border assisted transnational terror groups like Al-Shabaab to target Kenya more 
easily. This is because the country shares a long, remote, sparsely populated and poorly protected 
borders with Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia. All of these countries have to 
some extent varying degrees of political instability that undermined their ability to provide for their 
citizen’s basic needs especially safety and security and to protect their territorial integrity. Kenya is 
home to refugees mostly from surrounding states such as Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia. Kenya’s 
limited financial and human resources further undermines its ability to better police her borders. This 
has added to the country’s inability to prevent the smuggling of weapons and terrorist entrance into the 
country (Soke, 2003 and Somerville, 2002). However, among all the neighboring countries, Somalia is 
the most dangerous in terms of security, and because besides sharing a 700-kilometer boundary that is 
hardly policed, this border area has been a conflict zone since the colonial era (Weiss, 2004).  
4.3.2 Kenyan Policy Responses to Threats of Transnational Terrorism 
Kenya is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREAC) program 
and is also a strong ally of the United States in the fight against transnational terrorism. The country’s 
cooperation with the US and other partner nations remains strong. The Kenyan government has 
welcomed substantial US counterterrorism assistance in the aftermath of the Westgate attacks and has 
requested additional support on border security and other counter terrorism initiatives (US Department 
of State, 2013). In the wake of the threats of transnational terrorism to the country’s security and 
stability, Kenya has passed numerous counterterrorism legislations. The Prevention of Organized of 
Crime Act of 2010, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2011 and the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 2012, which was re-amended in 2013, to strengthen the criminalization and 
financing acts of terrorism (US Department of State, 2013). 
As a further response to the menace of transnational terrorism, Kenya participated in a range of US 
government counterterrorism sponsored programs in 2013. The first of these was the US Department 
of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program that was intended to build the country’s law enforcement 
capacities in the areas of border security, investigations and crisis responses. It was also intended for 
the institutionalization of counterterrorism prevention and response capabilities. In addition, the US 
Department of States’ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Assistance was 
primarily intended to build the capacity of Kenya’s new Independent Police Accountability Office. 
Lastly, the US Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Patrol Assistance focused on 
providing multinational training for rural border patrol units such as those in the Kenyan Police Service 
and the Kenyan Wildlife Service. In terms of countering the financing of terrorism, Kenya is a member 
of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), which is a Financial 
Action Task Force Style (FATFS) regional body. Kenya contributed significant troops to the Africa 
Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The country also hosted numerous training campaigns involving 
79 | P a g e  
 
law enforcement professionals from neighboring states in order to build counterterrorism capacities and 
to increase regional cooperation (US Department of State, 2013). 
4.4. Preliminary Conclusion 
In summary, there are numerous reasons that gave rise to the menace of transnational terrorism in Africa 
and they pose a serious threat to the continent’s security and stability. The nature of the African state 
itself is responsible for making the continent vulnerable to transnational terrorist activities.  Repressive 
rules, violent and exploitative nature that characterizes most of the African states were inherited from 
the colonial administration. Secondly, failed and weak states have been cited by scholars and policy 
makers as responsible for transnational terrorism. The failure of most African states has incapacitated 
them from providing adequate safety and security to the citizens. These states could not guarantee 
economic development for the advancement of the state. Transnational terror organizations use the 
domestic crisis in most African states to shield themselves from effective counterterrorism policies 
issued by domestic states and by international state and non-state actors. Porous borders and large 
ungoverned lands such as those in the Sahara-Sahel region provides safe havens for terrorist to 
coordinate their activities because there are no security or law enforcement agencies to counter their 
activities. Weak maritime security control promotes the proliferation of illegal weapons and other 
devices that terrorists use when planning their attacks due to lack of port securities to monitor the 
African coastline. In this way, they are able to use the sea as an entry point. Moreover, poorly trained 
and underpaid government officials can also become corrupted by terror groups and individuals seeking 
entry by giving them huge sums of money in order to attain legal documents like passports and visas. 
In addition to this, government officials lacking internal security might be able to promised protection 
by terrorist groups in exchange for immunity from foreign governments that are interested in addressing 
threats of transnational terrorism through the issuing of terror alert lists.  
Socioeconomic conditions such as starvation, injustices and repression attract terror organizations 
because such conditions create a society where people have nothing to lose from obeying or disobeying 
the rules of the country. This gives transnational terrorist organizations the upper hand in terms of 
gaining new recruits from the impoverished youth looking for any earnings to support their families. 
Africa’s geopolitical location also makes the continent vulnerable to threats of transnational terrorism 
because the continent sits at the crossroad between the ISIL and al-Qaeda. 
The groups are competing for influence and recruitment in the African region. It should be noted that 
former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had a dreaming of seeing the establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate that would extend from Morocco in the Atlantic Ocean to Pakistan in the Indian border. 
Violent religious influence also adds another dynamic to Africa’s vulnerability because approximately 
half of the continent’s population is Muslim. Radical Muslim clerics and businessmen have built 
mosques and madrassas in much of Africa where they have preached anti-Western messages among 
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their followers. In terms of responding to threats of transnational terrorism, the United State has taken 
the lead through its global war on terror (GWOT). African countries, the African Union, European 
Union and the United Nations system have all played their parts trying to counter the menace of 
transnational terrorism to Africa’s security and stability. However, given the pervasiveness of the threat, 
one might conclude by asserting that more still need to be done to address and prevent the menace not 
only in Africa but globally because terrorism is a global phenomenon that affects all corners of the 
world, directly or indirectly. 
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                                                               Chapter Five 
Implications of Transnational Terrorism on Africa’s Security and Stability 
and Conclusion 
Transnational terrorism present one of the most pressing challenges the twenty first century has ever 
seen. Its activities have had global impacts and seek to redefine the international state system by 
establishing new forms of state regimes that are based on radical religious doctrines. In this way, not 
only does transnational terrorism undermines the strength and capacity of the state, but it further affects 
the critical relationship between the state and society. This is because the implications of transnational 
terrorism have expanded along the numerous borderlines of Africa states, consequently affecting the 
security and stability of the continent and its citizens, through augmenting the proliferation of artilleries, 
large-scale immigration, economic and security backlashes, inciting public fear, forged documentation 
and religious tensions within societies. There is an increasing call by policy makers on state and no-
state actors from national, regional and global levels to formulate counter-terror strategies that would 
prevent and eliminate the menace of transnational terrorism in Africa and the world at large (Bamidele, 
2014:2). 
5.1. Implications of Transnational Terrorism on Africa’s Security and Stability 
5.1.1. Implications of Transnational Terrorism 
The implications of terrorism on the African continent is that transnational terror networks erode state 
legitimacy by encouraging corruption, infiltrating of state structures and competing with the state for 
the provision of public services. This is because transnational terror organizations often operate with 
creativity and skill by taking advantage of any opportunity that arises to pursue their goals. They can 
achieve this through their rational strategy of exploiting societal divisions and forming relationships 
with actors that are hostile to the state such as rebel groups or extremist militants such as Al-Shabaab 
and Boko Haram. They can also achieve this goal by exploiting opportunities where state structures can 
be easily conscripted for political gain and this is often the case in African states where the rule of law 
is weaker and citizens cannot hold their government accountable, thus increasing instability fears and 
security gabs within states (Bamidele, 2014:4).  
Another implication of transnational terrorism on Africa’s security and stability is that, transnational 
terrorist organizations are expanding the connection lines of instability and security threats by including 
the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This is because violent deaths from armed 
conflicts have been gradually decreasing since the demise of the Cold War. In some African countries, 
death rates due to transnational terror activities are higher than those previously experienced during the 
continent’s era of armed conflicts (Human Rights Watch, 2003).  
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Transnational terrorism activities affect more than half of all African states. However much remains 
unknown about this phenomenon’s triangular relationship with states that are considered fragile or have 
experienced violent armed conflicts at least once or twice in their history. Yet, these states are so 
prevalent in the continent. For scholars, these sorts of states tend to display high capacity deficits, weak 
governmental institutions, internal divisions, insufficient infrastructure, subgroup hostility towards the 
state, high poverty rates and substantial reliance on nongovernmental and traditional institutions. These 
conditions have created ideal environments for transnational terrorism. Nevertheless, the presence of 
transnational terrorists in these states also threatens the very process of nation-building that is needed 
to address threats to national security (Stewart, 2011). 
As transnational terrorism becomes more prevalent in African states with severe governance deficits 
and contested political settlements, a little focus on law and order assistance is not only insufficient, but 
it may actually be inexpedient. The justice systems are often completely counterproductive while local 
security forces are often associated with history of predatory and abusive behavior. Similarly, 
augmenting the strength of the systems that are already oriented against equitable, fair and legitimate 
treatment for the majority of the citizens, could provide reasons for renewed violence or the backlash 
of a population that may perceive state actions to be biased and crackdown on transnational terrorists 
to be a camouflage for further marginalization of specific groups (Bamidele, 2014:5). 
Another implication of transnational terror organizations in Africa is that they have established Islamist 
operations in the continent so that they can exploit the tensions between the seemingly unified African 
societies (Albert, 2005). This is because al-Qaeda has for some time longed for an active establishment 
or acquisition of an active affiliate in Africa. In a magazine published in 12 June 2006, by a group that 
was then known as al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, the author Abu Azzam al-Ansari was quite upfront about 
the intensions of al-Qaeda and the holy warriors to disturb Africa’s security and stability by appreciating 
the significance of the African region for the military campaigns against the Crusaders.  He argued that 
the continent has not yet found its proper and expected role in the international system (Alli, 2012). It 
was predicted then that the next stage of war against transnational terrorism would see Africa as the 
battlefield for global dominance between transnational terror organizations and western states (Alli, 
2012). 
Another implication of transnational terrorism in Africa is that transnational terror networks compete 
with the state in various levels. They can provide services for the populations that would otherwise be 
provided by the state. Transnational terror groups like Hezbollah in Central Africa Republic, Tuareg 
Fighters in the Sahara-Sahel region, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, have all 
competed for popular support in part by providing services to people. In the continent, militias are 
considered more legitimate than the state and assume roles as varied as settling disputes and providing 
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welfare services (Krueger, 2008).  In this context, the legitimacy of the state is eroded because 
transnational terror groups have become more effective service providers.  
The final implication of the threat of terrorism on the African state is that, regionally transnational terror 
activities are transforming the regional system, overturning the rules governing states, creating new 
histories and reconfiguring power in regional politics and economics (Enders, Sandler and Gailulleov, 
2011). Transnational terrorists also buy off government officials so that they can give them space or 
consent to carry out their operations. This increases security and instability fears because transnational 
terror groups operate under state jurisdiction and are immune to state protection from threatened 
countries and intergovernmental organizations (Annan and Danso, 2013).   
5.1.2. Implications of Responses to Transnational Terrorism  
After the United States declared the global war on terror (GWOT), Muslims in East Africa faced human 
rights violations under new and intrusive legislations such as Tanzania’s Prevention of Terrorism Act 
of 2002. The law was passed despite the fact that its provisions ran counter to the human and civil rights 
guarantees of the country’s constitution. Similarly, Kenya’s Suppression of Terrorism Bill of 2002 
granted sweeping powers to the police and security forces to prosecute acts of terrorism. These 
counterterrorism laws were criticized by the Muslim groups with the complaints that they faced 
intensified surveillance. This created conditions of insecurity and fear among many, given that they 
could be arrested, searched, interrogated and detained without regard to due process or recognition of 
their human rights (Amnesty International, 2001).  
5.1.3. Recommendations on Implications of Transnational Terrorism 
In their efforts to combat transnational terrorism, regional governments and the African Union (AU) 
should reach out to and engage with societies that were mainly affected by threats of transnational 
terrorism rather than sidelining them and potentially driving them underground. For instance, by 
expanding the options for legitimate, regulated employment, national governments can reduce 
motivations for citizens to engage in the informal sector by increasing economic viability and 
strengthening resistance to infiltrations by transnational terrorists (Bamidele, 2014:3). 
Secondly, by strengthening collaboration between state parties and social networks at the local level, 
domestic governments and regional organizations can more effectively gather information on shifting 
patterns of terrorism, understand vulnerability and be able to identify opportunities for building 
resilience to the menace of transnational terrorism (Bamidele, 2014:3). 
Thirdly, given the scope of the threat posed by transnational terrorism on Africa’s security and stability, 
a more effective strategy is needed in circumstances where transnational terrorism intersects with other 
pressing issues. State fragility, armed conflicts and HIV/AIDS pandemic, should be addressed by the 
governments of African states. Fourthly, regional cooperation and law and order interventions must 
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form part of the larger counterterrorism strategy that takes into account the political, economic and 
social realities. In the long-run, building and reinforcing the connections between state and society in 
failed and weak states will be essential to undermining transnational terrorism and ensuring lasting 
security and stability in the continent (Bamidele, 2014:3).  
Finally, domestic governments should supplement any effort directed at combating transnational 
terrorism with community engagement and reform efforts that emphasize accountability loops to ensure 
that they are not undermining long-term peace building and maintenance security and order. Regional 
actors should also encourage accountability and community engagement among their partners 
(Bamidele, 2014:5).   
5.2. Conclusion 
Trans-African countries must create operational mechanisms to combat the menace of transnational 
terrorism and other factors that are conducive to the spread of transnational terrorism. They should 
develop sub-regional structures to coordinate their efforts because this type of partnership has the 
capacity to expand across all corners of the continent. The international community has also shown 
willingness to combat the threat of transnational terrorism on Africa’s security and stability by 
providing civil and military assistant projects to train and equip states and security forces on the menace 
of transnational terrorism. Africa should adopt a holistic approach to terrorism that assesses the root 
causes of the phenomenon and addresses the relationships between domestic and transnational 
terrorism.  
There is no doubt that transnational terrorism is one of the malicious phenomenon facing humanity in 
the twenty first century. Global cooperation is perhaps the most effective approach in the fight against 
the problem of transnational terrorist activities. It is also important for Africa and the international 
community to recognize that there is no instant solution and remedy to prevent the phenomenon but 
what is required is collaboration and sharing of information by all UN member parties in the hope that 
collective action is more effective than individual action.  
5.2.1. Analyzing Policy Reactions to Conceptualizing Transnational Terrorism in Africa 
Scholars and academics need to formulate an agreed upon definition of terrorism so that it could be 
easy for policy makers to come up with effective counterterrorism responses. The development of 
transnational terrorism should be studied and understood in historical context because terrorism is a 
well-established strategy. At the moment there is no universally agreed upon definition as to what is 
terrorism or who is a terrorist and this creates problems for policymakers in terms of formulating 
counterterrorism strategies. This is because one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. In its 
earliest forms, terrorism in Africa was conceived in the context of political violence given that at most 
part the struggle for liberation was rooted in acts of political violence. However, when colonial 
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administrations used political violence to suppress opposition their actions were not classified as state 
sponsored terrorism but as legitimate national security measures. This shows biasness in the early 
conceptualization of the term terrorism in Africa.  
Even international actors like the United States classified liberation movements as terrorist 
organizations that posed a threat to international security and stability. It has also been observed that 
non-violence struggles no matter how moral it may sound, cannot be the only universal standard of 
action that oppressed people can resort to in order to liberate themselves from repressive regimes. The 
experiences of almost all African histories clearly demonstrate that political violence is sometimes 
justifiable to liberate oneself form the scourge of colonial oppression. 
5.2.2. The Birth of Transnational Terrorism in Africa 
This study has found that transnational terrorism in Africa is linked to three historical periods that 
evolved from the time Africans first came into contact with outside peoples namely the Arabian 
merchants and slave traders, the European colonizers and slave traders and lastly the colonialization of 
Africa. The first epoch, saw sub-Saharan Africans coming into contact with Arabian merchants and 
missionaries who terrorized local peoples in search of slave and this epoch marked the beginning of 
slave trade in Africa. The second epoch also witnessed the arrival of European colonizers who also 
terrorized and brutally shipped millions of Africans into what famously became known as the ‘’Atlantic 
slave trade``. Nonetheless, the last epoch of historical evolution of transnational terrorism in Africa is 
somehow different from the two epochs in that it was a continuation of the second stage, the instigation 
of colonialism and the scramble of the continent into European colonies. Africa during this stage was 
partitioned into British, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and German colonies and native Africans 
were made to feel the sense of second-class citizenship in their own fatherland. 
5.2.3. Varieties of Terrorism and Policy Responses to Transnational Terrorism 
The study has noted that there are different types of terrorism in the world that include transnational, 
international, domestic, state terror, right-wing and separatist terrorism. However, for the purpose of 
this study we focused our attention on transnational terrorism because this type of terror is said by policy 
makers to be carried out by independent actors that can be state or non-state in nature such as Boko 
Haram, al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. Even individuals like Osama bin Laden, regardless of support from 
sympathetic states actors and whose instrument of resolve together with its implications surpass national 
boundaries of sovereign states (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2010:6).  
Scholarly attempts to understand transnational terrorism has been growing among social researchers 
since the late 1960’s when the phenomenon assumed its transnational character and policymakers 
asserts that there are five main categories of counterterrorism policies that can be employed by African 
policy makers  in order to assist their attempts to counter the menace of transnational terrorism on the 
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continent’s security and stability and these include proactive, coercive, persuasive, defensive and long-
term counter terror policies. Of all counterterror strategies, Proactive policies are the one’s often 
preferred by policy makers and they include attacking terrorist bases, assassinating their top leaders, 
freezing terrorist assets and gathering and sharing crucial security information. We have observed that 
Kenya’s decision to launch a military operation against Al-Shabaab inside Somalia is part of this 
strategy. 
The study found that coercive counterterrorism policies rely heavily on the state’s capacity to use force 
as the American experience reveals that for US policymakers the attacks of 9/11 were signs that al-
Qaeda with the help of the Taliban government was at war with the US, hence the decision to declare 
war on Afghanistan was justified on those premises. Persuasive policy approaches on the other hand 
draw mostly from liberal doctrines that emphasize on soft elements of persuasion and diplomacy in 
order to understand and deal with the issues that underpin the use of terrorism in social and political 
life. Defensive or passive counterterrorism approaches rely on the realist principle of self-help in which 
individual states create mechanisms to protect their critical infrastructures from possible terrorist 
threats, such as increasing police patrols on the street etc. Finally, the study found that long-term 
counterterrorism policy is mostly favored by intergovernmental organization like the African Union 
(AU), European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) in order to promote communication and build 
trust between policy makers and societies in which terrorist groups operate in order to address the 
complexity of the environment in which terrorism develops and advances. 
5.2.4. Investigating the Roots and Responses to Transnational Terrorism in Africa: A case of 
Kenya  
5.2.4.1. The Roots of Transnational Terrorism in Africa 
The study has found that there are combinations of factors that make Africa vulnerable to threats of 
transnational terrorism and these include Africa’s geopolitical location, failed and predatory states, 
religious fundamentalism and social-economic conditions. Failed and predatory states are founded to 
render Africa vulnerable to transnational terrorism because they create an enabling environment for 
transnational terrorist organizations to operate, due to their weak security, porous borders, inefficient 
governance, high corruption and economic inequality rates and the general chaos resulting in lack of 
effective rule of law and often easy access to weaponries. 
The study has also found that the geography of Africa plays a huge role in rendering the continent 
vulnerable to transnational terrorism, especially if one considers the continent’s close proximity to some 
of the world’s war stricken country’s like Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 
(ISIL) has publicly shown interests in establishing an Islamic Caliphate that would link Africa with the 
Middle East. Also the presence of al-Qaeda in Somalia through its regional affiliates Al-Shabaab and 
in North Africa through al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIL’s presence through Boko 
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Haram and other militant affiliates mostly in North Africa, increases the threats of transnational 
terrorism on Africa’s security and stability because globalization through technological advancements 
has made it easier for such groups to share information and cooperate internally and with other groups 
in order to secure geographic access and acquire the necessary weapons for conducting their clandestine 
operations. Poverty and is another factor which facilitates the recruitment by al-Qaeda of extremists 
predominantly among Africa’s youth (Yousifi, 2006:1). 
Killing in the name of religion has been practiced by groups throughout the world for many centuries 
from the Jewish Zealots, to the Assassins and to the Crusaders. However, in contemporary politics the 
growing importance of religion as political tool to address socio-political grievances has raised concerns 
because religion has a tendency to transcend national borders and racial lines. Africa over the few years 
has been witnessing transnational terror based on religious intolerance for instance Al-Shabaab attacks 
in Kenya have been mainly directed at Christian civilians and Boko Haram has at times targeted 
Christian churches and villages in part of northern Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon and this has raised 
security and stability issues because Africa is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. 
5.2.4.2. Responses to Threats of Transnational Terrorism 
5.2.4.2.1. Responses at the Individual Level of Analysis  
State and non-state actors have responded to threats of transnational terrorism in Africa from all levels 
of analysis and policy makers have asserted that the menace of transnational terrorism in the African 
continent cannot be confronted from an intelligence and law-enforcement approach only, but it requires 
counterterrorism (CT) strategies that promotes cooperation in all spheres from societal, to governance, 
to regional bodies and to intergovernmental agencies. It also requires programs that enhance socio-
economic development, good governance and democracy and the promotion of human rights and social 
inclusion. Following 9/11 events, the Bush administration has been active in strengthening 
counterterrorism policies in Africa. In his capacity as the President of the United States George W. 
Bush, has funded many counterterrorism projects throughout Africa and some of his major counterterror 
projects include the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and has introduced counterterror cooperation relationships with 
countries like South Africa, Ghana, Uganda and Namibia.  
Taking over from President Bush, President Obama has also done his part to eliminate the threat of 
transnational terrorism in the continent by donating $5 billion to assist in the training and equipping of 
foreign governments including those in Africa for counterterrorism programs. The study has also found 
that the Obama administration also created the Counter-Terrorism Partnerships Fund with the aim of 
adding more currency and a new name to an already existing account of security cooperation programs 
with the African continent. President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya also in his part, has established socio-
economic programs that targeted mostly poverty stricken regions of Kenya such as the coastal region 
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in order to equip the youth of the area with skills in the hope that they will refrain from becoming Al-
Qaeda recruits. The administration of Kenyatta has also launched military operations against Al-
Shabaab following attacks in Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, Garissa University, Lamu, Mandera etc. 
5.2.4.2.2. Responses at the State Level of Analysis  
African states and their United States counter parts have responded to threats of transnational terrorism 
form all levels of analysis. We have already highlighted counterterror responses made by the US in the 
continent through its successive governments and African governments have also played their parts in 
attempting to eliminate and prevent the menace of transnational terrorism. The study also found Kenya 
to be an active member of the global and regional counterterrorism initiatives. It has also found that one 
of the reasons for its active membership lies in its victimization by transnational terrorists. These include 
the 1998, bombing of US embassy in Nairobi, the Westgate Mall attack and the Garissa University 
attack to mention a few. Kenya in line with fellow African states has contributed troops and police 
under the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to try and ease the instability and threats of 
transnational terrorism facing that country. 
5.2.4.2.3. Responses at the Systemic Level of Analysis 
The study has found that Africa was among the first regions of the world to react to threats of 
transnational terrorism, from as early as the 1950s African states were developing counterterrorism 
strategies. In 1992, members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) met in Dakar, Senegal where 
they adopted Resolution 213 with specified objectives of strengthening cooperation and coordination 
among African states in order to heighten the effectiveness of the organization in its efforts to fight 
eliminate the threat of transnational terrorism on the continent’s security and stability. Following the 
1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, the OAU initiated in 1999 the Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism, which rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism in the continent and in 
September 2002, adopted the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Transnational 
Terrorism. It established a legal framework and a roadmap for African countries to implement 
international counterterrorism policies in accordance to the OAU Convention, as well as the 
counterterrorism tactics that were mandated by the Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 on all 
UN member states.  
The study also found that regional and sub-regional economic community (REC) organizations such as 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been vocal in their efforts to 
eliminate the threat of transnational terrorism in their region and the continent as a whole. The continent 
also has three active Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regional counterterror money laundering and 
terrorist financing bodies and these include the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (GIABA), the Middle East and North Africa 
Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
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Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). In addition, given that the Sahel-Sahara region poses immediate 
security threat on Europe, the EU executed in 2011 the Security and Development Strategy for the 
Sahel, which consisted of four components of action, namely development, good governance and 
internal conflict resolution. 
5.2.4.2.4. Responses at the Global Level of Analysis  
From a global one might say, the study found that cooperation remains the main instrument against the 
menace of transnational terrorism, because no country regardless of its might could fight the 
phenomenon alone. In this regard the United Nations through its principal organs the Security Council 
and the General Assembly has established the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) 
which was tasked with the responsibility to enhance coordination and coherence of counterterrorism 
activities within the UN system. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001, 
which established certain mandatory counterterrorism requirements on all UN member states and the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) which was tasked with the responsibility to increase the ability 
of member states to combat terrorism 
5.3. Case Study Examination 
The study has found that Kenya has been a victim of transnational terrorism as early as 1976. There is 
a combination of factors that renders it a target of transnational terrorism. These factors include its close 
relationship with Israel and other Western nations, its coastal tourism industry, religious contestation 
for regional dominance, local tensions due to socio-economic inequalities and its weak security and 
problem of uncontrolled borders. The study has also found that on record the period of 2010-2015 has 
witnessed the deadliest transnational terror incidents in the history of Kenya, with more than 300 deaths. 
There is no doubt that threats of transnational terrorism have heightened security and stability fears on 
only in Kenya but throughout Africa, because no one knows when and where the next attack will occur. 
5.4. Recommendations 
The international community must continue to increase assistance to African states in all forms, whether 
legal, institutional or logistical. A lot of caution could be done in providing assistance particularly that 
would enable the ratification of international conventions on terrorism, to train African prosecutors and 
judges to improve their legal arsenals (Yousfi, 2006:5).   
The international community should also align Africa, through the African Center for Studies and 
Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), on research activities carried out by the UN and its various 
committees on transnational terrorism.  This will assist African leaders increase security and 
intelligence awareness on the harmful effects of terrorism on the continent’s economies and societies 
(Yousfi, 2006:5). 
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The international community through the UN should support the African Union (AU) in its efforts to 
solve the current regional conflicts in order to prevent the emerging cells of terrorism from gaining 
ground in the continent. 
The international community should also assist Africans in their economic and social developmental 
processes, in order to eliminate the factors that could prompt the African youth to join transnational 
terror organizations.  
The international community should also take advantage of the lessons of African states in their struggle 
against transnational terrorism and to provide the continent with assistance needed regarding 
extraditions, mutual legal advice based on the obligation, persecute or extradite.  
In addition, the international community should support African states in the implementation of 
measures that are provided in Article 50 of the UN Charter in order to apply and respect the embargos 
on weaponry that are imposed by the UN against certain African states because of civil wars (Yousfi, 
2006:5). 
Finally, for counterterrorism strategies to thrive in the African continent, the international community 
will need to assist African governments to provide viable social and economic opportunities to their 
populace (Boudali, 2007:3).  This is necessary in order to separate the local conditions that led to social 
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